

16 WEMBER 1965

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CAS MESSAGE

FROM WASHINGTON

TO SAIGON

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S/C

REFERENCES: EMBTEL 987, 22 SEPTEMBER 1965

EMBTEL 1314, 16 OCTOBER 1965

1. DEPT OF STATE HAS ADVISED THAT THE FUNDING OF  
\$55,000 WILL BE PROCESSED THROUGH THEIR CHANNELS.

2. ASSUME NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY CAS.

END OF MESSAGE

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. § 552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 19 MAY 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 13 -M- 1346

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 19 2014

Group D  
13-M-1346

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 19 2014

CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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EYES ONLY

27 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY GILPATRICK

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Philippine Election Project

[REDACTED] Macapagal, the opposition candidate, in this November's Presidential election in the Philippines. Is this the right thing for the U.S. to do?

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

Politics and national security in the Philippines are so intimately related that the U.S. Defense establishment (our bases account for most U.S. personnel and property) has a very real stake in the decision on [REDACTED]. We need to be certain that a U.S. decision will not lead to further weakening of an already inadequate Philippine security structure. The gravity of U.S. security needs in Asia at this time dictates a realistic appraisal of the proposal prior to a decision.

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

Based upon personal experience in Philippine elections and upon study of the current situation, the following comments are offered for consideration:

a. The U.S. does not have a clean-cut choice between Macapagal and Garcia as individuals. Both present themselves to the Philippine electorate as pro-U.S. and to the U.S. government as friends.

b. Garcia is a smart ward-politician, is spending more money on the politically-rewarding things, and has a well-run organization. (He showed real skill in exploiting the recent visit of the Filipino's beloved MacArthur.) In other words, Garcia has a really good chance to win, barring the unforeseen. If he wins, and has knowledge of U.S. support to his opponent, this would place the U.S. in a bad position, during a critical era in Asia.

c. However, the problem is not that simple. Further factors carry more weight, in reality. The big question is: can the U.S. afford to permit another Garcia Administration such as the last one?

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From a national security view, the answer must be an emphatic "no." Although the present Administration includes some able persons and true U.S. friends, the end result of corruption and mal-administration has been the furthering away of the Philippine military establishment to a hollow shell (the "active" Army is down to one battalion combat team in being), the lowering of public morale to a point where there is little of political value worth a Filipino's risking life to defend, and an increase of vulnerabilities inviting illegal overthrow of the government above those of the 1950 high crisis. Further weakening of the Philippine security posture, let alone permitting the present posture to continue, should be completely unacceptable to any responsible U.S. official.

4. The need for corrective action is politically apparent. What can the U.S. do? It can either rely on the Philippine electorate to change the Administration through the ballot or undertake U.S. political action to cause the Administration to change personnel and practices. Other courses of U.S. action or inaction involve an even more politically unstable Philippines. But, the two courses open to us are not promising. The Philippine electorate is largely the captive of a skillfully rigged balloting system to circumvent one of the world's most enlightened electoral codes: U.S. support of Filipino means to help make the electoral code effective was stopped in 1955 and not given again. As for the second course, the influencing of the Administration to change its personnel and practices, U.S. reliance on pragmatic and mechanistically-applied techniques has proven to be largely ineffective.

5. Would a Maguayad victory mean some constructive political change desired by the U.S.? The answer is yes, initially. His first Cabinet undoubtedly would be composed of able and unswerving men who would start rehabilitation through some appealing and energetic programs. In the longer run, Maguayad's weaknesses as an executive and the emergence of Liberal Party stalwarts (who were quite vocal when they were last in power) would generate a downward trend again.

6. There has been considerable miscomprehension of the U.S. role in Maguayad's political victory in 1953. Emotional reaction to the U.S. part in this election is still affecting U.S. judgment, to our detriment and to the detriment of the Philippines. In this time we became more subjective and practical. Basically, the U. S. made certain that

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the 1953 election was a "free election" through truly secret balloting and an honest count, that the real issues were presented thoroughly to the electorate, and that Magsaysay had freedom to campaign. Almost all U.S. political actions and the relatively small U.S. funds were expended on just those objectives (although it was a complex operation, took 9 months of hard work, and required intimate knowledge of Philippine politics). Magsaysay's own story of receiving \$3-million dollars from the U.S. to help him campaign was untrue and was told by him only to impress political leaders into supporting him, yet, it still has currency. Since I had these U.S. funding responsibilities in 1953, I know how much smaller U.S. expenditures actually were and for what, and so do the proper U.S. fiscal authorities. The point is, we should heed the truth of the 1953 lessons and free the U.S. to play a wiser and more constructive role in the Philippines from now on. We might well concentrate on means to allow the Philippine electorate to express itself truly through the ballot box, this is an act of understanding friendship to the Filipino people and an act of faithfulness to our own heritage, if done properly.

g. As for the 1961 election, Macapagal and his party need help to insure honest inspection of the polls, effective curbs on fraud, freedom of public assemblage, and freedom of movement for candidates and political workers as authorized in the Philippine Constitution and Electoral Code. It would be good if the U.S. could do this through a non-partisan Filipino organization, but an effective organization neither exists nor could be created in time. The incumbent Garcia Administration has given ample evidence that it intends to circumvent the law; (transfers of Constabulary personnel contain the key). Thus, a minimum U.S. action should be the provision of funds, in the surest manner possible, to help Macapagal and the opposition exercise their lawful right. If this is what the sum named is for, it should be so stipulated and approved.

h. This specific funding is a minimum U.S. action. The Philippines situation requires more. Thus, it is recommended that State be asked to prepare a U.S. program of constructive political action, which should include actions which can be accomplished during the 1961 Presidential campaign, and submit this to the Group as a matter of urgency. While the NSC itself might be a more proper place to submit the program, the Group is a current focal point of U.S. attention to the problem, and is an NSC organization which is facing up to the most sensitive aspects which need resolving.



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ANNEX

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GUERRILLA WARFARE CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

1. Purpose:

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Chief, Records & Declass Div. WHS

Date: MAY 19 2014

## 2. Facts Bearing On the Problem

a. French Union - Associated States forces have officers and men experienced in partisan warfare, with both in the Maquis during WWII and against the Viet-minh. General Navarre and other general officers (including General Coquery) have the experience and capability. Former Viet-minh officers, some with years of guerrilla leadership on the same terrain to be used by friendly guerrillas, are available for employment by the Vietnamese.

b. (copy "B" here)

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50 U.S.C. § 552

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 19 MAY 2014

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Declassify:

Deny in Full:

c. (copy "C" here)

Declassify in Part: X

Reason: 3.3(b)(1)

MDR: 13-M-1346

d. (copy "d" here)

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(Service de Documentation Exterieur  
et Contre-Expionage,

e. (copy "E" here)

f. There is <sup>clearly defined</sup> no organization within the F.T.E.O. for waging guerrilla warfare in areas vital to the enemy, on a scale large enough to be effective. The <sup>existing</sup> only organization with ~~guerrilla warfare~~ <sup>or "action service"</sup> mission is the GCMA, which is under the S.D.E.C.E. (-A: The French counterpart of CIA). GCMA has made a start with several tribes, but has been a minor unit within F.T.E.O. and suffers from poor definition of command <sup>lines,</sup> and supply channels, and missions in conjunction with regular forces (not being included in operational orders). The Chief of S.D.E.C.E. is directly under both the Deputy Chief of Staff, F.T.E.O., (currently Col. Fleurent) and the High Commissioner.

g. Guerrilla warfare training is given at the GCMA school at Cap St. Jacques. Some basic jungle fighting and counter-guerrilla training is given at Vietnamese Army training centers, although the ~~the~~ instruction is not uniform.

### 3. Discussion

a. (copy "F" here)

b. (copy "G" here)

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~~d. A start has been made already in guerrilla~~

d. GCMA, which is the "action service" of S.C.E.D.E., has been working since 1951 to initiate guerrilla warfare. It has created forces in Northwest Tonkin and Central Laos intended primarily to defend their homes and not to take the offensive. These forces form a thin and scattered defense line along the outer perimeter of the Viet-minh. Total strength is estimated at 300 white and 3,000 indigenous, organized as follows:

1) (copy "I" here)

2)

3)

4)

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date:

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e. (copy J" here)

f. (copy K here)

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Date: MAY 19 2014

g. (copy L here)

h. (copy M here)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

i. The GCMA's main training center at Cap St. Jacques was visited <sup>8 July</sup> by General O'Daniel's advisee, on guerrilla warfare, accompanied by [REDACTED] and Col. Belleaux, chief of S.D.E.C.E. for the Associated States, and Major Tringnier, chief of GCMA. Although small, the training center appeared to be well organized, with excellent training aids and thorough instruction. ~~Training aids were excellent.~~ There were 50 students, radio ~~trainees~~ and 27 sabotage trainees. While this is not capacity for the training center, Col. Belleaux stated that it was a secret school for specialized training and that S.D.E.C.E. was not desirous of training large groups. He agreed, however, that cadres could be trained at the center, ~~which trained~~ (which trained) ~~all personnel~~ (GCMA officers stated that had

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trained the 8th Battalion in 45 days). Water shortages and lack of barracks ~~were~~ also used as reasons for not training large units. The staff of 22 instructors at the ~~school~~ <sup>center</sup> serve 6 months at the center, then join guerrilla or command units for a period of combat duty, for an indefinite period before returning to the center as instructors again; ~~the instructors thus~~, the instructors are combat wise and practical in their instruction. ~~Some~~ Graphs kept by the center indicated a total of 676 men trained to date, (the training period lasting from 2 to 3 months until ~~the~~ each student is adequately trained), of whom ~~the~~ about 300 are rated as "good" and useful for the full scope of guerrilla warfare. Although men are sent to the center by combat commanders to train for specific missions ~~to train~~ ("I want him to blow up a railroad tunnel"), the center gives each man a basic course in guerrilla warfare, political and psychological indoctrination, and marksmanship. The best students are singled out for special training as guerrilla leaders. Several were in current courses, including one ~~the~~ old radio student who appeared to be about 10

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years old). The center has ~~go~~ beaches to practice commando landings, jungles for guerrilla combat training, a nearby airstrip and drop zone for airborne training, and sufficient Vietminh units close enough for realistic training in counter-guerrilla combat (one radio class was communicating with a training unit living in the jungle in a Viet-minh controlled area for one week).

CIA 3.3(b)(1) OSD 3.3(b)(1)

j. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ with S.D.E.C.E. and GCMA have been observing these organizations closely during the past year. They feel that GCMA is engaged (copy "N" here).

~~h. (copy not here)~~

k. Captain Edward Korn, Assistant Military Attaché, <sup>privately</sup> stated that these ~~men~~ are former Viet-minh officers who crossed over to Vietnam-controlled territory due to their dislike of Communism. These officers are now living as civilians, yet are highly skilled guerrilla leaders, and well motivated to fight Communism. They are nationalists (anti-French), yet but can

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be organized into a guerrilla cadre under a political leader such as Governor Nguyen Huu Tri of Northern Vietnam.

#### 4. Conclusions

a. Aggressive guerrilla action ~~can~~ can be initiated within forces and conditions <sup>now</sup> existing in the Associated States. ~~A~~ Strong guerrilla action in a vital Viet-minh zone, (such as Thanh Hoa, Phu Tho Quan, or Vinh), would force the enemy to change delay operational plans <sup>long enough to free an enemy rear area of harassment</sup> and permit the F.T.E.O. to seize ~~initiative~~ the initiative on 15 September as planned. Heretofore, the Viet-minh has shown ~~a~~ an ability to seize the initiative shortly before an F.T.E.O. planned operation, to do the same, forcing the F.T.E.O. to abandon its plans and expend ~~a~~ its ~~years~~ energy on defense. 1953 could continue this pattern. There are ~~no~~ indications that the Viet-minh are planning attacks for early Fall, to beat the F.T.E.O. to the punch. A strong guerrilla diversion would gain time for mounting F.T.E.O. aggressive actions and ~~time~~ public imagination, thus lifting the mor-

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of both French and Vietnamese forces.

b. Successful guerrilla warfare requires good political motivation. While such motivation is ~~reportedly~~ weak at present (French intentions were reportedly still mistrusted in early July re independence for the Associated States and key Vietnamese government and military leaders <sup>still</sup> held French citizenship by choice), ~~the~~ sufficient ~~in~~ political motivation could be found in Governor Tri's nationalist movement if he were to ~~organize~~ or Defense Minister Quat were to organize a guerrilla cadre of battalion strength for expansion into a regiment by local recruitment in the area of operation. ~~General~~ ~~Sogny~~ F.T.N.V. headquarters now has close liaison with Governor Tri and could coordinate the military action.

c. Although GCMA is the one ~~milit~~ French organization <sup>now</sup> conducting <sup>guerrilla</sup> ~~military~~ warfare, its capabilities appear to be too restricted to make it an <sup>organizing and directing</sup> ~~the~~ agency for ~~aggressive~~ <sup>aggressive</sup> guerrilla warfare.



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a sufficient scale to <sup>weaken</sup> ~~break~~ the Viet-minh in vital areas discussed with Generals Navarre and Cogny. It ~~to~~ would be more realistic, then, to establish a guerrilla ~~force~~ warfare sections at major headquarters (F.T.E.O. and F.T.N.V. ~~at~~ initially) and use regular military means to support guerrilla action. However, GCMIA instructional personnel appear to be well qualified to train cadres for ~~good~~ large guerrilla units.

Office of the Secretary of Defense **5 U.S.C. § 552**  
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ANNEX

Subject: Activities Paramilitary Units Under Control and Direction  
SIECK (Service de Documentation Extérieure et Contre-Expionage)  
in Indochina

*GCMA or activity service*  
C. 2. Activity of the ~~SIECK-controlled paramilitary organization in~~  
~~Indochina~~ since its formation in 1951 has developed along the following  
primary lines:

"J"  
1) Resistance and counter-guerrilla activities utilizing primarily  
minority tribal groups in Northern and Central Vietnam and in Laos.

(Thais, Meos, Muongs, Nungs).

2) Organization and training of a special Vietnamese paramilitary  
service.

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

3) Commando and air-borne type operations.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

*GCMA*  
From very limited beginnings the ~~SIECK-paramilitary service now~~  
has grown to its current strength of approximately 300 white and 3000  
indigenous personnel. Results in the three fields of activity listed in  
-paragraph one have been generally unimpressive to date, This has been due  
to an inability to surmount certain problems:

1) The fear (primarily in French civilian political circles) that  
once strengthened militarily, the minority tribal groups might get out  
of control and cause political difficulties for the French or the  
governments of the Associated States. This has hampered full military  
use in the past of the minority groups. Until recently the SIECK was  
forbidden officially to deal with the Meos due to the fears and opposi-  
sition of the Lao Government. (In spite of this order the Meos have  
been contacted and used fairly effectively for over a year.) The

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problem is complicated by a growing lack of confidence in certain of the minority group leaders who have developed a "wait and see" attitude in their relations with the French as a result of recurrent French defeats in the Thai country and upper Laos.

2) Development of the Vietnamese <sup>action</sup> specialized paramilitary service has been retarded by Franco-Vietnamese mistrust and by recurrent difficulty with Vietnamese recruits chosen for training at the SDECE directed school. The Vietnamese training program is still in the experimental stage but, according to the SDECE Chief, will soon be expanded in coordination with the Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese National Army. <sup>(General Hinh has selected 25 men from the Vietnamese Surete for Commando training by GCMA at Cap St Jacques.)</sup> It is believed that French interest in this program stems mainly from a desire to closely supervise and control Vietnamese steps in the <sup>action service</sup> ~~specialized paramilitary~~ field. The basic mistrust of the Vietnamese by the French officers <sup>of</sup> ~~making up~~ the <sup>GCMA</sup> training cadre will have to be overcome if any effective training is to be done. In justice to these French officers it must be recognized that, from the French point of view, this mistrust has a ~~real and solid~~ basis in fact.

3) <sup>GCMA</sup> ~~Specialized SDECE paramilitary~~ units have been too often attached to purely orthodox military operations and used as regular commando type forces in ~~unprofitable~~ routine coastal landings. Examples of this are such operations as "Capestan" (Quang Ngai), "Toulouse"

(Qui Nhon), "Atlas" and "Meknes" (Nhatrang and Phan Thiet). ~~The SDECE~~

<sup>GCMA</sup> units have participated in these orthodox operations because:

- a) <sup>GCMA is</sup> ~~The SDECE paramilitary organization operates under the cover of the Groupement Commandes Mitrer Aeroportes (GCMA) which~~

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native zones. They are not effective in other areas.

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is a regular airborne organization.

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"J"
- b) ~~Most of the paramilitary service officers are regular Army~~ <sup>GCMA</sup> and dislike isolation from the general orthodox military operations. The fact that promotions are slow for regular officers on detached service is a sore point.
- c) ~~A certain amount of cooperative action with the Army is~~ necessary in order to survive officially in the confused French military "family" in Indochina. The Army also directly supplies a substantial portion of the funds for the paramilitary organization.

1) ~~Additional reasons for lack of significant success~~ <sup>by GCMA in its</sup> ~~to date in the~~  
main fields of activity have been: CIA 3.3(b)(1) OSD 3.3(b)(1)

1) A. French inability to provide fundamental motivation for native units.

2) B. Difficult French inter-service relations and bitter rivalries which hamper effective development of essential operations.

3) C. Poor operational planning and inadequate security consciousness on part of organization personnel. (This is in process of being improved by assignment <sup>of</sup> career counterespionage officers to the <sup>GCMA</sup> ~~para-military~~ organization for security duties.)

4) D. Inadequate funds to properly support and maintain existing units. Several of these units in Cochinchina have been "farmed out" accordingly to plantations for garrison duty in order to meet the expenses of the organization.

5) E. Lack of clear objectives and support from Paris.

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4. The two main areas of paramilitary operations using the minority native groups are Northwest Tonkin and Central Laos.

*11*  
A. Northwest Tonkin: With the support of the Thai chieftain Deo Van Long three ~~main~~ guerrilla groups have been formed along with several other smaller units. Units are composed solely of Thais owing allegiance to Deo Van Long and commanded by a French ~~paramilitary~~ <sup>action</sup> service non-commissioned officer. Units are in radio contact with a central in French-held Lai Chau and receive logistical support by air from Hanoi by Army and civilian-leased planes. Drops consist mostly of ammunition, cloth, salt and rice. The ~~paramilitary~~ <sup>action</sup> service is also in contact with Meo elements north and west of Lai Chau. <sup>GCMA officers</sup> state that they had a guerrilla force of 2,500 in this Meo area (Moung) ~~elements were very active in the summer of 1952 and required the~~ Viet Minh to ask the aid of Chinese Communist troops to crush the resistance activity. Some of these groups <sup>are believed to</sup> remain active in very reduced numbers. There are no French officers with the Meos in this area and no radio contact at present.

B. Central Laos (Xiang Khouang - Plaine des Jarres): Meos in this area are primarily under the control of the chieftain To By. Units owing allegiance to To By and to which are attached SDECE ~~paramilitary~~ <sup>action</sup> service non-coms are located in a circle <sup>around</sup> spread out from the French strong-point at the Plaines des Jarres. Most of these units are in radio contact. Through To By, the French will attempt to control the opium crop and trade in upper Laos and harass Vietminh units remaining in Laos. They also hope these units <sup>will</sup> ~~will~~ prove effective in the event of the renewal of the Vietminh drive through Laos <sup>this</sup> ~~in this~~ fall.

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*was meeting Lao Kay, then defended by a Vietminh regiment which requested Chinese help. The Chinese reportedly sent a division (5 regiments) across the border and, in action June-September 1952, suppressed the guerrilla force.*

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*I* <sup>3)</sup> In addition to these two main areas <sup>listed above,</sup> other small units exist under the direction of the SDECE <sup>action</sup> ~~paramilitary~~ service. These are primarily in the Upper Laos-Northwest Tonkin frontier zone and along the Red River. These units have localized missions and occasionally cooperate in orthodox military actions based <sup>on</sup> ~~near~~ the French-held islands of resistance in Vietnam territory (Lai Chau, Phong Saly, Na San). ~~These units include:~~  
*I* According to ~~French sources~~ (and have not been corroborated) ~~in any other~~  
~~units include:~~

- I*
- a). 3 Companies Thai guerrillas in the Muong Te (102-37, 22-28) area.
  - b). 200-300 armed men in the Ba Xat area (103-51, 22-36), broken up into smaller teams. Organization was spurred by 60 trained saboteurs dropped along the west bank of the Black River between January <sup>and July</sup> 1953, ~~and the present time.~~
  - c). 200 armed men in the Phong Saly area (102-06, 21-41).
  - d). 100 men at Muong Sing (101-09, 21-11)
  - e). 300 men N.W. Ba Xat (103-51, 22-31). This unit <sup>is</sup> partially armed with modern rifles, rest with home-made arms. ~~It~~ <sup>is</sup> led by French-trained Hung <sup>and</sup> recaptured Phong Tho (103-26, 22-36) in early July 1953.
  - f). 100 men east of Muong Khousa (102-30, 21-00).
  - g). 50 men in the Dien Bien Phu area (103-00, 21-10).
  - 4). Other minor units, mostly in the process of formation, exist in Central Annam. ~~The~~ <sup>I</sup> limited activity in Cochinchina is centered in the Vietnam zones north and west of Saigon where small units ~~formerly~~ in Southern

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I Cochinchina are being used. Activity in Cambodia other than a small training installation at Kep (10h-19, 10-29) is negligible due to the persistent opposition of the Cambodian Government.

7. The above strength figures are approximations only. The guerrilla units will not necessarily remain in the sectors listed. However, an important fact, is that the bulk of the minority units can only be used in their own native zones. They cannot be used effectively in other areas.

(L) ~~g. The <sup>GCMA</sup> ~~South~~ paramilitary organization only~~ drops small sabotage and straight intelligence gathering teams in the Viet Minh zones. This activity has been carried out with only varying degrees of success. This is a field in which greater concentration of effort should be made.

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

h. ~~During the past year, the~~ ~~GCMA~~ <sup>GCMA</sup> has visited the following installations under ~~SBSC~~ <sup>S.D.E.C.E.</sup> control:

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

M 1) Cap St. Jacques (South Vietnam). The ~~paramilitary~~ <sup>action service</sup> school at Cap St. Jacques for guerrilla warfare training has ~~28~~ <sup>22</sup> French and indigenous instructors on its staff. Courses are given in radio, sabotage, psychological and political warfare, close combat and judo, infiltration of installations and jungle warfare. Because of the generally low mentality of the students (to date primarily from the native minority groups), training is overly supervised. The school has been in operation for almost two years. In general the instructors are of high caliber.

2) Quan Loi (Terre Rouge, Rubber Plantation, South Vietnam). A small installation. Unit from here is occasionally borrowed by Army for coastal operations.

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3) ~~3~~ Cu Lao Re Island - off the Central Annamese coast, this SDECE controlled installation is used as a base for <sup>action service</sup> ~~paramilitary~~ units engaged in coastal operations. ~~Island has an airstrip capable of handling C-47's, use the island's airstrip.~~

M 4) ~~4~~ Hon Me (105-56, 19-21). An island off the strongly Vietnamese held coast of northern Annam. This island serves as a base for mainland sabotage and agent operations. Due to its location off the heartland of the Communist zone it is believed to have a great potential if properly developed.

5) ~~5~~ Haiphong. Support base for Hon Me island and radio central.

6) ~~6~~ Tourane. ("Ilot de l'Observation"). A training installation for paratroops and maritime training.

7) ~~7~~ Hanoi. Headquarters for Tonkin <sup>action service</sup> ~~paramilitary~~ operations, radio central, and training school.

8) ~~8~~ Phuc Yen (105-42, 21-14). Paramilitary installation for operations directed against the Thai Nguyen area. Work in this area has been notably unsuccessful.

M 9) ~~9~~ Lai Chau. Small training installation and radio central for Northwest Tonkin region.

10) ~~10~~ Kep (104-19, 10-29) (Cambodian coast). Small training installation primarily aimed at developing means for impeding Vietnamese coastal traffic in Cambodia and southern Cochinchina.

11) ~~11~~ Other small installations (not visited) are located at Luc Nam (106-24, 21-18) and Tien Yen (107-24, 21-19) in North Vietnam and at Kontum (108-00, 14-22) in the plateau area of Southern Annam.

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10. ~~Despite the weaknesses and problems of the SDECE directed specialized paramilitary service as observed during the past year and noted briefly in this report, we believe it is engaged in a vital field of operation in Indochina, which should receive adequate recognition and support, that GCMA~~  
The installations visited by the CIA observer offer a substantial potential for the training of specialized teams during the next 12-18 months, ~~and that~~ *GCMA*  
SDECE paramilitary service contains officers with excellent training and background in dealing with the minority groups ~~in Indochina.~~ *the Associated States.* However, ~~we think~~ *that GCMA*  
do not believe the ~~SDECE paramilitary service~~ is the proper unit to direct any large expansion of counter-guerrilla organizations ~~on the part of the French Command.~~ *for*  
*They feel that GCMA should train and operate*  
~~its service should be used in the fields where it is vitally needed and at present operates virtually alone. These fields are the training and operation of small specialized teams for guerrilla missions, sabotage, escape and evasion, etc., Work in these fields can best be done by a small compact organization operating in close coordination with the French Military High Command. The SDECE should continue to operate in the guerrilla field but only on a relatively small scale and with special highly trained units.~~  
CIA 3.3(b)(1) OSD 3.3(b)(1)  
~~We are continuing liaison with SDECE in Indochina, endeavor to press for the expansion of activities along lines previously outlined. We have provided in the past certain types of equipment not readily available through normal military channels (100 SSN 1 rockets, 2 C-47's for support of drop operations and training special crews, 2500 pounds tetrahedrons, etc.) We will continue to try to provide assistance in terms of special equipment where warranted and not available through normal channels. They state that~~  
Special emphasis, if approved by Washington, will be placed on expanding the potential and effectiveness in terms of both

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
Security Information

- 11 -

*active service*

*paramilitary* and intelligence operations of the two SIECE-controlled  
N islands off the Communist-held coast of Central Vietnam.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

MAY 19 2014

~~SECRET~~  
Security Information

26 July 1956

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

MAY 19 2014

Personal

Dear Villiers:

It has been suggested by ASCHAM that I write you this personal letter in order to explain to you the true position of this organization as regards the proposal which we understand the X Office is considering as regards yourself. We are all particularly anxious that you not be misled or given any misapprehensions with respect to our attitude in this connection, and this is a matter which does not lend itself particularly well to a cable exchange. In fact, it would be preferable if we were able to discuss it orally, but I believe that I can get our points across adequately in this letter.

A few days ago Mr. Y of the X Office called [redacted] on the telephone and said that he was giving thought to recruiting you for the X Office at the end of your tour of duty in Saigon. He inquired as to the probable duration and termination date of your stay in Saigon; asked about the date of your return to the Air Force; and concluded by asking whether KUBARK would have any objection to the application of the X Office to the Air Force for your assignment to that office. [redacted] was troubled at the time by a number of aspects of this telephone call and reported it to me immediately, advising me what had been said in the conversation. It is my understanding that [redacted] attempted to indicate that the decision as to your future following the termination of your tour which is presently scheduled for some time in December, was in some doubt, and that under the circumstances [redacted] did not see how KUBARK could reasonably object to the X Office applying to the Air Force for your assignment to them. [redacted] was not too happy about the reply which he formulated, but said to me -- and I agreed with him -- that there was not very much else which he could have said under the circumstances of the conversation. In my discussion of this development with ASCHAM, he was also inclined to agree that [redacted] had done the best that he could, but the thought has naturally arisen in all of our minds that [redacted] response could be subject to some misunderstanding or misinterpretation on the part of Mr. Y. We are more concerned with the possibility that he may make representations to either the Air Force or yourself, or both, that KUBARK has agreed to your assignment to the X Office, or is otherwise quite willing to have you accept such an assignment.

CIA 3.3(b)(1).

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50.5.c. 552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 19 MAY 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)  
MDR: 13 -M- 1346

13-M-1346

MAY 19 2014

I am sure that I do not need to tell you that this is not at all the true position of KUBARK. The facts are quite simply as we left them in our last conversations with you when you were here, viz.:

a. We are very glad that you are remaining in Saigon until December;

b. When you return to Washington at the end of your present tour, we understand that you propose to explore further with the Air Force what future position and assignments they may wish to offer to you;

c. Depending upon what the Air Force has to offer to you, you may decide to continue to make the Air Force your career or you may decide to resign from the Air Force;

d. In the event of the latter decision, it would be our hope and our expectation that you would give favorable consideration to employment with KUBARK on a career basis.

Confidentially, but quite frankly between us, we would not be at all happy with the prospect of your assignment to the X Office for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that we seriously doubt that such an assignment would afford the proper scope for your rather unique abilities. But in addition to that, it is our feeling that if you are to remain with the Air Force, but to be on detached duty from it, it would be far more satisfactory for you to be assigned to KUBARK than to go into the X Office -- which does not have a uniform record of consideration for our interests. I believe you are aware of certain of the difficulties which have arisen in the past, but I am sure that you do not know about all of these.

This letter requires no answer other than an acknowledgment of your receipt of it -- unless I have failed to make clear any of the points or unless I have erroneously stated the understanding which I believe we have concerning your future course of action. May I suggest that you destroy this letter after reading it, since its only purpose is to anticipate, if possible, and correct if necessary any misapprehension which may be created in your mind by some communication which you may receive from the Pentagon.

Sincerely,



~~SECRET~~

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

CIA

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)&gt;25Yrs

2 August 1956

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 19 2014

Personal

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

Dear [REDACTED]

Appreciate your writing the personal letter of 26 July about the X office and my future assignment. This whole thing is somewhat embarrassing, because since I last saw you several folks have asked about my next assignment and if I would be adverse to serving with them, to which I have replied that it would be an honor, but that at this particular time my thinking is really concentrated on the tasks immediately before me.

Incidentally, Admiral Radford told me that he would like to see me stay with Hubert. He introduced the subject, during a long conversation on rather abstract subjects, while we were flying over Opanades. In answer to a question from him, I had told him that folks known to me had proven to be well trained at this installation.

The embarrassing part about all this is that I'm actually not built to sit down and think coldly about the details of my future. This is even more true when in the midst of a seven-ring circus such as my present location. If it appears that I'm playing a very game of waiting the best offer, I think that you folks know me well enough by now to understand that I'm not.

These past years with Hubert have been deeply satisfying ones for me and I am warmly grateful for the opportunities and help given. I feel that few people have had the chances I've had, thanks to you, to do things so worth doing. Maybe I haven't made my feelings on this plain enough to you all in the past, but that's the way I do feel.

I suggest that we put the subject of my future into moth-balls until I can finish things up here satisfactorily.

With all good wishes for you and the future,

Sincerely,

G. S. Villiers

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. § 552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 19 MAY 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)  
MDR: 13 -M- 1346

13-M-1346

CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 19 2014

24 March 1954

Dear Donthut:

CIA 3.3(b)(1) OSD 3.3(b)(1)

You and I would be sitting down for some personal gab about this time, under other circumstances...because it's time for some talk. But, this will have to substitute for the time being.

Your reply to the news about [redacted] request for me came in today...and made me happy by giving me a chance to stay on with the family a while longer (and made them right happy, too). On the other hand, there were some disturbing things about it. As I know you understand and appreciate, the most disturbing was that a grand person whose office is across the street from yours indicated that he was resentful of our implied criticism...when actually no such thing existed. I'd hate to see anything happen that would estrange him from harmonious relationships with [redacted] Kubark. And, of course, I'm still quite mindful of [redacted] asking me in the past if I would come to him when he really needed me, and my reply that Uncle could always find a way to do so, if there was real need. I'd hate to have him start feeling that Uncle was starting to let him down...because if we lose him (which you know is not impossible under current pressures), then we'd have a really tough problem on our hands.

But, the most disturbing part of all was something that I've reserved just for the two of us. If I read your message correctly, Glymph wrote it, possibly without reference by you to Lambeck. In fact, that scared me. Lambeck is the one person you have who has a real "feel" of the actual tensions at work under the surface. He and Stombeck know that their value as your assets with [redacted] will be far from spoiled in my association with [redacted] Why did [redacted] become close to them in the first place? It wasn't a whim on his part, as you and I know. My presence furnishing ammunition to the anti-Americans doesn't worry me very much...in fact the comment on that simply didn't sound to me like you at all. That's simply one of the things we've been through time and again since you've been in the Philippines. There's just different leadership behind it, and slightly different ammunition being used.

I couldn't use the I-C gag, although I'd intended something similar, because my place there hasn't opened up correctly yet... and any hints getting over there from Manila that I might go (at this time) might throw a real hitch into affairs. It's all mixed up in a complex affair involving various entities here and in Europe and Asia. Nuts, it couldn't be much more complex...and has had me with my nose to the grindstone on it. I have a lot to learn, and have taken some part in shaping our play. All of which has kept me from keeping closer tabs on affairs where you are.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5052

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 19 MAY 2014 Authority: EO 13526

Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_

Declassify in Part: X

Reason: 3.3(b)(1)

MDR: 13 -M- 1346

Security Information

13-M-1346

The telephone call, of course, brought me back into affairs. I went back over letters and visits of folks from there, to try to dig out what was really bothering [redacted]. It might be that he feels a bit hopeless about just plain administration of his affairs (letters unanswered, things not getting done when he's away, etc) or perhaps he's getting ready to really open up an attack on his current enemies and wanted somebody to give him a little nudge to do it somewhat left-handedly.

But, reviewing the news, it sure does look far from pleasant. Business men in NY (according to [redacted] et al) are receiving more and more cynicism in letters from the Americans in Manila towards the government, and the trend towards investing or helping out there is starting to reverse itself. It is based to a fair extent, I imagine, on letters being unanswered, on nobody being present to take care of business, of some of the large grants going to waste (such as the recent \$2 million one) because nobody there even looked up and said "huh" about them. And, of course, trust being put in folks who are close to being wrong goes (such as [redacted] etc) in carrying out various and sundry missions in which they look out mainly for themselves. It looks sort of aimless and haphazard.

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

Incidentally, [redacted] are having their Stateside trip arranged by [redacted] should be here soon. Folks here are getting discouraged on their search for stuff on [redacted] (or is it [redacted]), but I asked them to dig into some dusty gloomy places where they haven't gone yet. They've been trying hard they tell me.

I took up an extension for Lambeck with the right folks, and they told me today that it was going to be okay for a one year extension. I feel strongly that some time before the end of that year, he should make up his mind to come aboard as a staff man. It's clearly the place he should be. However, the folks I talked to didn't seem to be in a sweat over extending him another year (which others had told me they would be).

I made a strong pitch for Lambeck to receive a top decoration, which the lads had proposed and then sort of gone soft on. It was slightly embarrassing for me to do, but you know how I feel about backing you all up in the field. Whether I did any good or not, I don't know.

Remember Sanlach? Despite my report on him to you, and your own feelings re what he did, the only report on him that is in the record here is one from Olynph when the fellow had been with us only a short time, saying that it was too early yet to determine his usefulness, although we weren't too sanguine. That has hurt him here, and yet I feel that he was all fired up to help us when he returned. I've talked with him, and will do what I can to help

Whim out here -- yet I know that you want to be fair to the guy and at least give him some sort of a rating on performance. I personally think he did a damn good job on his trip south and that we should say so, regardless of anything else. It's hard to come by folks who are willing to help us out in the local jungle here.

Your strong recommendation re a new job for Olymph had a funny reaction here: all they could do would be to move him into the spot where you wanted him (and some were quite gleeful about it, and I fear their motives weren't kindly towards you or Olymph) and, of course, then figure that he would have to be replaced by someone suitable. This someone is a guy I've talked to a little and am not so happy about. Still immature. Aide to a national guard general, Princeton, a little steeping for a few months in a family business, then desk work shuffling papers for us with one junket visiting the field for a short period. A little glimmer of the big idea, pleasant manners, but not even as eager as some of the other boy scouts. Your recommendation countered my moves to protect you, so I had to drop them. Please, please, please don't let the administrative characters dictate your operational moves and please, please, please rely on the G-3 types. The administrative types have a definite and valuable place, but can ruin you when they try to operate. This last bit just sprang up as I was writing this paragraph and isn't slanted towards individuals. Just some general advice from a guy who is doggone fond of you and wants you to look good all along the line.

The desk folks here are privately worried as hell over the lack of reports from your gang. I suspect that they've hidden the fact somewhat from the front office, which increases their worries. They guess at the obvious, that chubby Willie is not well liked and that personality irritations are the cause. And yet, you and the folks at home will be the ones to get somewhat burned fingers over the deal, perhaps. In case it would help any, I've had a long and intimate talk about him with the chap whom he replaced. He told me that Willie had quite a background as a kid of being too fat to be able to join the other boys at play (clumsy, etc) and has quite an inferiority complex as a result -- and that maybe a new approach by you of taking him under your wing a little more closely and warming him up might do wonders. Worth a try, huh? And, I'd suggest that you look personally into the lack of reports...talking to these folks yourself, individually.

Oh yes, tell Lambeck please that I didn't forget his featherweight specials. The hammerless deals are still in the pilot stage, but the folks have been hunting them all over the country. There might be only two or three which can be obtained. If so, I asked that they be sent out, and the remainder of the required number be made up of others (perhaps a similar model with hammer). Also tell him that I've had some talks with our bug juice friend and that what we suspected about the juice was correct (our friend being mad as hell about what we were told, but officially helpless). It will take a little doing to get what Lambeck wanted from him further. The guy



is one of the staunchest allies we ever made.

In between the alarms and excursions on dozens of other things, I'm writing (slowly and painfully) a pol-war handbook thing, drawing out some principles and lessons from the 1950-53 experiences. It's not a history, uses some of the happenings only as examples to illustrate points...but I might have to switch it around to look more like a history, for lighter reading, and to make my points before the reader is aware of them. If as or when I ever finish the thing (it seems more like an albatross around the neck at times) I'll send you the first draft for comment, etc. Wish it didn't have to be so highly classified, because there are sure a heck of a lot of folks on our side who need to learn some lessons, and this one might help them some.

Am sorry about what I hear re our more fiery red-headed friend and his boss, Doggenit, I spent some time trying to tell him how to love honor and obey a guy...for his integrity if for nothing else. Anything you can do to help patch that one up? I don't want to see them playing it outely. I'm doing what I can to help them both out with their home folks in various and sundry subtle ways, when I can. However, if they keep squabbling among themselves, they're the ones who will get hurt...because their home folks on the lower decks hate their guts still, and even more because they've been spanked by the big boys for it. They blocked the red head's desired visit home, they couldn't find funds for this travel in their budgets. They have a lot of similar little tricks to pull which slow down our help. But, the guy whom our red head saved and put in place to take over the desk is becoming a real psycho (he hates our whole gang, turns an apoplectic red in the face when he even hears my name, and has gradually worked up a terrific persecution complex...dangerous!).

Re your assistant, proposed. I argued that you were ready and willing to take over a lot more direct supervision of affairs than in the past. But, our home folks are great believers in organization charts and with you moving Glymph out of a spot, they insist that that spot be filled again...whether or not there is anything for the guy to do. However, if I were you, I would start taking more of a hand in sparking up the boys...perhaps beginning with cranking them up on reports (first love of most of the wee people at home).

Please give my best to all of the gang. They are frequently in my thoughts and warmly so.

Geoffrey B Villiers

MAY 19 2014

TO: [REDACTED]  
 FROM: [REDACTED]  
 SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Report, Pornographic Films.

2 November 1976

1. Attached report was furnished me yesterday by [REDACTED] courier [REDACTED]. It was [REDACTED] wish that I get the report to VILLIERS as quickly as possible.

2. [REDACTED] above was prompted, he indicated, because of the well-known friendship of VILLIERS for the subject female named in the report. [REDACTED] is a long-time friend and admirer of VILLIERS and prefers that VILLIERS decide how to handle this matter in Vietnam. It is my belief he gave this report to me rather than to yourself because he did not want it to become a matter of record until VILLIERS could evaluate it and take action at his end.

3. FYI: [REDACTED], I believe, the over-all boss of [REDACTED] has assisted VILLIERS' projects from the USIS and in Saigon and is of course well known to him. [REDACTED] formerly had offices in USIS, Manila; is a frequent visitor here.

4. Recommend that report be pouched to VILLIERS and informed that [REDACTED] is concerned in the matter. Apparently no action against [REDACTED] is planned by him here at this time.

*GRM*  
 GRM

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 Authority: EO 13526  
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
 Date:

MAY 19 2014

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Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. § 552  
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
 Date: 19 MAY 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
 Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Declassify in Part: X  
 Reason: 3.3(b)(1)  
 MDR: 13 -M- 1346

13-M-1346

~~SECRET~~

CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

TO:

2 November 1956

FROM:

SUBJECT: Report, Pornographic Films.

1. Attached report was furnished me yesterday by [redacted] courier was [redacted]. It was [redacted] wish that I get the report to VILLIERS as quickly as possible.

2. [redacted] was prompted, he indicated, because of the well-known friendship of VILLIERS for the subject female named in the report. [redacted] is a long-time friend and advisor of VILLIERS and prefers that VILLIERS decide how to handle this matter in Vietnam. It is my belief he gave this report to me rather than to yourself because he did not want it to become a matter of record until VILLIERS could evaluate it and take action at his end.

3. [redacted] FII: [redacted], I believe, the over-all boss of [redacted] has conducted VILLIERS' protests from the USIS end in Saigon and is of course well known to him. [redacted] formerly had offices in USIS, Manila, is a frequent visitor here.

4. [redacted] Reason and that report be pushed to VILLIERS and informed that [redacted] is concerned in the matter. Apparently no action against [redacted] is planned by him here at this time.

U R N

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

MAY 19 2014

Office of the Secretary of Defense **5 U.S.C. § 552**  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: **19 MAY 2014** Authority: EO 13526  
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Declassify in Part: **X**  
Reason: **3.3(b)(1)**  
MDR: **13 -M- 1346**

13-m-1346


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CIA 3.3(b)(1-9)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 19 2014

OSD 3.3(b)(1-9)  
13-M-1346

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50 USC  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS + 552  
Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: X  
Declassify in Part:  
Reason: 3.3(b)(1-9)  
MDR: 13 -M- 1346



CIA 3.3(b)(1-4)

OSD 3.3(b)(1-4)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 19 2014



CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

13 February 1951

Dear Leland:

Thanks for your recent letter about Lansdale.  
It was very timely.

Attached is a copy of one which I have just  
written to Vandenberg urging his promotion and I am  
supplementing this by a personal request. You will note  
the final paragraph of this letter.

We are now in process, insofar as our authority  
permits, of providing coordination for our own activities  
in various critical areas by designating one official as  
representative of the Director with such coordinating  
authority. In your case [redacted] Lansdale  
is the man.

For your private information, Lucian Truscott  
is going to [redacted] as my representative and will coordinate  
our activities in the adjacent area.

Faithfully,

*W. B. Smith*  
Walter B. Smith  
Director

Encl.

Major General Leland S. Hobbs  
Chief Advisor  
Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group  
APO 928, c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

Office of the Secretary of Defense *5 U.S.C. § 552*  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: *19 MAY 2014* Authority: EO 13526  
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Reason: *3.3(b)(1)*  
MDR: *13 -M- 1346*

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: *MAY 19 2014*

~~SECRET~~

*13-m-1346*

September 27, 1951

Dear General Smith:

The Department has recently received from Ambassador Myron M. Cowen in the Philippines the following commendation of Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lansdale, who is approaching the end of his assignment in Manila:

"During the past eighteen months Lt. Col. Edward Lansdale has been in Manila attached to JUSMAG. This has been [REDACTED] which I consider to have been of the greatest importance, and I learn with regret that his tour of duty in the Philippines is approaching completion. In effect, Colonel Lansdale has been the right hand of the Secretary of National Defense Magsaysay's success in breaking the backbone of the Huk military forces and in dispersing the Philippine Communist organizational setup. It is inconceivable to me that the Philippine situation would be as favorable as it is without Colonel Lansdale's superb performance. He has lived day and night with Magsaysay at very real risk to himself. He has guided and advised him. He has provided a driving power and when necessary a restraining one and furthermore has been a better source of intelligence than all the rest of our intelligence efforts put together.

"I believe Colonel Lansdale deserves the highest possible commendation for his performance in the Philippines and I would be grateful if my appraisal could be made a part of his official record."

I concur with Ambassador Cowen's recommendation and suggest that this commendation be made a part of Colonel Lansdale's military record.

Sincerely yours,

James E. Webb

The Honorable  
Walter B. Smith,  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

MAY 19 2014

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5052.552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 19 MAY 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
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Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)  
MDR: 13 -M- 1346

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13-m-1346

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
 Authority: EO 13526  
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
 Date:

MAY 19 2014

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## I. FOREWORD

Please note that this report is classified as "sensitive" as well as "secret."

This is the condensed account of one year in the operations of a "cold war" combat team, written by the team itself in the field, little by little in moments taken as the members could. The team is known as the Saigon Military Mission. The field is Vietnam. There are other teams in the field, American, French, British, Chinese, Vietnamese, Vietminh, and others. Each has its own story to tell. This is ours.

The Saigon Military Mission entered Vietnam on 1 June 1954 when its Chief arrived. However, this is the story of a team, and it wasn't until August 1954 that sufficient members arrived to constitute a team. So, this is mainly an account of the team's first year, from August 1954 to August 1955.

It was often a frustrating and perplexing year, up close. The Geneva Agreements signed on 21 July 1954 imposed restrictive rules upon all official Americans, including the Saigon Military Mission. An active and intelligent enemy made full use of legal rights to screen his activities in establishing his stay-behind organizations south of the 17th Parallel and in obtaining quick security north of that Parallel. The nation's economy and communications system were crippled by eight years of open war. The government, including its Army and other security forces, was in a painful transition from colonial to self rule, making it a year of hot-tempered incidents. Internal problems arose quickly to points where armed conflict was sought as the only solution. The enemy was frequently forgotten in the heavy atmosphere of suspicion, hatred, and jealousy.

The Saigon Military Mission received some blows from allies and the enemy in this atmosphere, as we worked to help stabilize the government and to beat the Geneva time-table of Communist takeover in the north. However, we did beat the time-table. The government did become stabilized. The Free Vietnamese are now becoming unified and learning how to cope with the Communist

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. § 552  
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13-M-1346



DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date:

MAY 19 2014

~~SECRET~~

enemy. We are thankful that we had a chance to help in this work in a critical area of the world, to be positive and constructive in a year of doubt.

## II. MISSION

The Saigon Military Mission (SMM) was born in a Washington policy meeting early in 1954, when Dien Bien Phu was still holding out against the encircling Vietminh. The SMM was to enter into Vietnam quietly and assist the Vietnamese, rather than the French, in unconventional warfare. The French were to be kept as friendly allies in the process, as far as possible.

The broad mission for the team was to undertake paramilitary operations against the enemy and to wage political-psychological warfare. Later, after Geneva, the mission was modified to prepare the means for undertaking paramilitary operations in Communist areas rather than to wage unconventional warfare.

On the scene, the team undertook another essential task in warfare, a task which has been overlooked by our side on a number of "cold war" battlegrounds. This task was to provide some measure of staff work and coordination for the U.S. leader (the Ambassador, in his role as Chief of Mission), to help him weld a political-military-economic-unconventional warfare team required for success in the "cold war." It was this self-imposed task which added the extra hours of work each day, and for which this team has become noted.

In a "hot" war, a military commander has a staff to assist him and a commander for each unit in the forces under him. In a "cold" war, the U.S. commander is usually a civilian and has a commander for each unit under him, political, psychological, economic, military, and unconventional. The Embassy staff is made to function as a general staff by necessity, but has little time to do so and still meet Washington requirements levied on it. Embassy staff members have become little more than official reporters for Washington agencies. The "country team" is not a staff in a military sense. It is in reality a commanders conference.

In Vietnam, we are facing an enemy who has a general staff experienced in the strategy and tactics of a "cold" war. This means that the enemy fights as a team, making effective use of political, psychological, economic, military, and unconventional

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forces by using them in a coordinated manner. It is this teamwork by the enemy which has brought us so many staggering defeats after the shooting stopped in World War II; staggering, because in that brief period the enemy has occupied and now holds 2 3/4 million square miles of land which was formerly free and has made captive some 700-million human beings who were formerly free.

SMM's self-imposed task of performing cold-war staff functions for the Ambassador grew out of the necessities of the situation, received official sanction for the coordination part of its role, but was not always understood. The team recognized the necessity and performed well, for it knows that its primary mission is to help bring defeat to the Communists, and providing staff work is one vital role for victory.

### III. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE YEAR

#### a. Early Days

The Saigon Military Mission (SMM) started on 1 June 1954 when its Chief, Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, arrived in Saigon with a small box of files and clothes and a borrowed typewriter, courtesy of an SA-16 flight set up for him by the 13th Air Force at Clark AFB. Lt-General John O'Daniel and Embassy Charge Rob McClintock had arranged for his appointment as Assistant Air Attache, since it was improper for U.S. officers at MAAG at that time to have advisory conferences with Vietnamese officers. Ambassador Heath had concurred already. There was no desk space for an office, no vehicle, no safe for files. He roomed with General O'Daniel, later moved to a small house rented by MAAG. Secret communications with Washington were provided through the Saigon station of CIA.

There was deepening gloom in Vietnam. Dien Bien Phu had fallen. The French were capitulating to the Vietminh at Geneva. The first night in Saigon, Vietminh saboteurs blew up large ammunition dumps at the airport, rocking Saigon throughout the night. General O'Daniel and Charge McClintock agreed that it was time to start taking positive action. O'Daniel paved the way for a quick first-hand survey of the situation throughout the country. McClintock paved the way for contacts with Vietnamese

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political leaders. Our Chief's reputation from the Philippines had preceded him. Hundreds of Vietnamese acquaintanceships were made quickly.

Working in close cooperation with George Hellyer, USIS

Chief, a new psychological warfare campaign was devised for the Vietnamese Army and for the government in Hanoi. Shortly after, a refresher course in combat paywar was constructed and Vietnamese Army personnel were rushed through it. A similar course was initiated for the Ministry of Information. Rumor campaigns were added to the tactics and tried out in Hanoi. It was almost too late.

The first rumor campaign was to be a carefully planted story of a Chinese Communist regiment in Tonkin taking reprisals against a Vietnam village whose girls the Chicomus had raped, recalling Chinese Nationalist troop behavior in 1945 and confirming Vietnamese fears of Chinese occupation under Vietnam rule; the story was to be planted by soldiers of the Vietnamese Armed Paywar Company in Hanoi dressed in civilian clothes. The troops received their instructions silently, dressed in civilian clothes, went on the mission, and failed to return. They had deserted to the Vietnamese. Weeks later, Tonkinese told an excited story of the misbehavior of two Chinese Divisions in Vietnam territory. Investigated, it turned out to be the old rumor campaign, with Vietnamese embellishments.

There was political chaos. Prince Bui Loc no longer headed the government. Government ministries all but closed. Bao Dai remained at Cames. The more volatile leaders of political groups were proposing revolution, which included armed attacks on the French. Col. Jean Carbone of the French Army proposed establishing a magnet with Vietnamese (Nungs and others) known to him close to the Chinese border and asked for our backing. Our reply was that this was a policy decision to be made between the FEC top command and U.S. authorities.

Oscar Arellano, Junior Chamber International vice-president for Southeast Asia, stopped by for a visit with our Chief; an idea in this visit later grew into "Operation Brotherhood".

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On 1 July, Major Lucien Cosein arrived, as the second member of the team. He is a paramilitary specialist, well-known to the French for his help with French-operated maquis in Tonkin against the Japanese in 1945, the one American guerrilla fighter who had not been a member of the Patti Mission. He was assigned to MAAG for cover purposes. Arranged by Lt-Col Wm. Rosson, a meeting was held with Col Carbonel, Col Nguyen Van Vy, and the two SMM officers; Vy had seen his first combat in 1945 under Cosein. Carbonel proposed establishing a maquis, to be kept as a secret between the four officers. SMM refused, learned later that Carbonel had kept the FEC Deuxieme Bureau informed. Shortly afterwards, at a Defense conference with General O'Daniel, our Chief had a chance to suggest Vy for a command in the North, making him a general. Secretary of State for Defense Le Ngoc Chan did so. Vy was grateful and remained so.

Ngo Dinh Diem arrived on 7 July, and within hours was in despair as the French forces withdrew from the Catholic provinces of Phat Diem and Nam Dinh in Tonkin. Catholic militia streamed north to Hanoi and Haiphong, their hearts filled with anger at French abandonment. The two SMM officers stopped a planned grenade attack by militia girls against French troops guarding a warehouse; the girls stated they had not eaten for three days; arrangements were made for Chinese merchants in Haiphong to feed them. Other militia attacks were stopped, including one against a withdrawing French artillery unit; the militia wanted the guns to stand and fight the Vietminh. The Tonkinese had hopes of American friendship and listened to the advice given them. Governor Tri died, reportedly by poison. Tonkin's government changed as despair grew. On 21 July, the Geneva Agreement was signed. Tonkin was given to the Communists. Anti-Communists turned to SMM for help in establishing a resistance movement and several tentative initial arrangements were made.

Diem himself had reached a nadir of frustration, as his country disintegrated after the conference of foreigners. With the approval of Ambassador Heath and General O'Daniel, our Chief drew up a plan of overall governmental action and presented it to Diem, with Helliher as interpreter. It called for fast constructive action and dynamic leadership. Although the plan was not adopted, it laid the foundation for a friendship which has lasted.

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Oscar Arellano visited Saigon again. Major Charles T. R. Bohanan, a former team-mate in Philippines days, was in town. At an SMM conference with these two, "Operation Brotherhood" was born: volunteer medical teams of Free Asians to aid the Free Vietnamese who have few doctors of their own. Washington responded warmly to the idea. President Diem was visited; he issued an appeal to the Free World for help. The Junior Chamber International adopted the idea. SMM would monitor the operation quietly in the background.

President Diem had organized a Committee of Cabinet Ministers to handle the problem of refugees from the Communist North. The Committee system was a failure. No real plans had been made by the French or the Americans. After conferences with USOM (FOA) officials and with General O'Daniel, our Chief suggested to Ambassador Heath that he call a U.S. meeting to plan a single Vietnamese agency, under a Commissioner of Refugees to be appointed by President Diem, to run the Vietnamese refugee program and to provide a channel through which help could be given by the U.S., France, and other free nations. The meeting was called and the plan adopted, with MAAG under General O'Daniel in the coordinating role. Diem adopted the plan. The French pitched in enthusiastically to help. CAT asked SMM for help in obtaining a French contract for the refugee airlift, and got it. In return, CAT provided SMM with the means for secret air travel between the North and Saigon.

Later, through Dr. Wesley Fisher who was an intimate friend of President Diem, we induced the Vietnamese government to honor U.S. and other personnel who had aided in refugee work. We devised a Presidential Citation ribbon which was awarded to military personnel. The citation itself was written by us. A number of SMM personnel most intimately connected with aiding the refugees never received this honor, for "cover" reasons.

b. August 1954

An agreement had been reached that the personnel ceiling of U.S. military personnel with MAAG would be frozen at the number present in Vietnam on the date of the cease-fire, under the terms of the Geneva Agreement. In South Vietnam this deadline was to be 11 August. It meant that SMM might have only two members

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present, unless action were taken. General O'Daniel agreed to the addition of ten SMM men under MAAG cover, plus any others in the Defense pipeline who arrived before the deadline. A call for help went out. Ten officers in Korea, Japan, and Okinawa were selected and were rushed to Vietnam.

SMM had one small MAAG house. Negotiations were started for other housing, but the new members of the team arrived before housing was ready and were crammed three and four to a hotel room for the first days. Meetings were held to assess the new members' abilities. None had had political-psychological warfare experience. Most were experienced in paramilitary and clandestine intelligence operations. Plans were made quickly, for time was running out in the north; already the Vietminh had started taking over secret control of Hanoi and other areas of Tonkin still held by French forces.

Major Concin was given responsibility for developing a paramilitary organization in the north, to be in position when the Vietminh took over. He was assigned Army Captain Michael Moriarty, Navy Lt Robert Andrews, and Army Lt Frank Garbers. With General O'Daniel's help, this team was moved north immediately as part of the MAAG staff working on the refugee problem. The team had headquarters in Hanoi, with a branch in Haiphong. Among cover duties, this team supervised the refugee flow for the Hanoi airlift organized by the French. One day, as a CAT C-46 finished loading, they saw a small child standing on the ground below the loading door. They shouted for the pilot to wait, picked the child up and shoved him into the aircraft, which then promptly taxied out for its takeoff in the constant air shuttle. A Vietnamese man and woman ran up to the team, asking what they had done with their small boy, whom they'd brought out to say good-bye to relatives. The Chagrined team explained, finally talked the parents into going south to Free Vietnam, put them in the next aircraft to catch up with their son in Saigon.

Army Lt Rufus Phillips and Marine Capt Arthur Arundel volunteered to assist in political-psychological warfare and were assigned for liaison with G-5 of the Vietnamese National Army, with the community self-help program of the Ministry of Social Action, and with USIS. They learned rapidly. Arundel later was case officer for some effective "black" strikes against the Vietminh. Phillips became an outstanding psychological warrior, beloved by the Vietnamese Army.

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Navy Lt Joseph Redick, with his excellent French, was made executive assistant to the Chief. He worked twelve to twenty hours a day in our labors to shape weapons against the Vietminh and construct a political base for the struggle. Lt Redick had rushed in directly from Washington to beat the deadline.

A second paramilitary team was formed to explore possibilities of organizing resistance against the Vietminh from bases in the south. This team consisted of Army Lt-Col Raymond Wittmayer, Army Major Fred Allen, and Army Lt Edward Williams. The latter was our only experienced counter-espionage officer and undertook double duties, including working with revolutionary political groups. Major Allen eventually was able to mount a Vietnamese paramilitary effort in Tonkin from the south, barely beating the Vietminh shutdown in Haiphong as his teams went in, trained and equipped for their assigned missions.

Navy Lt Edward Bain and Marine Captain Richard Smith were assigned as the support group for SMM. Actually, support for an effort such as SMM is a major operation in itself, running the gamut from the usual administrative and personnel functions to the intricate business of clandestine air, maritime, and land supply of paramilitary materiel. In effect, they became our official smugglers as well as paymasters, housing officers, transportation officers, warehousemen, file clerks, and mess officers. The work load was such that other team members frequently pitched in and helped.

c. September 1954

Highly-placed officials from Washington visited Saigon and, in private conversations, indicated that current estimates led to the conclusion that Vietnam probably would have to be written off as a loss. We admitted that prospects were gloomy, but were positive that there was still a fighting chance.

On 8 September, SMM officers visited Secretary of State for Defense Chan and walked into a tense situation in his office. Chan had just arrested Lt-Col Lan (G-6 of the Vietnamese Army) and Capt Giai (G-5 of the Army). Armed guards filled the room. We were told what had happened and assured that everything was all right by all three principals. Later, we discovered that Chan

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was alone and that the guards were Lt-Col Lan's commandos. Lan was charged with political terrorism (by his "action" squads) and Chai with anti-Diem propaganda (using G-5 leaflet, rumor, and broadcast facilities).

The arrest of Lan and Chai, who simply refused to consider themselves arrested, and of Lt Minh, officer in charge of the Army radio station which was guarded by Army troops, brought into the open a plot by the Army Chief of Staff, General Hinh, to overthrow the government. Hinh had hinted at such a plot to his American friends, using a silver cigarette box given him by Egypt's Nasser to convey the hint. SKM became thoroughly involved in the tense controversy which followed, due to our Chief's closeness to both President Diem and General Hinh. He had met the latter in the Philippines in 1952, was a friend of both Hinh's wife and favorite mistress. (The mistress was a pupil in a small English class conducted for mistresses of important personages, at their request, by Lt Redick).

While various U.S. officials including General O'Daniel and Foreign Service Officer Frank Meloy participated in U.S. attempts to heal the split between the President and his Army, Ambassador Heath asked us to make a major effort to end the controversy. This effort strained relations with Diem and never was successful, but did dampen Army enthusiasm for the plot. At one moment, when there was likelihood of an attack by armored vehicles on the Presidential Palace, SKM told Hinh bluntly that U.S. support most probably would stop in such an event. At the same time a group from the Presidential Guards asked for tactical advice on how to stop armored vehicles with the only weapons available to the Guards: carbines, rifles, and hand grenades. The advice, on tank troops and destruction with improvised weapons, must have sounded grim. The following morning, when the attack was to take place, we visited the Palace; not a guard was left on the grounds; President Diem was alone upstairs, calmly getting his work done.

As a result of the Hinh trouble, Diem started looking around for troops upon whom he could count. Some Tonkinese militia, refugees from the north, were assembled in Saigon close to the Palace. But they were insufficient for what he needed. Diem made an agreement with General Trinh Minh The, leader of some 3,000

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Cao Dai dissidents in the vicinity of Tayminh, to give General The some needed financial support; The was to give armed support to the government if necessary and to provide a safehaven for the government if it had to flee. The's guerrillas, known as the Lien Minh, were strongly nationalist and were still fighting the Vietminh and the French. At Ambassador Heath's request, the U.S. secretly furnished Diem with funds for The, through the SMM. Shortly afterwards, an invitation came from The to visit him. Ambassador Heath approved the visit.

On 15 September, a small SMM party in civilian clothes visited Trinh Minh The at his mountain hideout, Nui Ba Den, not far from Tayminh. His troops and small arms factories were inspected. He pledged support to the government, asked for U.S. friendship, and agreed only to defend himself against the French and not initiate attacks. Unknown to the French high command, The later made a pact with local French commanders to permit them to report operations which actually were contrived so that the forces did not meet. At SMM's request, General The released French prisoners he held.

Shortly after the General The meeting, the French complained officially to Ambassador Heath, asking that Lansdale be recalled from Vietnam for his anti-French work. Ambassador Heath refused. The French had a violent hatred for The, blaming him for the death of General Chanson, and had implanted agents close to him.

President Diem encouraged contacts between SMM and select military leaders such as Trinh Minh The. Shortly after this, he had Hoa Hao General Nguyen Giac Ngo contact us, explaining that he didn't want us to give material help to Ngo, but to teach Ngo how to earn the love and affection of his people. Another leader was Hoa Hao General Lam Thanh Nguyen, whom Diem warned us was avaricious. Following Diem's advice, we kept our contacts with Nguyen brief and social.

The northern SMM team under Conein had organized a paramilitary group (which we will disguise by the Vietnamese name of Binh) through the Northern Dai Viets, a political party with loyalties to Bao Dai. The group was to be trained and supported by the U.S. as patriotic Vietnamese, to come eventually under government control when the government was ready for such activities. Thirteen Bins were quietly exfiltrated through the port of Haiphong, under

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the direction of Lt Andrews, and taken on the first stage of the journey to their training area by a U.S. Navy ship. This was the first of a series of helpful actions by Task Force 98, commanded by Admiral Gahin.

Another paramilitary group for Tonkin operations was being developed in Saigon through General Nguyen Van Vy. In September this group started shaping up fast, and the project was given to Major Allen. (We will give this group the Vietnamese name of Hoo.)

Our paramilitary groups came from political parties which later developed into opposition against President Diem, making our work highly sensitive. Both the French and British have dabbled in the troubled waters of these political parties.

On 25 September, the government was re-shuffled to make room for Cao Dai and Hoa Hao leaders in the Cabinet. The United States, among others, had advocated this move as part of "broadening the base of government". Cabinet meetings took on a distinct Machiavellian air.

Towards the end of the month, it was learned that the largest printing establishment in the north intended to remain in Hanoi and do business with the Vietnamese. An attempt was made by SAM to destroy the modern presses, but Vietnamese security agents already had moved into the plant and frustrated the attempt. This operation was under a Vietnamese patriot whom we shall call Trien Dinh; his case officer was Capt Arundel. Earlier in the month, they had engineered a black paywar strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed by the Vietnamese instructing Tonkinese on how to behave for the Vietnamese takeover of the Hanoi region in early October, including items about property, money reform, and a three-day holiday of workers upon takeover. The day following the distribution of these leaflets, refugee registration tripled. Two days later, Vietnamese currency was worth half the value prior to the leaflets. The Vietnamese took to the radio to denounce the leaflets; the leaflets were so authentic in appearance that even most of the rank and file Vietnamese were sure that the radio denunciations were a French trick.

The Hanoi paywar strike had other consequences. Dinh had enlisted a high police official of Hanoi as part of his team, to effect the release from jail of any team members if arrested.

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SMM "Black" leaflet distributed in Hanoi just before the Vietminh entered the city. The Vietminh were largely unsuccessful in denying this.

VIET-NAM DAN-CHU CONG-HOA -- nam thu X

**BONG BAO THU-BO HOANG-DIEU:**

May tham dur cuoc dai lien-hoan  
ky niem ngay thu do Hoang-Dieu  
dooe giai phong.

UY BAN KHANG CHIEN HANH CHINE  
HOANG-DIEU you cau toan the dan chung noi  
ngoai thanh Hoang-Dieu hay huong ung cuoc  
dai lien-hoan trong ba ngay do Tong-cong-dean  
Lao-dong Viet-Nam te-chue voi su hop tac cua  
chinh quyen nhan dan de an mung ngay thu do  
Hoang-Dieu dooe giai phong khoi ach no-le  
cua chinh phu bu nhia lam tay sai cho thue  
dan Phap.

Trong dip do:

1) Cong nhan bat luan cac nganh, tru  
nganh Cong An, se dooe nghi ba ngay 11,12.  
18 thang mui.

2) Ho Chu-tich, sau 8 nam xa cach, se chinh  
thue ra mat dong bao thu do tai Cong truong  
Nha Hat Lon vao ngay 12 thang 10 sap toi.

3) De that chat tinh than thien quoc te  
voi nhan dan Viet-Nam, cong nhan Lien So va  
cong nhan Trung-quoc se gui bieu thue pham va  
quan ao cho cac cong nhan bi song droi ban tay  
sat cua dich tai Thu-do. Nhung tang pham do  
se dooe phat khong cho dong bao trong ba  
ngay lien-hoan sap toi.

UY MAN KHANG CHIEN HANH CHINH  
THANH HOANG-DIEU

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The official at the last moment decided to assist in the leaflet distribution personally. Police officers spotted him, chased his vehicle through the empty Hanoi streets of early morning, finally opened fire on him and caught him. He was the only member of the group caught. He was held in prison as a Vietminh agent.

d. October 1954

Hanoi was evacuated on 9 October. The northern SMM team left with the last French troops, disturbed by what they had seen of the grim efficiency of the Vietminh in their takeover, the contrast between the silent march of the victorious Vietminh troops in their tennis shoes and the clanking armor of the well-equipped French whose western tactics and equipment had failed against the Communist military-political-economic campaign.

CIA 3.3(b)(1) OSD 3.3(b)(1)

The northern team had spent the last days of Hanoi in contaminating the oil supply of the bus company for a gradual wreckage of engines in the buses, in taking the first actions for delayed sabotage of the railroad (which required teamwork with a CIA special technical team who performed their part brilliantly), and in writing detailed notes of potential targets for future paramilitary operations (U.S. adherence to the Geneva Agreement prevented SMM from carrying out the active sabotage it desired to do against the power plant, water facilities, harbor, and bridge). The team had a bad moment when contaminating the oil. They had to work quickly at night, in an enclosed storage room. Fumes from the contaminant came close to knocking them out. Dizzy and weak-kneed, they masked their faces with handkerchiefs and completed the job.

Meanwhile, Polish and Russian ships had arrived in the south to transport southern Vietminh to Tonkin under the Geneva Agreement. This offered the opportunity for another black psywar strike. A leaflet was developed by Dinh with the help of Capt Arundel, attributed to the Vietminh Resistance Committee. Among other items, it reassured the Vietminh they would be kept safe below decks from imperialist air and submarine attacks, and requested that warm clothing be brought; the warm clothing item would be coupled with a verbal rumor campaign that Vietminh were being sent into China as railroad laborers.

SMM had been busily developing G-5 of the Vietnamese Army for such psywar efforts. Under Arundel's direction, the First Armed Propaganda

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Company printed the leaflets and distributed them, by soldiers in civilian clothes who penetrated into southern Vietminh zones on foot. (Distribution in Camau was made while columnist Joseph Alsop was on his visit there which led to his sensational, gloomy articles later; our soldier "Vietminh" failed in an attempt to get the leaflet into Alsop's hands in Camau; Alsop was never told this story). Intelligence reports and other later reports revealed that village and delegation committees complained about "deportation" to the north, after distribution of the leaflet.

SMM had been working to develop a civilian-military team of Vietnamese for "pacification" of Vietminh dominated areas south of the 17th Parallel. Our hope was to have Army psywar personnel make up composite teams with personnel from the Ministries of Social Action, Information, and Public Health. (SMM had worked with Social Action in June and July, in community self-help projects, and had instituted community voting with symbols for illiterates). Despite the bitter contention between the Army and the civil government, SMM managed to bring officers and officials together in a series of luncheon meetings at our Chief's house and construct a joint working committee of Vietnamese for the effort. Lt Phillips took the committee to the Philippines in October, for a firsthand inspection of Philippine military-civil operations which had been so successful against the Communist Huk. The committee returned, cordial friends and full of ideas.

As part of the work to narrow the rift between government and Army, Navy Lt Lawrence Sharpe, an intelligence officer with Task Force 98 who had been a classmate of Vietnamese Army officers at the Ft Bragg Army Psywar School, was transferred for temporary duty with SMM by Admiral Sabin. With Ambassador Heath's approval, Sharpe was moved in with his friend Lt Minh, who was in command of the Army Radio Station. Army radio broadcasts had undertaken a biting character assassination of President Diem and had picked up a big audience in south Vietnam. Army psywar officers and others close to Minh told us that the anti-government pro-Hinh propaganda campaign was being run by Jean Barre, United Press correspondent and publisher of a weekly newsletter circulated in the French community. Sharpe was instructed by us to gain editorial control of the broadcasts, in stages: switch from character assassination of Diem to attacking him for not taking action against Communist subversion in the south, and then again switch from that to a plain attack against the

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the Communists for their subversive work. It was a tricky task, because the broadcast propaganda line had to be changed after the French propagandists had written it and they kept close tabs on the radio station. One U.S. official complained bitterly to SMM about an American being at the anti-Diem radio station, although the operation was explained to him. USIS wanted to remove U.S. equipment they had given to the radio station, but armored vehicles and troops guarding the station made this unfeasible. Lt Sharpe worked hard at his task, with partial success.

On 14 October, the first medical team of Filipino volunteers for "Operation Brotherhood" arrived, 7 doctors and 3 nurses. SMM, working with Dr Ho Quang "Manny" Phuoc and other members of the Saigon Junior Chamber of Commerce, found a place for them to stay, vehicles, and furnishings. Their original bedding came off our own beds. The Filipinos quickly established a clinic in the refugee center at Bien Hoa. SMM has continued being momma and papa to this group of dedicated volunteers ever since. We're proud that they have earned accolades from leaders of the free world and have won such a place in the hearts of the Vietnamese that word of this unselfish help by free Asians has seeped through all the way to the Chinese border and into areas held by dissidents such as Ba Cut, with patients smuggled through to them. Vietnamese leaders have told us that these Filipinos brought with them the best medicine for a sick nation: courage.

Contention between Diem and Hinh had become murderous. Adherents of each side died in a dirty, gangster-type of warfare of tommy-gun fire from moving vehicles, grenades thrown into houses, kidnappings and tortures. Our work of attempting a compromise solution became most difficult; as we met with friends on either side, we hoped that our friends on the other side hadn't picked that moment for an attack. Finally, we learned that Hinh was close to action; he had selected 26 October as the morning for an attack on the Presidential Palace. Hinh was counting heavily on Lt-Col Lan's special forces and on Captain Giai who was running Hinh's secret headquarters at Hinh's home. We invited these two officers to visit the Philippines, on the pretext that we were making an official trip, could take them along and open the way for them to see some inner workings of the fight against Filipino Communists which they probably would never see otherwise. Hinh reluctantly turned down his own invitation; he had had a memorable

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time of it on his last visit to Manila in 1952. Lt-Col Lan was a French agent and the temptation to see behind-the-scenes was too much. He and Gial accompanied SMM officers on the MAAG C-47 which General O'Daniel instantly made available for the operation. 26 October was spent in the Philippines. The attack on the Palace didn't come off.

e. November 1954

General Lawton Collins arrived as Ambassador on 8 November. He appointed Col Lansdale as a member of his personal staff. Collins flew to Dalat to meet the French chief, General Ely. On his return to Saigon, Collins said that Ely had asked for the removal of Lansdale but that this request was politely but firmly turned down.

Collins, in his first press conference, made it plain that the U.S. was supporting President Diem. The new Ambassador applied pressure on General Hinh and on 29 November Hinh left for Paris. His other key conspirators followed.

Part of the SMM team became involved in staff work to back up the energetic campaign to save Vietnam which Collins pushed forward. Some SMM members were scattered around the Pacific, accompanying Vietnamese for secret training, obtaining and shipping supplies to be smuggled into north Vietnam and hidden there. In the Philippines, more support was being constructed to help SMM, in expediting the flow of supplies, and in creating Freedom Company, a non-profit Philippines corporation backed by President Magsaysay, which would supply Filipinos experienced in fighting the Communist Huks to help in Vietnam (or elsewhere).

SMM conducted a field survey of Vietnamese Army operations in a Vietminh dominated area, the Long-My district near Soc Trang, and discovered that Lt-Col Duc, the local commander, was applying many of the lessons which we had been teaching. Troops were courteous, they had constructed a school and were holding classes for both children and adults with Army volunteers as teachers, they had helped rebuild the market place and church, they carried out active patrolling, and they had placed locked boxes to receive information and suggestions from the population. People responded to the treatment. In a few days they started being friendly with the troops (something usually reserved

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for Communist troops in Asian countries) and, after a Vietminh night hand-grenade attack on the market place, information about names and locations of the Vietminh cadres started to flow to the Army from the people.

Upon return from the survey trip, SMM gave briefings on its findings to Ambassador Collins, General O'Daniel, and U.S. officers in MAAAG. Col Jose Banson, Philippines military observer, assisted SMM in the briefings. SMM suggested that President Diem visit Soc Trang and Long My, to give impetus to the work of the troops. Ambassador Collins enthusiastically backed the idea. The ensuing trip was the first of a series of such visits, with the Army winning over an area and backed up soon by a visit by the President. The people responded warmly. The visiting by a leader was a new experience for them.

The SMM survey trip also revealed a movement towards Camau by Hoa Hao rebel Ba Cut, who appeared to be picking up some Vietminh cadres in his move and adding them to his ranks. People in the Rachgia area told us stories of tortures by the Ba Cut forces. One torture was new to us, the driving of small nails into the ear drum. Some weeks before, Trinh Minh The had had a sharp brush with Ba Cut in the Seven Mountains region close to the Cambodian border; both The and Ba Cut had requested SMM intervention to arrange a truce, but Ba Cut's terms seemed to consist almost solely of receiving arms and ammunition from SMM which we refused; General The had finally taken a small party of scouts into Ba Cut's rear and surprised Ba Cut and his staff, who were promptly brought down by automatic-weapon fire; Ba Cut had been left for dead on the field, but prompt medical aid (reportedly by a French surgeon) saved his life. Shortly after this, the Vietnamese Army had a disastrous campaign against Ba Cut in the same area, with Ba Cut directing his troops from a stretcher. Vietnamese Army officers were convinced that French advisers with them had brought about the disaster; these officers were particularly bitter about a French-arranged truce, French orders to cease fire and entruck in a convoy which turned out to be a Ba Cut ambush as soon as the troops were in the trucks. True or not, the Vietnamese believed it.

On 23 November, twenty-one selected Vietnamese agents and two cooks of our Heo paramilitary group were put aboard a Navy ship in

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the Saigon River, in daylight. They appeared as coolies, joined the coolie and refugee throng moving on and off ship, and disappeared one by one. It was brilliantly planned and executed, agents being picked up from unobtrusive assembly points throughout the metropolis. Lt Andrews made the plans and carried out the movement under the supervision of Major Allen. The ship took the Hoo agents, in compartmented groups, to an overseas point, the first stage in a movement to a secret training area.

#### f. December 1954

General Le Van Ty was appointed Chief of Staff on 12 December. Our friend General Vy had been acting as Chief of Staff, was slated to be moved up to the top position in the Vietnamese Army. Inspector General. Vy had refused the Chief of Staff post while Hinh was still in Vietnam. We arranged a meeting of the two generals with Ambassador Collins for an informal talk on the necessity of keeping partisan politics out of the Army.

Meanwhile, discussions between the U.S., Vietnamese and French had reached a point where it appeared that a military training mission using U.S. officers was in the immediate offing. General O'Daniel had a U.S.-French planning group working on the problem, under Col. Rossen. One paper they were developing was a plan for pacification of Vietnam and disident areas; this paper was passed to SHAM for its assistance with the drafting. SHAM wrote much of the paper, changing the concept from the old rigid police controls of all areas to some of our concepts of winning over the population and instituting a classification of areas by the amount of trouble in each, the amount of control required, and fixing responsibilities between civil and military authorities. With a few changes, this was issued by President Diem on 31 December as the National Security Action (Pacification) Directive.

President Diem had been worrying about the veterans, liked the idea of a veterans legion as a patriotic civic organization, and stated that he would welcome Philippines help. This was a task for the newly organized Freedom Company, which sent the National Commander of the Philippines Veterans Legion, Friaco Juan San Juan, for a brief survey. San Juan brought with him Alfonso Enriquez, who had been active in the PVL and formerly chief of police in Samboanga.

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Enriquez stayed on as Saigon representative of Freedom Company, eventually opening a small office across the street from the Ministry of Defense in Saigon, and working with both the President and the Defense Minister in organizing what later became the Vietnamese Veterans Legion. The main difficulty was in finding veterans who had real leadership and had remained loyal to Diem in the Hinh crisis; it was a frustrating and puzzling search for the Philippines (and for us), since the government constantly changed its mind about loyalties as rumors, reports and suspicions about persons continued to flood the Presidency. SMM gave guidance and help from the back-ground.

The Freedom Company office in Saigon became, in effect, the unofficial Philippines consulate for a long period. Col. Jose Danson, official observer for his government, frequently was asked for assistance in getting visas and taking care of other consular chores. As exchange between Vietnam and the Philippines increased, he asked Freedom Company for help, eventually depended upon them for most of the work. It gave Enriquez and his staff, as well as SMM, an unusual knowledge of the Philippine colony in Vietnam.

There was still much disquiet in Vietnam, particularly among anti-Communist political groups who were not included in the government. SMM officers were contacted by a member of such groups who felt that they "would have to commit suicide in 1956 (the 1956 Plebiscite promised in the 1954 Geneva Agreement) when the Vietnam would surely take over against so weak a government. One group of farmers and militia in the south was talked out of migrating to Madagascar by SMM and staying on their farms. A number of these groups asked SMM for help in training personnel for eventual guerrilla warfare if the Vietnamese won. Persons such as the then Minister of Defense and Trinh Minh The were among those loyal to the government who also requested such help. It was decided that a more basic guerrilla training program might be undertaken for such groups than was available at the secret training site to which we had sent the Binh and Hoo groups. Plans were made with Major Bohemann and Mr. John C. Wachtel in the Philippines for a solution of this problem; the United States backed the development, through them, of a small Freedom Company training camp in a hidden valley on the Clark AFB reservation.

Till and Peg Durdin of the N. Y. Times, Hank Loeberman of the N. Y. Times, Homer Bigart of the N. Y. Herald-Tribune, John

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Mecklin of Life-Time, and John Roderick of Associated Press, have been warm friends of SMM and worked hard to penetrate the fabric of French propaganda and give the U.S. an objective account of events in Vietnam. The group met with us at times to analyze objectives and motives of propaganda known to them, meeting at their own request as U.S. citizens. These mature and responsible news correspondents performed a valuable service for their country.

Army Lt David Smith, who had had political and psychological warfare experience, arrived for six months temporary duty (counting travel time). His performance was superior. Lt Smith, and others sent in for short tours of temporary duty, barely had time to learn Vietnam's problems, became constructive members of the team, before their time was up. These short tours plagued SMM.

SMM had a number of political acquaintances useful to Ambassador Collins. One of these was former Defense Minister Pham Huy Quat, leader of the Northern Dai Viets, whom Collins felt would be a strengthening addition to the government since he had had cabinet experience in previous governments. SMM teamed up with Dr Wesley Fishel, promoted several meetings between Diem and Quat, but Diem never came around to inviting Quat to join his government. Later, following a Cao Dai propaganda attack on Quat personally (which seemed to amuse members of the government), Quat went into open opposition. SMM has maintained friendship with Quat and his associates.

g. January 1955

The Vietminh long ago had adopted the Chinese Communist thought that the people are the water and the army is the fish. Vietminh relations with the mass of the population during the fighting had been exemplary, with a few exceptions; in contrast, the Vietnamese National Army had been like too many Asian armies, adept at cowing a population into feeding them, providing them with girls. SMM had been working on this problem from the beginning. Since the National Army was the only unit of government with a strong organization throughout the country and with good communications, it was the key to stabilizing the situation quickly on a nation-wide basis. If Army and people could be brought together into a team, the first strong weapon against Communism could be forged.

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The Vietnamese were aware of this. We later learned that months before the signing of the Geneva Agreement they had been planning for action in the post-Geneva period; the National Army was to be the primary target for subversion efforts. It was given top priority by the Central Committee for operations against its enemy, and about 100 superior cadres were retrained for the operations and placed in the Dich Van organization for the work, which commenced even before the Agreement was signed. We didn't know it at the time, but this was SMM's major opponent, in a secret struggle for the National Army.

At General O'Daniel's request, SMM worked out a reorganization of the National Army's 6th Bureau to fit U.S. concepts. Its operational intelligence was transferred to G-2. It retained special Counter Espionage and an "action force" similar to our rangers.

General O'Daniel was anticipating the culmination of long negotiations to permit U.S. training of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, against some resistance on the part of French groups. In January, negotiations were proceeding so well that General O'Daniel informally organized a combined U.S.-French training mission which eventually became known as the Training Relations & Instruction Mission (TRIM) under his command, but under the overall command of the top French commander, General Paul Ely.

The French had asked for top command of half the divisions in the TRIM staff. Their first priority was for command of the division supervising National Security Action by Vietnamese, which could be developed into a continuation of strong French control of key elements of both Army and population. In conferences with Ambassador Collins and General O'Daniel, it was decided to transfer Colonel Lansdale from the Ambassador's staff to TRIM, to head the National Security division. Colonel Lansdale requested authority to coordinate all U.S. civil and military efforts in this National Security work. On 11 January, Ambassador Collins announced the change to the country team, and gave him authority to coordinate this work among all U.S. agencies in Vietnam.

The new task, too vital in the fight against Communism to be passed up, required a reorganization of SMM. Two teams were formed, the Whites and the Blues. The White team, under Major Connel, was given the responsibility for all paramilitary and support

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duties of SMM, and was to remain compartmented from other activities. The Blues, under newly arrived Lt-Col Edmund Quereau, were responsible for all political-psychological warfare duties of SMM and were moved into the National Security Division of TRIM. This split was dictated by the French move of placing their trained intelligence and security officers into the National Security Division of TRIM.

Life with the French in the National Security Division was a curious and unpleasant experience just below the surface. Some of the French officers were clearly charged with responsibility for espionage on U.S. officers in TRIM, at times were observed writing reports on U.S. personnel. The chief of staff of TRIM, French Colonel Carbonel, brought in his old comrade Lt-Col Jacques Romain-Defosses as Lansdale's deputy. Carbonel, Romain-Defosses, and Axelrad were known within the FEC as "the Three Musketeers" for their intelligence and paramilitary activities in Vietnam in the past ten years. Axelrad, a civilian, later joined the National Security Division as a Lt-Col. Lt-Col Revol, advisor to G-6 of the National Army when the G-6 organization was engaged in terrorist acts against President Diem's government during the Hinh revolt, joined the National Security Division. Others, such as Major Boussiquet who was quickly transferred from an attache post in Pakistan, were brought in. This French group apparently worked under the daily direction of TRIM's chief of staff, Colonel Carbonel, and daily fed us the latest French propaganda line (Diem was weak, Diem was blood-thirsty, the VNA had low morale, the VNA was unable to fight, Americans didn't understand the Vietnamese, all whites must encourage only selected Vietnamese loyal to the French because the remainder would turn against all whites in another "night of long knives" similar to that of 1946).

Despite the under-surface friction, there was immediate work to do. The Vietnamese Army needed help in mounting and carrying out the occupation of zones being vacated by Vietminh forces under the Geneva Agreement. Two large zones were left for regrouping and transfer of Vietminh forces: the Camau peninsula on the southern tip of Vietnam (to be vacated 8 February) and a Central Vietnam zone south of Tourane consisting of Binh Dinh province and half of Quang Ngai province (to be vacated 22 April). The National Security Division was assigned

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responsibility for the success of these operations by Ambassador Collins and General O'Daniel, including logistical support, planning, movement, personnel, training, and psychological problems. Personnel were borrowed from other TRIM divisions and organized into a field team which moved to Sootrang with the VNA command post for the Camau operation. Lt Phillips was assigned to the field team for psychological warfare. An Operations Brotherhood field team of Filipino medical personnel was assigned to Camau, with Lt. Smith as the SMM officer responsible in Saigon.

The pressure of work to be done and social gatherings at the Chief's house overcame enough of the friction between the French and us to permit teamwork to develop in the National Security Division. (However, as French officers were won over and started to work sincerely with us, they seemed to earn transfers and were shipped out of Vietnam.) At its peak load, the National Security Division was carrying out 26 large projects. The projects included the take-over of Vietminh zones, planning security "sweeps" by the VNA, making useful citizens of demobilized soldiers, integrating sect forces, extending government into the villages, using the Army to fight illiteracy, securing weak points along the Laotian and Cambodian borders, directing security surveys of the nation, and training G-2, G-5, and G-6.

President Diem had continued requesting SMM help with the guard battalion for the Presidential Palace. We made arrangements with President Magsaysay in the Philippines and borrowed his senior aide and military adviser, Col Napoleon Valeriano, who had a fine combat record against the Communist Huks and also had reorganized the Presidential Guard Battalion for Magsaysay. Valeriano, with three junior officers, arrived in January and went to work on Diem's guard battalion. Later, selected Vietnamese officers were trained with the Presidential Guards in Manila. An efficient unit gradually emerged. Diem was warmly grateful for this help by Filipinos who also continuously taught our concept of loyalty and freedom.

The patriot we've named Trieu Dinh had been working on an almanac for popular sale, particularly in the northern cities and towns we could still reach. Noted Vietnamese astrologers were hired to write predictions about coming disasters to certain Vietminh leaders and undertakings, and to predict unity in the south. The work was carried out under the direction of Lt Phillips, based on our concept of the use of astrology for psywar in Southeast Asia. Copies of the almanac were shipped by air to Haiphong and then smuggled into Vietminh territory.

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Binh also had produced a Thomas Paine type series of essays on Vietnamese patriotism against the Communist Vietnam, under the guidance of Capt Arundel. These essays were circulated among influential groups in Vietnam, earned front-page editorials in the leading daily newspaper in Saigon. Circulation increased with the publication of these essays. The publisher is known to SMM as The Dragon Lady and is a fine Vietnamese girl who has been the mistress of an anti-American French civilian. Despite anti-American remarks by her boyfriend, we had helped her keep her paper from being closed by the government (Hollister did this) and she found it profitable to heed our advice on the editorial content of her paper.

Arms and equipment for the Binh paramilitary team were being cached in the north in areas still free from the Vietnam. Personnel movements were covered by the flow of refugees. Haiphong was reminiscent of our own pioneer days as it was swamped with people whom it couldn't shelter. Lying space and food were at a premium, nervous tension grew. It was a wild time for our northern team.

First supplies for the Hoo paramilitary group started to arrive in Saigon. These shipments and the earlier ones for the Binh group were part of an efficient and effective air smuggling effort by the 581st Air Wing, U.S. Air Force, to support SMM, with help by CIA and Air Force personnel in both [REDACTED] SMM officers frequently did cooie labor in manhandling tons of cargo, at times working throughout the night. Marine Capt Smith had been in charge of SMM cargo operations. They later became the responsibility of Army Lt Garbers. All available other officers pitched in to help, as part of our "blood, sweat and tears". CIA 3.3(b)(1) OSD 3.3(b)(1)

President Diem made a trip to Central Vietnam. Unscheduled stops and unheralded demonstrations by the population clearly demonstrated Diem's popularity, and seemed to surprise French Army officers and journalists who were on the scene (apparently, they had believed French propagandists who claimed that Diem was unpopular, weak, and supported only by Americans). SMM sent Army Lt Smith along on the trip to evaluate Diem's popularity. His report became useful in reappraising Diem in several official U.S. quarters.

By 31 January, all operational equipment of the Binh paramilitary group had been trans-shipped to Haiphong from Saigon, mostly with the help of CAT, and the northern SMM team had it cached in operational

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sites. Security measures were being tightened at the Haiphong airport and plans for bringing in the Hec equipment were changed from the air route to sea. Task Force 98, now 98.7 under command of Captain Frank, again was asked to give a helping hand and did so.

**h. February 1955**

Operation "Liberty", the occupation of Camau, commenced on schedule 8 February. After consultation with General O'Daniel, and at Vietnamese request, all TRIM officers of the field team in Soc-trang were brought back to Saigon, except for Lt. Phillips who entered Camau in civilian clothes. The Operations Brotherhood medical team of Filipinos set up medical clinics along the road as quickly as their trucks stopped, kept the clinics open 24 hours a day by working in shifts.

In Saigon, Ambassador Collins unconsciously gave SMM an accolade in a country team meeting. He had heard that only one TRIM officer remained of the field team for Camau, a lieutenant, when he had distinctly ordered a team of field grade officers. General O'Daniel explained that the field grade officers had done their work, been pulled back. Ambassador Collins said that it was too soon, to get the team back there again and not leave so much responsibility to one lieutenant. General O'Daniel replied that the lieutenant was Phillips, "one of Lansdale's team". "Oh, that's different then", replied Collins graciously. Phillips stayed on alone, got the job done.

We had a closely-coordinated working relationship with USIS for "Operation Liberty", as we did in many of our other projects. USIS printed up 3-million leaflets written by SMM which were air-dropped by the Vietnamese Air Force in Camau and later in Binh Dinh. We also have had exceptionally fine working relationships with the USIS-USOM motion picture group under Charles Merts, not only in producing paywar films but in the making of training and indoctrination films as well.

In Saigon, SMM worked long hours to keep logistical support flowing into Camau. It was found that the medical support plan had been based upon faulty reports of available supplies, among a number of other problems which faced us suddenly. Lt. Dave Smith unscrambled the medical problem, but often found himself loading medical supplies on aircraft himself. Other problems

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included the need for potable water, troop behavior of units which arrived at the last minute for the operation and had missed the indoctrination course designed by SMM, and read-building equipment. Anti-Vietminh activities were carried out by a former Vietminh leader who had broken with the Communists; Diem had discussed this with SMM and permitted us to work with the operations commander, Col Due, on this; one action included the off-loading of cloth and sewing material from a ship in Bangkok and flying it to the operation, with the cooperation of USOM (FOA), CARE, and MAAG-Thailand. Colonel Banson stayed with the Operations Brotherhood team, was invaluable in arranging its field support and in making full psychological use of the team among Vietnamese who had been under Vietminh domination for many years.

Freedom Company in the Philippines reported that it had commenced work on a training camp, for our use as needed, and had christened it Camp Banson after the first U.S. officer with the Philippine scouts.

For some weeks, SMM had been working quietly with Trinh Minh The at Diem's request to bring about the integration of his Lien Minh troops into the National Army. On 13 February, a regiment of the Lien Minh arrived from Ba Den mountain and were integrated at a public ceremony in Saigon attended by President Diem and many foreign observers. After he was made a general in the National Army, The walked over and shook hands with the two SMM members present in the section for foreigners, then rejoined the President for the review. (This action by The caused caustic comments by the French afterwards, although their intelligence reports already had noted The's relations with SMM, been confirmed previously by the U.S. Ambassador.) The Lien Minh were in black calico uniforms, the men closest to the reviewing stand wearing tennis shoes. The others were barefoot. Although their uniforms were faded to a dirty gray, and they were barefoot, their weapons were in excellent condition, clean and ready for use. These were fighting men whose leader had pledged them to SMM, who in turn had insisted that they be loyal to Vietnam.

There is a lesson here for everyone concerned with "control" of foreign persons and groups. The strongest control is one that is self-imposed; it is based upon mutual trust and the awakening of unselfish patriotism on ideals or principles we ourselves cherish. Once established, the foreign person or groups serve our own best

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national interests by serving their own highest national interests, which coincide with ours. SLM based its own methods on a happening when Corregidor and Bataan were besieged by hostile Japanese in early 1942. Philippine President Queson had cabled the President of the United States, pointing out that an enemy was gaining control of the countryside, that many Filipinos had died fighting with the Americans against this enemy, that to continue the struggle might well cost many more lives, probably without avail, and would the United States release the Philippines from its pledge to continue the fight so that it could withdraw from the struggle? The President of the United States cabled back his reply. The United States was sympathetic towards the plight of the Philippines and freed them to do as they chose, but the United States had pledged itself to defend the Philippines and would continue to honor its word by continuing to fight as long as there were U.S. soldiers for the fight. Word of these two cables was whispered by Filipino after Filipino throughout the islands. The manner in which the Philippines remained loyal to the same cause as the United States amazed the world. The United States has an immense fund of honor and ideals to draw upon among many peoples and nations; it is there, awaiting correct use.

Since early in 1955, President Diem and Defense Minister Ho Thon Minh had been discussing a Vietnamese substitute for the French-conceived Groupes Administratifs Mobiles (GAM's), a form of military government used in the fight against the Vietminh. Minister Minh had given Kieu Cong Cung the task of formulating a Vietnamese organization which would be more permanent than the GAM's. Both Diem and Minh instructed Cung to obtain the advice of our Chief, who brought in the Blue Team of SLM to start helping Cung. After discussions with President Diem, the project was given the name of Civic Action which translated well in Vietnamese. President Diem gave one of his trusted men, Tran Trung Dung, responsibility for developing the project further; Cung became deputy to Dung. SLM requested a census of government employees, since USOM (FOA) had only sketchy estimates. The plan was to establish a small coordinating group under the President and send trained government employees into the provinces, to establish government at the village level and connect it with the national government. Villages were often dominated by secret Vietminh cadres, had been left alone by the French administration, knew little or nothing of the national government.

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Defense Minister Minh called two meetings of all military and civil authorities from the regions and the provinces. The Presidential Directive of 31 December on National Security Action was explained and discussed, along with implementing directives to the Armed Forces from the Defense Minister. Conditions in each province were discussed and its proper zone classification (created by BMM) assigned by mutual consent. Methods of constructing a team between people-government-army, and of using that team against the Communist Vietnamese, along lines which BMM had consistently been teaching in Vietnam, were described by Vietnamese officials, discussed, and adopted by most of the officials present. (Later, U.S. observers were surprised to find these methods working successfully in remote areas.)

During the last day of the second big meeting of regional and provincial officials, Mr. Dung introduced his plan for Civic Action. It met a storm of protest. Provincial chiefs looked upon it as an attempt by the central government to decrease provincial authority. (The U.S. country team had reacted in much the same manner to the plan.) Diem, Dung, Cung, and Minh in the following days were insistent that Civic Action be started. BMM suggested some modifications of the plan, which were adopted. President Diem ordered Dung and Cung to start, gave them a small budget. They started recruiting cadres from the Ministries of Public Health, Education, Social Action, and Information and commenced training the first team of these cadres, to dress like villagers, live simply, and work hard to help the villagers. On funds eked out a little at a time, mostly under Cung's leadership, a pilot project was tried (BMM brought U.S., French and Vietnamese officials to inspect this pilot project) and Civic Action gradually spread to ten provinces, without U.S. material aid. Province chiefs changed their tune, started asking for teams for their provinces.

As part of National Security Action, BMM suggested that the President visit Canau, talk with the people there who had lived under the Vietnamese. The President did so. It was a successful visit, although there was still evidence of the existence of Vietnamese political cadres. The National Security Division of TRIM was busily listing and studying the lessons learned in the Canau operation, while planning the next major occupation of Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai. Again, this was our responsibility.

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On 28 February, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles visited Vietnam. He was much struck by Operations Brotherhood and the warmly favorable reaction it had caused among the Vietnamese people. He remarked on it in his public statements.

The atmosphere in Vietnam was lightening. We were learning more about the enemy south of the 17th Parallel, were able to start making specific plans to combat him with increasingly stronger military and governmental actions.

i. March 1955

The Blue Team of SMM in the National Security Division became heavily engaged in a number of problems, the most immediately complex of which was in planning the demobilization of the National Army, which didn't want to be demobilized. Fiscal reasons dictated that the Army be phased down from its strength of 260,000 at the start of the year to about 100,000 in the Fall. As troops were demobilized, Vietminh agents exploited the situation, pointing out that the Vietminh were now sure to win since their own forces were being strengthened (this was among mountain people being softened by Vietminh paramilitary forces). Other troops, as they saw their eight-year way of livelihood about to end, took to the hills with their weapons and became bandits. Still others were recruited by sect forces, to swell the ranks of the private armies. Complicating the problem was the fact that most soldiers had married, with an average of wife and three children per soldier. This meant about 800,000 persons would be affected by the demobilization, making it an even larger problem than that of the refugees from the north.

Since our Chief had been given authority to coordinate U.S. agencies in such work and to contact Vietnamese officials as needed, a series of work groups was established of Americans, French and Vietnamese to find solutions to the problem. It was decided to discharge persons with homes south of the 17th Parallel, as far as possible. President Diem backed this with a directive. A quick survey was made of all public works projects, so that troops in the neighborhood could be discharged and given priority for jobs on the projects; this was keyed in with Defense Ministry demobilization orders. With the help of Ambassador Collins, FOA chief Leland Barrows, and General O'Daniel, 5-million piastres were made available to permit demobilization pay of one-thousand piastres per man as an emergency measure. Then a work group was assigned to

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come up with a more permanent solution, preferably one that would combine solutions to both the refugee and demobilization problems. The immediate crisis had been met.

Another knotty problem was that of the private armies, the sect forces. In early March, it was estimated that the sects had a total of about 40,000 men under arms. Somehow, the best sect troops would have to be selected and integrated into the National Army, and the remainder demobilized. Most of these troops had been paid suppletifs of the French Expeditionary Corps, but payments had ended in February; the national government had had to start paying the bill. Ambassador Collins and General Ely discussed the problem. Ely would contribute all funds he could make available, Collins would try to obtain whatever remainder was necessary. They appointed Colonel Lansdale to head a Franco-American work group to come up with a peaceful solution to the problem of the sect armies, to work closely with General Gambier while Ely made a quick trip to France.

The French and American work group was formed quickly, split into teams. One team obtained facts on status of forces, strengths, numbers and types of weapons, rates of pay, and available means of livelihood. Other teams worked on economic, political, and psychological aspects of the problem. The whole group caught the spirit of working hard and fast, obtained facts about the sects hitherto only loosely reported, soon had some practical solutions being worked out. We knew that time was running out for us, the sects were getting restless. In the closing days of our work, we worked right around the clock, coming up with our proposed solution ahead of deadline. General Ely returned from Paris. He and Ambassador Collins met with our work group, decided to give the matter further study. We warned them that time was extremely short, that the sects were about to take action by arms and that a peaceful solution would have to be introduced immediately or the opportunity would be lost. The opportunity was lost.

While we had been working on the problem of the sect forces, the leaders of the sects (most of whom were now members of the government) had held a series of secret meetings, formed a United Front. General Trinh Minh The conferred with SMM on the problem, describing these meetings to us almost as they met. He felt that he could be most useful on the inner council of these meetings, rather than walk out of them. Bay Vien and Ba Cut were the ringleaders,

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were advocating an anti-Diem and anti-U.S. program. We asked General Tho to confer with President Diem; we saw President Diem separately. It was decided to have Tho stay with the United Front's inner council temporarily.

As a ploy to break the trend towards an armed coup against the government, our Chief asked for a meeting with Ambassador Cellins, General O'Daniel, and the Embassy political staff, recommending to them that the initial step be a briefing of sect leaders on the future of the National Army, the briefing to be given by O'Daniel, Lansdale, Rosen, and Cartmell at TRIM. This was agreed to and accomplished to allay sect fears of the future.

Immediately after the TRIM briefing, however, Bay Vien called another meeting of the United Front, presented it with an ultimatum to be sent to President Diem asking him to meet a series of demands or leave office. Everyone present was forced to sign, under moral coercion. Trinh Minh The signed. So did General Phung, commander of the regular Cao Dai forces. Cao Dai Pope Tac had been made president of the United Front. Both Generals Tho and Phung immediately conferred with us. We pointed out that Bay Vien and Ba Cut were planning armed rebellion in the immediate future, that Vietnam's real future lay in a political solution to the problem, that Diem as a true nationalist offered a way out politically to them, and that they should withdraw from the United Front. They both promised to do so, and were told to see Diem and advise him of their true intention.

It is worth noting here that relations between BLM and the Cao Dai military leaders were based on trust and respect, not money. We had become friends. The only money, aside from the initial fund for the Lien Minh given to President Diem, was the small amount spent for food and drink during our conferences.

At President Diem's request, we had been seeing him almost nightly as tensions increased, our sessions with him lasting for hours at a time. He was trying desperately to get French and U.S. help to remove the Burets from the control of the Binh Xuyen, who had purchased control of opiate and police from Bao Dai in the late Spring of 1954 for a staggering sum, including part of the Binh Xuyen take from gambling, prostitution, and the opium traffic. French and U.S. reactions to the problem were in the form of advice to proceed

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slowly, to act with caution. Events would not permit this. Binh Xuyen terrorist squads were acting with automatic weapons and grenades, mostly against civilians; a favorite tactic was to use sub-machine-gun fire on civilian pedestrians at a crowded intersection, then make a fast get-away. Dien decided to gain some measure of control by taking over the prefectural police. On 28 March, a company of paratroopers took over the prefectural police building on rue Gallieni; across the street were Binh Xuyen barricades.

Days before, we had quietly warned U.S. agencies of the possibility of trouble. We asked our Filipino friends in Operation Brotherhood and Freedom Company to institute slightly curfews. Two doctors arrived the evening of 28 March from Canau, stating that the situation there was being endangered by De Cut and that they wanted duty either in quiet Saigon or to return to Manila. We sent them to the Brotherhood BOC, about two blocks away from the Cholon prefectural police headquarters. It came under mortar fire in the early morning. The doctors went home to Manila the next day. The other Filipinos stuck it out, earned further honor by their volunteer care of civilian wounded.

At midnight 28-29 March, the Presidential Palace started receiving mortar fire, one shell hitting the outer wall of the President's bedroom. On rue Gallieni, the Binh Xuyen attacked the prefectural building, were repulsed and then chased down the street. Another paratroop company, in truck convoy on the way to the prefectural building, came under machine-gun fire from a drugstore. The drugstore was quickly demolished. SMM requested permission to send personnel to the Palace; permission was denied. A telephone check gave us a preliminary idea of the situation: some casualties among the troops at the Palace, the Binh Xuyen driven away from the prefectural police building, the Army moving in and taking up positions around the many Binh Xuyen fortified strong-points in the city.

General Ely had decided on imposing a cease-fire, obtaining Ambassador Collins' concurrence in the early morning. French officers and troops moved in and stopped the fighting. Ely saw Dien and insisted upon his desisting from all armed action. The morning sun saw the troops facing each other, often only a few feet from each other, dug in behind sandbags, dirt or concrete structures. Our Chief saw Ambassador Collins early in the morning,

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explaining that only the Binh Xuyen would gain by the cease-fire, that a government which did not control its own police forces in its own capital and permitted a hostile armed force to exist in its midst, a hostile force which had opened fire upon the Presidential Palace, was a government without the power of sovereignty and would be so recognized by the people. The French imposed and U.S. backed cease-fire was continued. Ambassador Collins was sincerely convinced that the Binh Xuyen could be induced by French negotiations to withdraw from the Surete and police control of the metropolis.

The French had been insistent that the National Army was a hollow shell, that its officers would refuse to fight, that morale was so bad the troops would desert rather than follow "bloody Diem." The clandestine United Front radio station, which SMM had located at Ambassador Collins' request as situated at the Y-bridge headquarters of the Binh Xuyen, carried the same theme re a "blood-thirsty" Diem. Colonel Lansdale was placed on the death list by this same radio station. French intelligence and security officers at TRIM were jubilant, although they became glum when we pointed out how the paratroopers made the Binh Xuyen run, that all of us were working to make the National Army stronger and should be proud of the way they proved their combat mettle.

Meanwhile, Major Consin had briefed the members of the Binh paramilitary team and started them infiltrating into the north as individuals. The infiltration was carried out in careful stages over a 30-day period, a successful operation. The Bins became normal citizens, carrying out every day civil pursuits, on the surface.

We had smuggled into Vietnam about eight and a half tons of supplies for the Heo paramilitary group. They included fourteen agent radios, 300 carbines, 90,000 rounds of carbine ammunition, 50 pistols, 10,000 rounds of pistol ammunition, and 300 pounds of explosives. Two and a half tons were delivered to the Heo agents in Tonkin, while the remainder was cached along the Red River by SMM, with the help of the Navy.

On 31 March, General Phuong and his staff attended a ceremony at the Presidential Palace. Eight thousand of his Cao Dai troops were being integrated in the National Army. Pope Tac had left the United Front after a spat with Bay Vien, which included some

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sharp remarks about the Binh Xuyen being chased down rue Gallieni by the paratroopers in the early morning of 29 March. Cao Dai forces under Boul and Ba Cat had failed to join the revolt, despite the attempts by French journalists to describe Balgen-Cholon as "blockaded" by these forces. While Phuong was being sworn in at the Palace, we were sitting in the President's bedroom listening to a detailed run-down on the military and political situation by himself and his staff.

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During the first half of April, there was a continuing decline of public trust in the Diem government, brought about by the cease-fire. Binh Xuyen terrorists shot up the town at night. The Surets remained under Binh Xuyen control. Binh Xuyen troops manned their positions throughout the city. French armored vehicles and troops guarded a large sector of Saigon, extending their boundary lines even further after the late March affair. Bao Dai sent a message to Diem pointing out that Diem had caused the shedding of blood of innocent civilians by his rash actions and was hardly the man to head a government; a copy of this message was also given the Binh Xuyen, who used it over their radio station and in leaflets. Diem was held back from taking corrective measures by the French and U.S. governments, based on the expressed French desire "to prevent more bloodshed".

French journalists and Binh Xuyen propaganda then took up the theme that Colonel Lanudale was really to blame for the blood shed by innocent Vietnamese civilians and that he was rashly provoking another World War. In a few short days, his name had been placed on five "death lists". The propaganda line then changed as the public uneasily wondered why Diem remained inactive against the Binh Xuyen; the new line was that Diem was both weak and unpopular. Unfortunately, U. S. officials who were helping make Diem weak and unpopular now started thinking of ways of changing the government to one that was stronger and more popular. At TRIM, French officers kept us adequately informed of each propaganda change, apparently being given the new line each morning with breakfast at their mess.

Trish Minh Tho was part of the Vietnamese delegation to the Afro-Asian Conference which opened at Bandung 15 April. He had become our intimate friend; we were planning a trip together to the Philippines in May for which Tho was preparing by learning English.

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General The's propaganda theme for Bandung was worked out: Vietnamese nationalists hated the French colonialists and had fought against them, but hated the new Communist colonialism even worse because it would make them slaves, which is why 700,000 Vietnamese had fled from living under the new Communist colonialists in the north. General The had these mimeographed, with many lurid details, and personally handed them out to Communist delegates at Bandung.

Meanwhile, the Heo paramilitary team had finished its training at the secret training site and been flown by the Air Force to a holding site in the Philippines, where Major Allen and his officers briefed the paramilitary team. In mid-April, they were taken by the Navy to Haiphong, where they were gradually slipped ashore. Meanwhile, arms and other equipment including explosives were being flown into Saigon via our smuggling route, being readied for shipment north by the Navy task force handling refugees. The White team office gradually became an imposing munitions depot. Nightly shootings and bombings in restless Saigon caused us to give them dispersed storage behind thick walls as far as this one big house would permit. SMM personnel guarded the house night and day, for it also contained our major files other than the working file at our Command Post. All files were fixed for instant destruction, automatic weapons and hand grenades distributed to all personnel. It was a strange scene for new personnel just arriving.

Army Lt-Col Jorgensen reported for duty with SMM. His quick adaption to the needs of SMM at the moment and his intelligent, energetic work led to his being appointed Deputy to the Chief of SMM.

Tension mounted. With Ambassador Collins' approval, we received the government's plan of action against the Binh Xuyen from Diem, for comment on its effectiveness. This was shown to General O'Daniel, who assigned Lt-Col Hamelin to assist in the work. The annotated plan was given back to Diem, who was still trying hard to get either French or U.S. backing to remove the Binh Xuyen from top positions in the Surete. The green berets of Binh Xuyen shock troops could be seen all over town behind their fortified positions, including Surete headquarters on rue Catinat, the main shopping street of Saigon. The French told Diem that if he tried to take over Surete headquarters which was now included in the French zone, French troops would open fire on the Vietnamese Army. The United States advised Diem to be patient, that the French were really being helpful by negotiating with the Binh Xuyen. The cease-fire limit was extended.

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SMM was making new friends quickly in the Vietnamese Army, including most of the combat leaders commanding troops in Saigon-Cholon and Mai Hui Xuan, chief of military security, whom General Gambier had tried to dissuade from his course of action. Sizeable sums were being offered to Army officers and to sect leaders who were remaining loyal to Diem, to entice them into being at least neutral. Those who refused were subjected to character-assassination attacks, which always included that they had been bought with huge sums from Diem. We got the barest glimpse of the original type-script of one of these attacks, in the hands of TRIM associate Romain-Defosses who said that it had been prepared for Col Carbonel; it was a purported intelligence report of rapes, tortures, murders, and opium smuggling performed by Colonel Xuan. Xuan had long been deputy Surete chief under the French; they were infuriated that he would no longer do their bidding. Others came in for attack for the same reason, including Colonel Don who was chief of the General Staff and had been one of the two most promising French agents among Vietnamese graduates of French intelligence schools. Don chose to stick to his country, his President, and his Army. Both Xuan and Don started working with SMM; we only asked them to be loyal to their own country.

Old contacts started appearing. There were three different attempts by Bay Vien and the Binh Xuyen to open secret negotiations with SMM, one of these was via Corsican gangster friends of Major Concin which continued right into the later fighting. The others were through old Vietnamese acquaintances of ours. At the same time, the Hoa Hao dissident leader Ba Cut made contact through a former high official trusted by Diem. To them all, we replied that the U.S. was still supporting the legal government, Diem, and that we would listen to the dissidents only if they were willing to accept complete surrender from their attempt at a coup. Murder threats against us increased. There was a plot to kidnap Lansdale. Meanwhile, we were helping the government in its work to get the Binh Xuyen chief of staff, Colonel Manh, to rally to the government with troops loyal to him, who comprised about half the Binh Xuyen forces.

At the National Security Division of TRIM, despite obvious French hostility, we continued finishing plans for Operation "Giai Phong" (breaking of slave shackles), the name given to the National Army occupation of southern Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh provinces, using troops of the new 31st and 32nd Divisions. The area had been a real stronghold of the Communists, noted as a leftist hotbed as far

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back as the early 1930's. The Mixed Commission (French-Vietnamese) had agreed on a number of phase date lines within the area for Vietnamese occupation and Vietnamese withdrawal. Communication routes were badly damaged by the war. Almost all available shipping, needed for landings along the thousand mile shore-line, was being used for the evacuation of Hanoi and couldn't be spared. On top of all the usual headaches attending logistical support of an operation, which in our case also included support for Operations Brotherhood medical teams, we had the additional chore of supervising the paywar and behavior training of all troops assigned to the operations. At the last moment, divisional troops were moved south to reinforce Saigon-Cholon. We had to "make do" with fewer troops than the job required.

Colonel Le Van Kim had been assigned as commander of the operation. He had been the brightest of all Vietnamese officers given both military and intelligence training by the French, probably the most capable staff officer in the Vietnamese Army. President Diem was dubious about the choice; he simply didn't trust an officer who had been that close to the French. We offered to assign Lt Phillips to monitor the operation, to be with Col Kim day and night, and suggested that the President call in Kim, tell him that he knew about Kim's past but that he was entrusting him with an operation vital to the nation. As its similar cases in the past, we pointed out that this was real leadership and that Diem was the leader of his people and must demonstrate it to them. He took the advice, expressed surprise to us privately afterwards at the way Kim was backed up by the confidence placed in him. Phillips was assigned to the operation, with General O'Daniel's approval, the only non-Vietnamese military officer participating since Kim was firm in refusing to allow French or U.S. officers be present (including U.S. advisers with the 31st and 32nd Divisions).

Operation "Chai Phang" kicked off on time, 22 April. The troops were still a little dubious about their behavior doctrine, but Kim held them to it strictly. As the troops saw it working, they responded; as the troops responded, started helping people along the route of march, the people opened up to them; by the third day, the behavior action had snow-balled into genuinely brotherly feelings between the people and the troops. The people started to point out Vietnamese stay-behind cadres and their arms caches, started bringing food and flowers to the troops. The news swept into the zones being closed out by the Vietnamese, where they were promising to return soon, and were warning the people against the barbaric practices of the National Army. The last days of the Vietnamese in Binh Dinh were spent in allying out part a population no longer supporting them and getting ready to welcome the

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National Army; children had been hidden in the hills, because the Vietnamese were taking boys and girls down to the age of 12 for shipment to the north; Vietnamese currency became worthless, unlike their currency in other areas. The news from Binh Dinh was cheering to us in Saigon.

Salgon was now seething. Kidnapping of red beret paratroopers and green beret Binh Xuyen was active daily; banded open bottles of vitamins floated down the Saigon River. The respected Chinese who was starting to give President Diem (and SMM) the truth about the opium traffic was kidnapped at high noon from a crowded restaurant on a Cholon main street, never to be seen again. Colonel Xuan, whom the President had told to help SMM on the same opium project, was losing his best agents. French officers in the Binh Xuyen headquarters were busily obtaining the release of G-6 troops kidnapped by the Binh Xuyen, since G-6 was still being used as an arm of French intelligence. General Ely shrugged off Diem's repeated requests for the French to take back the six armed river vedettes of the French Navy being used by the Binh Xuyen, refused to deliver the armored vehicles promised months ago and held just outside of town at Bien Hoa.

General Tbe was asked to move his troops from their camp near Bien Hoa down into the Rung Sat area adjacent to the Saigon River, which was being reached as a guerrilla base for the Binh Xuyen. General Tbe could obtain no water supply for his troops (lack of water was to plague the Binh Xuyen later in this area) and found French armored squadrons accompanying him as he attempted to push towards the Rung Sat area. He left his troops in command of Col. Cao and slipped through to Salgon to ask our help; he needed water carriers and heavier weapons for the reduction of Binh Xuyen strong-points ahead of him. We saw Diem, who was bitter at Tbe's hesitancy; we patiently explained that these were genuine military needs, that Col Minh at First Military Region had given General Tbe neither essential supplies nor encouragement nor a plan of support, and that Tbe's effort would be wasted under these circumstances. The President made no comment.

Major Bohannan, who had been supporting us strongly from the Philippines, arrived in town. He had been about to visit the U.S. on home leave, after years of extra duty in the Philippines, but gave it up when he sensed that SMM was heading into a time of trouble. He was a combat infantryman of experience, had been

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Colonel Lansdale's valued deputy in the struggle against the Huks in the Philippines. Bursts of fire from automatic weapons could be heard around town, now and then the explosion of a plastic bomb. It was rapidly becoming the time and place for experienced hands.

Ambassador Collins had left for Washington. He and we had been meeting several times a day; just before he departed he told Lansdale not to be worried by newspaper rumors that the U.S. would stop supporting Diem. Lansdale asked then if his orders were to continue supporting Diem; Collins said yes. Members of the country team privately felt that Diem should be supported by us, that the National Army was ready to support him and had the capability of defeating the Binh Xuyen. Washington suggested that we get the country team leaders to state this, each through his own channel. This suggestion reached us the morning of 28 April, when we were working on support problems for "Chai Phong" and on a proposal to transfer the veterans bureau to the Ministry of Defense. A call came through from President Diem who wanted us to see him urgently.

On the way to the Palace, Lansdale and Redick came under fire from Binh Xuyen troops occupying the Petruski School near TRIM, forcing them to abandon their vehicle. Civilian cyclists near them were the only casualties. It was the usual terrorist strafing. When it stopped, they drove past Petruski to the Palace. Diem was worried, having just received word from his Washington Embassy that the U.S. appeared to be about to stop supporting him. Bao Dai was ordering him to go to France immediately, had requested a meeting there of a number of Vietnamese, including a majority composed of Diem's enemies, to discuss a new government. The telephone interrupted the conversation; the call was from the General Staff. It had just come under sub-machinegun fire from a jeep passing along rue Gallieni, a French Army jeep driven by a white man in colonial army uniform, with three green-beret Vietnamese handling the weapons. Col Don had been going out the doorway of the building, almost been hit. There were casualties.

Diem told Col Don on the telephone to return any further fire by the terrorists, hang up, then continued with describing his problem. On the 25th, the majority of the police had pledged loyalty to the government, although surete personnel were still holding out with the Binh Xuyen. The trouble was that the prefectural police were becoming

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frightened for the safety of their families when they left home, since Binh Xuyen troops still held strongpoints throughout town, French armor protected a large sector of Saigon containing not only Surete headquarters but also a Binh Xuyen reserve force of shock troops. Most of his Cabinet had resigned as he had failed to take action against the rebellious Binh Xuyen in the capital city. The people were furious against this bold armed holdup of the government by what they knew were only gangsters. Army and people laid the blame on the French, because they could see French armored vehicles and troops in the streets, evidently ready for action against the Vietnamese. We told him that it looked as though Vietnam still needed a leader, that Diem was still President, that the U.S. was still supporting him.

Shortly after starting a late lunch at home, and making dates to meet with General O'Daniel and Mr Barrows to ask them to send messages to Washington through their own channels, the sound of mortar explosives was heard. The telephone rang, amid increasing explosions, some of which were in the neighborhood. It was Vo Van Hai, Diem's confidential secretary on the telephone. He said that the Palace was under heavy mortar fire, that the President was on another line talking to General Ely, that Ely stated that he couldn't hear any explosions and the President was holding the mouthpiece out towards the explosions so Ely could hear them. Hai started to ask what should be done, interrupted himself to say that the President had just ordered the National Army to start returning the fire and had so informed Ely. He hung up.

We had prepared for the emergency. A small team had been formed with the CIA station in Saigon, whose acting chief Phil Potter had voluntarily placed himself under our Chief's guidance for the emergency period. Potter had been appointed head of a small operation group, with Bohannon as deputy and with members from both the CIA station and SMM. Key houses were linked by radio. Operational planning was done jointly, intelligence take shared instantly. All measures possible under the limits permitted by U.S. policy were taken for action against the Binh Xuyen and Ba Cut. (These will not be described here, but there were a number of successful actions).

Consin had been waiting for contact with Bay Vien's men, who still wanted a conference with us. He was ordered to return from the contact point. On the way to report in, he saw a taxi take a

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direct hit in front of him; the taxi was filled with civilians as only Vietnamese taxis can be. Mortar fire was increasing. Some shells were landing around the White team's building, where ammunition and explosives had been stored. Permission was requested to abandon the building, after destroying the files. This permission was denied, since the building was solid enough to sustain direct hits by 81-mm mortar fire and still protect our stored supplies. Even so, those on guard in the building were distinctly uneasy; the National Army had set up batteries across the street which Binh Xuyen mortars were attempting to reach. The Binh Xuyen had set fire to a large section of Cholon and the skies darkened with the smoke. Wrecked cars in the streets, troop movements, and firefighting between combatants in business and residential districts made detours necessary in driving.

Our Chief had asked Charge Randy Kidder to call a meeting of the country team, which Kidder had declined under the inconclusive circumstances of the morning. It was decided to try again, after a brief check in at the White team house to see conditions there. Everything was under control, so our Chief drove to the Embassy to see Kidder. Kidder was having a meeting with the military attachés. They were drafting a report on the fighting for Washington to which we contributed. When this was finished, our Chief asked Kidder again to call a meeting of the country team that evening, the subject to be the support of President Diem by the U.S. under the changed circumstances. Kidder stated that he was not in position to do this, since Collins was still Ambassador.

General O'Daniel and Mr Barrows were seen in late afternoon. They both felt strongly that the U.S. should continue supporting Diem, particularly now that he had been challenged and was fighting back, but neither felt that they should so inform their headquarters, since this was a political matter. (Next morning, Washington asked for the views of the country team on this subject; a meeting was held; the country team quickly agreed that Diem should be supported).

Fighting continued. We were getting fatigued, going without sleep in planning and taking actions, in keeping Washington up to the minute on events in Saigon. Dick Reese, USOM (FOA) photographer, had taken a light civilian aircraft over the Binh Xuyen lines to get

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pictures, was shot down; the Binh Xuyen radio and propaganda leaflets promptly announced that Reese was a spy for Colonel Lansdale. Reese and his French pilot were killed.

The next morning, we saw Trinh Minh The. The Army had asked him to bring his troops in from Bien Hoa and take the left flank when the Army started driving the Binh Xuyen south across the Saigon River and the Canal de Derivation. He was going now to get his troops and bring them past French armor into town. He had a large scale map of the entire area and showed us his plan. He then commented that the people in Cholon were overjoyed that the Army was continuing the fight and that talk had started openly against Bao Dai and the French whose armor was clanking around the streets.

President Diem wanted to see us. Vietnamese troops had captured some French while taking Binh Xuyen strongpoints south of rue Gallieni, more French were seen in the Petraski School which was being reduced by the Army, close by FEC headquarters at Camp de Mares. Bao Dai had sent a message ordering Diem to stop the fight immediately and go to France, that General Vy would take over. The President's eyes were red-rimmed from lack of sleep, but he had confidence in what he was doing. He would ignore Bao Dai. His manner was the same as a few days previously when he heard that General Hinh was returning, and calmly gave orders to either prevent Hinh's entry or arrest him upon landing. The Hoa Hao forces of Ba Cut and Soai had not moved towards Saigon; this was still a localized fight with the Binh Xuyen and the Army was determined to win.

Negotiations with Colonel Manh, Bay Vien's chief of staff, had reached a successful conclusion. His men were crossing the Canal de Derivation; he would prepare them for joining up with the National Army and was convinced that the men were eager to do so; they didn't want to fight the government. SMM worked with the Defense Ministry on surrender leaflets, to exploit this development with the remaining Binh Xuyen when the time came.

We had been getting reports of General Vy's movements during the afternoon (visits to Gambiez, Quat, and others). That night, John Mecklin of Time Magazine telephoned to say that Vy had been arrested at the Palace. We checked with the Presidency; Vy was there but not

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under arrest. Later Major Hoai of the Lien Minh visited us. The "Revolutionary Committee" had arrested Vy at the Palace, paratroopers were coming to free him, and what should the Revolutionary Committee do now? Generals The and Phuong, we learned, were members of this Committee and at the Palace. We commented that it was a hell of a way to run a revolution, and maybe the committee should escape out of the back door.

Just then, The and Phuong arrived at our Chief's house, grinning in embarrassment. President Diem had sent Vy back to the Army, to spend the night in General Hinh's old quarters. The Revolution had failed to arrest Vy, but the people were aroused against Bao Dai. They explained that the Revolutionary Committee had grown out of the Front organization which Diem's brother Nhu had tried to organize some days earlier; they had followed our advice and had joined with Nhu in the Front, but were dissatisfied with some of the weak organizations they felt Nhu was depending on, so had organized something more dynamic to meet the threat of Vy and Bao Dai, and called themselves the Revolutionary Committee. They wanted Bao Dai dethroned and wanted the French to stop interfering in Vietnamese affairs.

The Presidency telephoned early the next morning. Vy had arrested General Ty and Colonel Don, was holding them at Hinh's house, where they were being guarded by a battalion of Imperial Guards which had just arrived from Dalat. Could we come over? SMM officer drove over to the Palace. As we entered, Captain Cao ran down the stairs, told us that Vy's troops had just captured the Post Office two blocks away (it was the communications center for Saigon) and the National Treasury. We had barely started talking with the President when Cao returned. He had grabbed some men from the Presidential Guards, rushed to the Post Office and Treasury buildings, talked the Imperial Guard into leaving, and both building were now secure. He explained that quick action was dictated into him by Col Valeriano when he and others received training with the Malacanang Guards in Manila recently. The President made Cao a major.

Colonel Don reported in. He and Ty had been released by Vy, and Vy was leaving for Dalat with his troops (where Majors Connel and Allen met him secretly later for a conference on our Hec project). Don and other officers had teased Vy about being able to get gasoline and ammunition from the French, when they couldn't. Vy answered that the French would give him anything. The others then asked him to call up the French and

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request the armored vehicles which the French had been holding at Bien Hoa so long without delivery to the Vietnamese Army. The French rushed these vehicles to Minh's house, evidently having been holding them just outside town for this emergency, where Army men took them over and drove them into the fight against the Binh Xuyen. Don said the French still hadn't caught on, still thought that Vy would use this armor to bring the Army into line to stop fighting the Binh Xuyen and be loyal to Bao Dai. Don added that the Army felt the same as the Revolutionary Committee: Bao Dai was finished.

The addition of the armor hastened the withdrawal of the Binh Xuyen. By noon of 30 April, almost all of their forces had withdrawn across the Canal, except for strongpoints in Cholon which were still manned but cut off. National Army troops on the north bank were exhausted, catching quick naps before attempting a crossing. Boats were being gathered for the crossing, but the six vedettes of the Binh Xuyen were in the canal, ready to stop the crossing.

In the afternoon, Trinh Minh The slipped in for a visit with us. (His troop movement through Saigon had thoroughly alarmed many foreigners, including Americans, who felt that he was going to attack the colony of whites). General The reported that all of his troops except one battalion had crossed the canal over a bridge; that they were being held up now by the fire of the six vedettes (river gunboats) who were firing on the bridge at point-blank range from the canal; he wanted to finish the movement and join this last battalion to his troops across the canal where they had to reduce a Binh Xuyen fort which appeared to be heavily manned. The's hand was bleeding on the map he used to show us his position. We bandaged it for him, while giving him tactical advice on how to engage the gunboats from the shore, including the use of artillery. General The told us shortly afterwards that no artillery could be spared for him. We went to the Palace to see if something could be done. The General Staff was there, listened to us, and started artillery moving to the flank to support General The.

Diem wanted to talk about the Revolutionary Committee which was in session. He explained that there were some hot-heads on the Committee, particularly Soh and Lang. He sketched in their political backgrounds for us, including the smattering of political work they had

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learned as minor officials of the Vietminh. He felt that Phuong relished the wild action of the Committee, and that Trinh Minh The had been very foolish to join in with the action. Diem was going to call a Congress of delegates from all provinces to sit in with the Committee, change its character from one dominated by the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao (of General Ngo), to one that could speak with the voice of the people. He had sent a radio message to Hue and delegates from Central Vietnam provinces would be arriving in Saigon shortly. What would the United States do if this Congress dethroned Bao Dai? We explained that the United States probably would accept a legal action, but that dethronement by voice vote in a Congress such as that described by Diem was hardly a legal proceeding.

The President's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu came into the room hurriedly at this point and interrupted us. "Trinh Minh The is dead," he said. He explained that a report had just come in by telephone. General The had been shot through the head while directing the fire against the vedettes. It was news that hurt. Diem broke into tears. We sat with the President for a time, talking about our mutual friend The, then left.

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We suggested to President Diem that the government provide for General The's family, which was done. We also arranged that the Lien Minh make Ngo Dinh Diem their honorary leader. This was done at a private ceremony when The was buried at Nui Ba Den in the presence of his mother, his wife, his children, the Lien Minh staff, Lamedale and Redick. There had been a large public ceremony in Saigon, since The was a national hero. Colonel Cao assumed command of the Lien Minh and was made a general.

In late April, President Diem had requested funds to finance a former Vietnamese leader who promised to get rid of Ba Cut (through Vietnamese close to this Hoa Hao rebel). SAMM furnished 2-million piastres, as a first installment of the funds requested, but advised Diem to check details thoroughly before expenditure. The funds were passed in a large suitcase to Diem's confidential secretary. In following days, President Diem seemed somewhat embarrassed when queried about the project. Finally, he indicated that the plan had not worked out and asked what he should do with the money we had given him. We advised him to return it to us, which he did.

Fighting continued in Cholon, where some Binh Xuyen strong-points still held out. SAMM held one conference with General O'Daniel at MAAG on obtaining bridging material for the Binh Dinh operation, (Col Kim and Lt Phillips had flown down to get help) during which the Binh Xuyen strongpoints around MAAG were reduced; much of this conference was in shouts above the noise of machine guns and mortars, since some of the strongpoints were just across the street.

Colonel Manh was reported as probably dead. He had gone to his home in a little village south of Cholon to get his wife and a file of documents he had hidden. He had said previously that he had documents which gave details of the opium smuggling, including French participation. As he was leaving his house, an armed group seized him. He was last seen, bound and gagged, on the rear floor of a small taxi. His troops were under attack by the remainder of the Binh Xuyen, who were blocking their route through to the National Army. Surrender leaflets, which we had prepared, were dropped from the air, saturating areas held by the Binh Xuyen. On 2 May, five of the battalions fought their way through and joined the National Army. Little more than a thousand men were still alive in these units.

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On 4 May, the National Congress of People and Administrative Representatives met in Saigon, as called by President Diem. He had asked to see us and we sat in the bedroom talking to him while he prepared to appear before the Congress. Diem had been weeping, having just returned from Trinh Minh The's house, and put on dark glasses. We discussed the rumors that the French were asking the U.S. to recall certain Americans (as printed in the local French press as news), the Presidential Directive on Nationality (which would require Army officers to declare themselves either as French or as Vietnamese), and vicious rumors about Col Kim in Binh Dinh. On the latter, we suggested that the President send a mature person he trusted to Binh Dinh to investigate, since reports reaching us showed that Kim was behaving in exemplary and laudable fashion. (An investigator from the Presidency was sent, confirmed our reports.)

Operation Brotherhood had grown into an organization of 105 Filipino doctors and nurses, plus administrative personnel. They were operating ten medical centers, and were training Vietnamese in these operations to prepare them for eventual takeover. More than 2,000 patients were being treated on an average day. The hard work of these teams and their gaiety off-duty when they entertained refugees and orphan groups had become almost a legend in Vietnam. The "tinkling" (Filipino barefoot dance between clanking bamboo poles) was taken up by the Vietnamese (and Americans in Saigon). SMHM continued its help and guidance.

The National Security Division was collecting information about Vietminh activities and organizations south of the 17th Parallel, through available intelligence reports, field trips, and a provincial survey system which made use of TRIM and National Army field personnel (which we had established through the Ministries of Defense and Interior; they trusted us as friends not to mis-use unfavorable information). Results of this work were given to the country team and brought the remark by Ambassador Collins that this was the first detailed picture he had obtained of the enemy. He asked that it be given to General Ely, which was done.

Vietminh paramilitary organizations were located at several places in the foothills of Central Vietnam, in the high plateau jungles north of Kontum, along the jungled Laotian border west of Ban Me

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Thuot, in the swamps of the Plaine des Joncs, and in small cadres along the rivers and canals of the south. Their secret political control of villages was growing, since they were advocating the non-payment of taxes to a government which was to be replaced by the Vietminh in 1956 and were using small-scale terrorism to bring village elders into line.

Although the National Army was still engaged with the Binh Xuyen, and activities by Ba Cut and Soai in the West against the Army had been stepped up sharply (including the shelling of such population centers as Long Xuyen), the National Security Division started planning measures against the Vietminh, including operations in Central Vietnam and immediate security screening actions in provinces south of Saigon, such as Gocong and Bentre. Civic Action, which was developing rapidly on its still extremely limited budget, was asked to put teams into the more troubled areas as quickly as possible.

Haiphong was taken over by the Vietminh on 16 May. Our Binh and northern-Hue teams were in place, completely equipped. It had taken a tremendous amount of hard work to beat the Geneva deadline, to locate, select, exfiltrate, train, infiltrate, equip the men of these two teams and have them in place, ready for actions required against the enemy. It would be a hard task to do openly, but this had to be kept secret from the Vietminh, the International Commission with its suspicious French and Poles and Indians, and even friendly Vietnamese. Movements of personnel and supplies had had to be over thousands of miles.

As Haiphong was taken over by the Vietminh, Binh Dinh was taken over by the Vietnamese Army. SMM's black psywar, through Vietnamese Army agents, had embarrassed the Vietminh: in the name of the local Vietminh Committee, the people of Binh Dinh had been asked to redeem their Vietminh currency (as promised by the Vietminh) for Bank of Indochina piastres by seeing Vietminh officials at the last evacuation point. Thousands traveled to Qui Nhon where red-faced Vietminh lamely explained that they had no money. On 27 May, President Diem visited Qui Nhon and Binh Dinh, where he was given a tumultuous welcome.

Ambassador Collins left, with a warm letter of appreciation to SMM for its help to him. Frederick Reinhardt, the new Ambassador, arrived, and presented his credentials to Diem on 28 May.

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Alfonso Enriquez of Freedom Company had been working day and night, with a small team supporting him and with background guidance and help by SMM, to organize the Vietnamese Veterans. The First National Congress of the Vietnamese Veterans Legion was held on 29 May. This first Vietnamese Veterans' convention was a marked success, with President Diem and General O'Daniel as the honor guests, heading a long list of Vietnamese and foreign officials, including invited visitors from the Philippines Veterans Legion. Surete Chief, General Nguyen Ngoc Le, was chairman of the first convention and was elected as commander of the Legion. Enriquez had become highly popular with the Vietnamese, was asked to make a speech. He distributed gift shirts from the Philippines Veterans Legion. The convention adopted resolutions supporting President Diem and against the Vietminh. After the convention, work started on organizing provincial chapters. Membership in the World Veterans Organization was requested.

On 25 May, President Diem called us in to meet General Mai Huu Xuan, chief of Military Security. He told Xuan that he wanted Xuan to work closely with us in developing his intelligence work. Diem also asked SMM for help in seeing that Xuan got a good rest and some leave in the Philippines. This was arranged.

Our French associates at National Security Division told us that the French mission in Hanoi estimated that there were about 400 Chinese advisors with the Vietminh, mainly as advisors to the higher echelons. A French business man from Hanoi estimated that there were a total of perhaps 2,700 foreign advisors with the Vietminh, including a small Soviet mission. The General Staff of the National Army estimated that there were about 10,000 Vietminh clandestine cadres south of the 17th Parallel; the Vietminh paramilitary in the south were organized in 9 skeletal battalions and 14 skeletal companies.

By the end of the month, SMM was the recipient of unguarded comments by senior French officers, during work on combined projects or at social functions. The gist of these comments was: the French Expeditionary Corps would not fight the Vietminh, except to defend themselves or to protect the evacuation of French civilians.

On 30 May, President Diem told SMM that fighting in the West against SOAI and Ba Cut was imminent, perhaps by 31 May or 1 June.

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Disident actions against the National Army had become intolerable. General Hinh was with Soai at his Cai Von headquarters. Soai's clandestine radio station was broadcasting propaganda similar to that of the Binh Xuyen and Vietminh. Soai had artillery in position to fire on Cantho across the Bassac River from his headquarters; French gunners were reported as serving these guns. (High French officers stated these men were deserters). The plan given Soai was to capture Long Xuyen, Rongia and Chaudoc quickly, to create a favorable international opinion favoring these Hoa Haos over a "weak" government. The National Army was set to capture Cai Von and Lai Vung as soon as hostilities opened.

1. June 1955

On 5 June, General Hinh had called a meeting of sect leaders and Vietminh at Cai Von. The National Army struck swiftly, over-running dissident Hoa Hao positions and strong-points the first few hours. 1,500 of Soai's troops rallied to the National Army. Soai with a few men headed for a juncture with Ba Cut at the Seven Mountains, close to the Cambodian border near Hatien. Ba Cut left one regiment as a rear-guard; it was quickly destroyed by artillery. Ba Cut and Soai headed for hideouts. Hinh fled to Cambodia. Our old friend, Captain Gial, whom we had taken to the Philippines when he was on Hinh's staff planning a coup, was reported to have been killed by Ba Cut in anger over the disaster. One of the students from Redick's former English classes for mistresses was reported to have been in Cai Von with Hinh, safely escaped to Cambodia; we were relieved that this lovely, spirited girl got away.

The failure of a French-type of sect uprising was followed by a bitter and at times hysterical psychological operation by the French. Its main themes were:

1). The basic French mistake in 1945 was in not giving Vietnam its independence. From then on, France was supported by U.S. dollars and was no longer able to act as a free agent. In every showdown, France had to give in to U.S. policy, which was the root of all trouble in Indo-China. Cardinal Spellman influenced the U.S. to back Diem in 1954. The French might have found a modus vivendi with Diem if only certain Americans hadn't encouraged his antipathy towards the French. 100,000 men of the Expeditionary Corps and 30,000 French civilians were going home bitterly anti-American. This would drive France into the neutralist camp, aid the Communists in the next election.

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2). Dictator Diem was trying to hold the masses through terrorism and propaganda. The Army was corrupt. The Vietminh were increasingly powerful. (This line formerly included: the sects are unified and ready to overthrow the government).

3). (In diplomatic circles). Colonel Lansdale was financing Ngo Dinh Nhu in printing anti-French propaganda in a small shop in Cholon.

4). (Raymond Cartier, Paris Match, 4 June). Every Frenchman believes that Lansdale is writing anti-French propaganda at his desk. An anti-French commando group at the American Embassy is playing a mechanical political game and has plunged Vietnam into chaos.

5). (Cafes and army masses). Lansdale is now attempting to buy off the Hoa Hao. French Army personnel saw him with a suitcase containing 1-million piastres trying to bribe Ba Cut (who nobly turned down the offer). Soul had turned down a Lansdale check for 150-million piastres.

Lt-Col Jorgensen had been assigned by General O'Daniel to the Embassy, to assist Ambassador Collins in staff planning for a Civil Guard (national police force). Ambassador Reinhardt had requested that Jorgensen continue this work. SMM had brought in Colonel Valeriano to work with the Vietnamese on this organization, at President Diem's request. Jorgensen and Valeriano teamed up with the police experts of the Public Administration team of Michigan State University, who had arrived to establish a school of public administration in Vietnam, under FOA auspices. The plan finalized by Jorgensen was under long study by the country team; the Vietnamese were impatient to get started with their organization. As a first step, then, Jorgensen arranged for the inclusion of selected Guard officers at the newly-established Army Leadership course at Quang Trung. Twenty others were selected and sent to Manila for a brief Constabulary course given by the Philippines Constabulary, arranged by SMM through Freedom Company. The first group of Civil Guard officers arrived in Manila 10 June; training was given under the guidance of Freedom Company.

The first ten days of June saw a series of killings on the streets of Saigon and Cholon. Despite the fact that all of the victims were French, propagandists labelled this as an "anti-American" campaign, and it was so reported in the U.S. press. The victims were security officials and transportation people, mostly Corsicans recently moved down from

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Tonkin, who apparently had attempted to establish their own opium traffic organization and were stopped by Saigon gangsters from encroaching on long-held preserves.

SMM had long been attempting to reorganize Psychological Warfare in the Vietnamese Army, which had been an ineffective organization since the G-5 had supported Hinh the previous year. Civilians with assimilated rank had been placed in G-5, but had little knowledge of Army organization or capabilities. In June, Minister Adjoint of Defense Tran Trung Dung and Lt Phillips worked out a new psywar organization together, one which would have effective control from the Ministry down through battalions, but with military personnel in executive positions. Diem agreed to this new organization (but has never agreed to which personnel would be placed in key positions). Finally, 15 Army officers were approved by the Ministry to man the top organizations. Training of these men was arranged through Freedom Company at a special Philippines Army course, including field work. While these 15 were in training in the Philippines, SMM was informed that none of the men were trusted sufficiently for key jobs. Upon graduation, they were placed back into lower echelons.

Colonel Kim, whom Diem still suspected of being a French agent, had proven to be an excellent commander in the Binh Dinh operations. We had hopes that he would be selected to head all Army engineering organizations. SMM arranged an indoctrination trip to the Philippines for him in June, had him gently "brain-washed" by the Filipinos through Freedom Company.

President Diem had become enthusiastic about friendship with the Philippines. He told SMM that the very open and warm manner of the Filipinos, in contrast to other Asians whose feelings were continually half-masked, was imparting the true spirit of freedom and democracy among Vietnamese with whom Filipinos came in contact. Most of the government and army now wanted to visit the Philippines, he said. Col. Jose Bansen strongly recommended to President Diem that Nguyen Bao Tean, president of the Revolutionary Committee, be shown democracy in action by sending him to Manila for a visit. Tean arrived in June, where he was taken under the wing of Freedom Company and met leaders of both the executive and legislative branches of government. Tean was greatly interested in the Constitution. SMM arranged meetings through Freedom Company, with two practical Filipino Constitutional lawyers, Senator Lorenzo Tanada and Dr. Juan Orendain. Both had been

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admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court, were working lawyers, and knew the hard truth about politics from the inside. Toan was greatly impressed by these two and invited them to visit Vietnam, at the Revolutionary Committee's expense, and give advice on constructing a constitution for Vietnam.

Two of the Binh paramilitary teams, now operating behind enemy lines, opened radio contact with us. The third team sent a courier message; the Vietminh security measures in its area were still too strict to permit risking radio contact with us.

SMM within the National Security Division had initiated plans to establish a medium-wave radio transmitter, for Free Vietnamese use, to cover both the Vietminh areas of Tonkin and the Center, as well as Center and South Vietnam of Free Vietnam. The plan was originated by Lt Dave Smith, then given to SMM associate Lt-Col George Melvin. Melvin carried through lengthy surveys and coordination with both USOM (FOA) and USIS. A 100 kw transmitter located in the vicinity of Hue could dominate Tonkin over water; an oriented antenna would give complete coverage of the south. This was turned over to USOM and USIS for action.

m. July 1955

The Philippines recognized Vietnam on 12 July. The story behind this goes back several years, when our State Department first started suggesting this strongly to Philippines officials. In December 1954, Senator Clare Recto spoke out vigorously against recognition, arguing that Vietnam was going to turn Communist and the Philippines would be embarrassed. In June 1955, Alfonso Enriquez, who represented Freedom Company in Saigon, and Frisco Juan San Juan, National Commander of the Philippines Veterans Legion, attended the Veterans Convention in Cebu. They decided to push the recognition of Vietnam through the emergency session of the Philippines Congress which had been called by President Magsaysay. They enlisted the support of Senator Mac Peralta, a Legionnaire.

San Juan and Enriquez then turned to Major Bohannon for help. A campaign was mapped out. Mimeographed information brochures on Vietnam were sent to Legion posts, congressmen, civic leaders, and the press. Legion posts started writing their congressmen. Catholic

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Date: MAY 19 2014

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Action and the Junior Chamber of Commerce were induced to help the campaign. When Congress convened on 8 July, there was vigorous support for the recognition of Vietnam from the press, from many civic organizations. Senator Recto again attacked, but found himself against an overwhelming tide of public opinion. On the basis of this popular support, President Magsaysay extended recognition of 12 July without waiting for the Congress to pass a resolution. By the time Recto could muster ammunition for his own isolated stand, 23 July, it was too late.

One of the Binh courier routes makes use of a sailing junk. It put in at a small coastal spot near Nha Trang in Central Vietnam, and the Binh team went ashore to find its contact men. The head of the Bins assigned one of his men to meet the northern crew. Shortly he was picked up at a military check-point. His name was similar to a Binh Xuyen agent who was wanted by the National Army, and he was arrested. He was interrogated by being handcuffed to a leper, both beaten with the same stick to draw blood, told he would now have leprosy, and both locked up in a tiny cell together. SMM was able to have him released.

SMM became involved in the integration of the sect forces of Phuong (Cao Dai) and Ngo (Hoa Hao). The final formula was that half of each force would be integrated as a unit and the other half as individuals, all to receive training and equipment at Quang Trung. The propagandists were busily at work, attempting to induce hostility between the government and these two forces. General O'Daniel and SMM commenced work on the problem, with the approval of President Diem, and quickly obtained Phuong's and Ngo's agreement to working principles.

One of our Hoo agents was given the task of interrogating refugees from Vietminh zones and has furnished much detailed information, some of which is being compiled in a State Department study of social and economic conditions under the Vietminh.

Now, there were indications from Washington that SMM paramilitary operations would be transferred to the control of the Saigon CIA station, and that other SMM activities might be limited to purely clandestine operations. Some of the most stalwart support personnel in the Philippines were being removed. The Freedom Company camp was being shut down, limits placed on its operations. Since personnel slots for military are

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strictly limited under the Geneva Agreement, it appeared that there would be little or no room for SMM. We started to work on these problems.

General O'Daniel reorganized TRIM, with most of our personnel being transferred to MAAG, into the Direct Aid Liaison Section. In the reorganized TRIM, he gave SMM secret responsibility for the G-2 Branch of the Army Division. SMM placed this under associate Lt-Col Melvin, with Lt Phillips to help him. Lt Joseph Palastra was added later, to train Vietnamese commandos. This G-2 Branch is responsible for all intelligence, psywar, ranger, and paramilitary training of the Vietnamese Army. The Vietminh Army has the capability of over-running Free Vietnam; the National Army is planned to have the capability of delaying that enemy until the SEATO nations can send in forces to help, but SEATO has plain escape clauses for its participating nations. Thus, there is the distinct possibility of large portions of Free Vietnam being occupied by the Vietminh enemy in the future. If this happens, Army personnel now being trained by the G-2 Branch of TRIM will be the key to resistance by the Free Vietnamese, just as they will be the key to present actions against Vietminh paramilitary forces south of the 17th Parallel.

SMM itself was reorganized to fit the TRIM and MAAG reorganizations. The new SMM has four teams: Political-Psychological (Blue), Paramilitary (White), Intelligence-Security (Gold), and Support (Red). The White team has been separated physically from the others. Lt Hugo, who has been on duty in the Philippines as our support liaison officer, will be recalled for paramilitary duties at SMM, with another officer replacing him in Manila.

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IV. ORGANIZATION, SAIGON MILITARY MISSION  
31 July 1955

CHIEF

Col Edward Lansdale, USAF

:.....MANILA LIAISON

Lt Victor Hugo, USA

:

EK O

Lt Joseph Redick, USNR

:

.....  
OPERATIONS

Lt-Col Gordon Jorgensen, USAF\*

.....  
POL-PSYWAR  
(BLUE)

Lt Rufus Phillips,  
USAR, Chief

Lt John Gates, Jr.,  
USMCR

Lt Richard  
Mellor, USNR

PARAMILITARY  
(WHITE)

Maj Lucien Cousin,  
USAR, Chief

Maj Fred Allen,  
USAR

Lt Christopher  
Dock, USAR

Lt Joseph  
Palastra, USA

INTELL &  
SECURITY  
(GOLD)

Lt-Col Edmund  
Quereau, USAR,  
Chief

Lt Edward  
Williams, USAR

Lt George  
Moseley, USAR

SUPPORT  
(RED)

Lt Frank Garbers,  
USAR, Chief

Lt Jerome  
Morris, USNR

Sgt Charles  
Sandman, USA

PFC Elwood  
Butler, USA

PFC William  
Flanagan, USAR

OPN ASSOCIATE

Lt-Col George Melvin, USAR

(\*Acts as Deputy Chief in Col Lansdale's absence)

FORMER MEMBERS

Army:

Lt-Col Raymond Wittmayer  
Capt Michael Moriarity  
Lt David Smith  
Lt Richard Halloran  
M/Sgt Alex Alvarez

Navy:

Lt Edward Bain  
Lt Robert Andrews  
Lt Lawrence Sharpe (assoc)

Air Force:

Lt-Col Jesus Villamor

Marine Corps:

Capt Richard Smith  
Capt Arthur Arundel

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## V. EXPENDITURES

Expenditures listed here are for FY 1955. While this does not cover the precise period of the report, it does cover all major expenditures. Expenditures not covered are minor recurring expenses. Included herein are initial costs for establishing the mission, such as official vehicles and office equipment. Pay and allowances of U.S. personnel are not included, nor are weapons, ammunition and radios drawn from U.S. stocks.

Operational, including pay and expenses of agents (including Binh and Heo paramilitary teams), safe-houses, transportation (such as a sailing junk)

Support Equipment, such as vehicles, safes, desks, darkroom photographic equipment, office equipment

Living Quarters, mostly Saigon but includes Haiphong, both cities were landlords' heaven

Per Diem and Travel, including \$20,565 for Vietnamese Garde Civile personnel trained in the Philippines (the bulk of this money will be reimbursed to us); a number of U.S. personnel were with us for fairly short periods of TDY and received per diem; Filipinos are included

Expendable Items, such as operational clothing and cover equipment for safehouses

Maintenance of Fixed Property

Storage, Maintenance and Operation of Vehicles, gasoline and oil are bought on the local market

Wages for local caretaker, guard personnel

Miscellaneous, including transportation of property, confidential fund commo charges

Total

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CIA

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)&gt;25Yrs

VN

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

1 August 1961

204

Eyes Only

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY McNAMARA ←  
DEPUTY SECRETARY GILPATRIC

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale *Ed*

Subject: A Cold War Win

What does it take to win in the cold war? Allen Dulles has agreed that it might be useful to you and General Taylor, as you consider this problem, to read a closely-held report of some successful work in the past. A copy is attached.

The report covers one year

*[REDACTED]* written hurriedly in the midst of conflict, with certain details disguised. It shows what a handful of dedicated and qualified Americans can do, when properly on target and supported.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

cc: General Taylor (eyes only)

*Copy sent to  
Lansdale, McNamara  
& others*

(SECDEF HAS SEEN)

Office of the Secretary of Defense *50.S.C. 552*  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: *19 MAY 2014* Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: *X*  
Reason: *3.3(b)(1)*  
MDR: *13-M-1346*

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: *MAY 19 2014*

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Chief, Records & Declass Div. WHS  
Date: MAY 19 2014

CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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## I. FOREWORD

Please note that this report is classified as "sensitive" as well as "secret."

This is the condensed account of one year in the operations of a "cold war" combat team, written by the team itself in the field, little by little in moments taken as the members could. The team is known as the Saigon Military Mission. The field is Vietnam. There are other teams in the field, American, French, British, Chinese, Vietnamese, Vietminh, and others. Each has its own story to tell. This is ours.

The Saigon Military Mission entered Vietnam on 1 June 1954 when its Chief arrived. However, this is the story of a team, and it wasn't until August 1954 that sufficient members arrived to constitute a team. So, this is mainly an account of the team's first year, from August 1954 to August 1955.

It was often a frustrating and perplexing year, up close. The Geneva Agreements signed on 21 July 1954 imposed restrictive rules upon all official Americans, including the Saigon Military Mission. An active and intelligent enemy made full use of legal rights to screen his activities in establishing his stay-behind organizations south of the 17th Parallel and in obtaining quick security north of that Parallel. The nation's economy and communications system were crippled by eight years of open war. The government, including its Army and other security forces, was in a painful transition from colonial to self rule, making it a year of hot-tempered incidents. Internal problems arose quickly to points where armed conflict was sought as the only solution. The enemy was frequently forgotten in the heavy atmosphere of suspicion, hatred, and jealousy.

The Saigon Military Mission received some blows from allies and the enemy in this atmosphere, as we worked to help stabilize the government and to beat the Geneva time-table of Communist takeover in the north. However, we did beat the time-table. The government did become stabilized. The Free Vietnamese are now becoming unified and learning how to cope with the Communist

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enemy. We are thankful that we had a chance to help in this work in a critical area of the world, to be positive and constructive in a year of doubt.

## II. MISSION

The Saigon Military Mission (SMM) was born in a Washington policy meeting early in 1954, when Dien Bien Phu was still holding out against the encircling Vietminh. The SMM was to enter into Vietnam quietly and assist the Vietnamese, rather than the French, in unconventional warfare. The French were to be kept as friendly allies in the process, as far as possible.

The broad mission for the team was to undertake paramilitary operations against the enemy and to wage political-psychological warfare. Later, after Geneva, the mission was modified to prepare the means for undertaking paramilitary operations in Communist areas rather than to wage unconventional warfare.

On the scene, the team undertook another essential task in warfare, a task which has been overlooked by our side on a number of "cold war" battlegrounds. This task was to provide some measure of staff work and coordination for the U.S. leader (the Ambassador, in his role as Chief of Mission), to help him weld a political-military-economic-unconventional warfare team required for success in the "cold war." It was this self-imposed task which added the extra hours of work each day, and for which this team has become noted.

In a "hot" war, a military commander has a staff to assist him and a commander for each unit in the forces under him. In a "cold" war, the U.S. commander is usually a civilian and has a commander for each unit under him, political, psychological, economic, military, and unconventional. The Embassy staff is made to function as a general staff by necessity, but has little time to do so and still meet Washington requirements levied on it. Embassy staff members have become little more than official reporters for Washington agencies. The "country team" is not a staff in a military sense. It is in reality a commanders conference.

In Vietnam, we are facing an enemy who has a general staff experienced in the strategy and tactics of a "cold" war. This means that the enemy fights as a team, making effective use of political, psychological, economic, military, and unconventional

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forces by using them in a coordinated manner. It is this teamwork by the enemy which has brought us so many staggering defeats after the shooting stopped in World War II; staggering, because in that brief period the enemy has occupied and now holds 2 3/4 million square miles of land which was formerly free and has made captive some 700-million human beings who were formerly free.

SMM's self-imposed task of performing cold-war staff functions for the Ambassador grew out of the necessities of the situation, received official sanction for the coordination part of its role, but was not always understood. The team recognized the necessity and performed well, for it knows that its primary mission is to help bring defeat to the Communists, and providing staff work is one vital role for victory.

### III. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE YEAR

#### a. Early Days

The Saigon Military Mission (SMM) started on 1 June 1954 when its Chief, Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, arrived in Saigon with a small box of files and clothes and a borrowed typewriter, courtesy of an SA-16 flight set up for him by the 13th Air Force at Clark AFB. Lt-General John O'Daniel and Embassy Charge Rob McClintock had arranged for his appointment as Assistant Air Attache, since it was improper for U.S. officers at MAAG at that time to have advisory conferences with Vietnamese officers. Ambassador Heath had concurred already. There was no desk space for an office, no vehicle, no safe for files. He roomed with General O'Daniel, later moved to a small house rented by MAAG. Secret communications with Washington were provided through the Saigon station of CIA.

There was deepening gloom in Vietnam. Dien Bien Phu had fallen. The French were capitulating to the Vietminh at Geneva. The first night in Saigon, Vietminh saboteurs blew up large ammunition dumps at the airport, rocking Saigon throughout the night. General O'Daniel and Charge McClintock agreed that it was time to start taking positive action. O'Daniel paved the way for a quick first-hand survey of the situation throughout the country. McClintock paved the way for contacts with Vietnamese

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political leaders. Our Chief's reputation from the Philippines had preceded him. Hundreds of Vietnamese acquaintanceships were made quickly.

Working in close cooperation with George Hellyer, USIS Chief, a new psychological warfare campaign was devised for the Vietnamese Army and for the government in Hanoi. Shortly after, a refresher course in combat psywar was constructed and Vietnamese Army personnel were rushed through it. A similar course was initiated for the Ministry of Information. Rumor campaigns were added to the tactics and tried out in Hanoi. It was almost too late.

The first rumor campaign was to be a carefully planted story of a Chinese Communist regiment in Tonkin taking reprisals against a Vietminh village whose girls the Chicoms had raped, recalling Chinese Nationalist troop behavior in 1945 and confirming Vietnamese fears of Chinese occupation under Vietminh rule; the story was to be planted by soldiers of the Vietnamese Armed Psywar Company in Hanoi dressed in civilian clothes. The troops received their instructions silently, dressed in civilian clothes, went on the mission, and failed to return. They had deserted to the Vietminh. Weeks later, Tonkinese told an excited story of the misbehavior of two Chinese Divisions in Vietminh territory. Investigated, it turned out to be the old rumor campaign, with Vietnamese embellishments.

There was political chaos. Prince Bun Loc no longer headed the government. Government ministries all but closed. Bao Dai remained at Cannes. The more volatile leaders of political groups were proposing revolution, which included armed attacks on the French. Col. Jean Carbonel of the French Army proposed establishing a maquis with Vietnamese (Nungs and others) known to him close to the Chinese border and asked for our backing. Our reply was that this was a policy decision to be made between the FEC top command and U.S. authorities.

Oscar Arellano, Junior Chamber International vice-president for Southeast Asia, stopped by for a visit with our Chief; an idea in this visit later grew into "Operation Brotherhood".

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On 1 July, Major Lucien Conein arrived, as the second member of the team. He is a paramilitary specialist, well-known to the French for his help with French-operated maquis in Tonkin against the Japanese in 1945, the one American guerrilla fighter who had not been a member of the Patti Mission. He was assigned to MAAG for cover purposes. Arranged by Lt-Col Wm. Rosson, a meeting was held with Col Carbonel, Col Nguyen Van Vy, and the two SMM officers; Vy had seen his first combat in 1945 under Conein. Carbonel proposed establishing a maquis, to be kept as a secret between the four officers. SMM refused, learned later that Carbonel had kept the FEC Deuxieme Bureau informed. Shortly afterwards, at a Defense conference with General O'Daniel, our Chief had a chance to suggest Vy for a command in the North, making him a general. Secretary of State for Defense Le Ngoc Chan did so. Vy was grateful and remained so.

Ngo Dinh Diem arrived on 7 July, and within hours was in despair as the French forces withdrew from the Catholic provinces of Phat Diem and Nam Dinh in Tonkin. Catholic militia streamed north to Hanoi and Haiphong, their hearts filled with anger at French abandonment. The two SMM officers stopped a planned grenade attack by militia girls against French troops guarding a warehouse; the girls stated they had not eaten for three days; arrangements were made for Chinese merchants in Haiphong to feed them. Other militia attacks were stopped, including one against a withdrawing French artillery unit; the militia wanted the guns to stand and fight the Vietminh. The Tonkinese had hopes of American friendship and listened to the advice given them. Governor Tri died, reportedly by poison. Tonkin's government changed as despair grew. On 21 July, the Geneva Agreement was signed. Tonkin was given to the Communists. Anti-Communists turned to SMM for help in establishing a resistance movement and several tentative initial arrangements were made.

Diem himself had reached a nadir of frustration, as his country disintegrated after the conference of foreigners. With the approval of Ambassador Heath and General O'Daniel, our Chief drew up a plan of overall governmental action and presented it to Diem, with Hellyer as interpreter. It called for fast constructive action and dynamic leadership. Although the plan was not adopted, it laid the foundation for a friendship which has lasted.

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Oscar Arellano visited Saigon again. Major Charles T. R. Bohannon, a former team-mate in Philippines days, was in town. At an SMM conference with these two, "Operation Brotherhood" was born: volunteer medical teams of Free Asians to aid the Free Vietnamese who have few doctors of their own. Washington responded warmly to the idea. President Diem was visited; he issued an appeal to the Free World for help. The Junior Chamber International adopted the idea. SMM would monitor the operation quietly in the background.

President Diem had organized a Committee of Cabinet Ministers to handle the problem of refugees from the Communist North. The Committee system was a failure. No real plans had been made by the French or the Americans. After conferences with USOM (FOA) officials and with General O'Daniel, our Chief suggested to Ambassador Heath that he call a U.S. meeting to plan a single Vietnamese agency, under a Commissioner of Refugees to be appointed by President Diem, to run the Vietnamese refugee program and to provide a channel through which help could be given by the U.S., France, and other free nations. The meeting was called and the plan adopted, with MAAG under General O'Daniel in the coordinating role. Diem adopted the plan. The French pitched in enthusiastically to help. CAT asked SMM for help in obtaining a French contract for the refugee airlift, and got it. In return, CAT provided SMM with the means for secret air travel between the North and Saigon.

Later, through Dr. Wesley Fishel who was an intimate friend of President Diem, we induced the Vietnamese government to honor U.S. and other personnel who had aided in refugee work. We devised a Presidential Citation ribbon which was awarded to military personnel. The citation itself was written by us. A number of SMM personnel most intimately connected with aiding the refugees never received this honor, for "cover" reasons.

b. August 1954

An agreement had been reached that the personnel ceiling of U.S. military personnel with MAAG would be frozen at the number present in Vietnam on the date of the cease-fire, under the terms of the Geneva Agreement. In South Vietnam this deadline was to be 11 August. It meant that SMM might have only two members

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present, unless action were taken. General O'Daniel agreed to the addition of ten SMM men under MAAG cover, plus any others in the Defense pipeline who arrived before the deadline. A call for help went out. Ten officers in Korea, Japan, and Okinawa were selected and were rushed to Vietnam.

SMM had one small MAAG house. Negotiations were started for other housing, but the new members of the team arrived before housing was ready and were crammed three and four to a hotel room for the first days. Meetings were held to assess the new members' abilities. None had had political-psychological warfare experience. Most were experienced in paramilitary and clandestine intelligence operations. Plans were made quickly, for time was running out in the north; already the Vietminh had started taking over secret control of Hanoi and other areas of Tonkin still held by French forces.

Major Conein was given responsibility for developing a paramilitary organization in the north, to be in position when the Vietminh took over. He was assigned Army Captain Michael Moriarty, Navy Lt Robert Andrews, and Army Lt Frank Garbers. With General O'Daniel's help, this team was moved north immediately as part of the MAAG staff working on the refugee problem. The team had headquarters in Hanoi, with a branch in Haiphong. Among cover duties, this team supervised the refugee flow for the Hanoi airlift organized by the French. One day, as a CAT C-46 finished loading, they saw a small child standing on the ground below the loading door. They shouted for the pilot to wait, picked the child up and shoved him into the aircraft, which then promptly taxied out for its takeoff in the constant air shuttle. A Vietnamese man and woman ran up to the team, asking what they had done with their small boy, whom they'd brought out to say good-bye to relatives. The Chagrined team explained, finally talked the parents into going south to Free Vietnam, put them in the next aircraft to catch up with their son in Saigon.

Army Lt Rufus Phillips and Marine Capt Arthur Arundel volunteered to assist in political-psychological warfare and were assigned for liaison with G-5 of the Vietnamese National Army, with the community self-help program of the Ministry of Social Action, and with USIS. They learned rapidly. Arundel later was case officer for some effective "black" strikes against the Vietminh. Phillips became an outstanding psychological warrior, beloved by the Vietnamese Army.

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Navy Lt Joseph Redick, with his excellent French, was made executive assistant to the Chief. He worked twelve to twenty hours a day in our labors to shape weapons against the Vietminh and construct a political base for the struggle. Lt Redick had rushed in directly from Washington to beat the deadline.

A second paramilitary team was formed to explore possibilities of organizing resistance against the Vietminh from bases in the south. This team consisted of Army Lt-Col Raymond Wittmayer, Army Major Fred Allen, and Army Lt Edward Williams. The latter was our only experienced counter-espionage officer and undertook double duties, including working with revolutionary political groups. Major Allen eventually was able to mount a Vietnamese paramilitary effort in Tonkin from the south, barely beating the Vietminh shutdown in Haiphong as his teams went in, trained and equipped for their assigned missions.

Navy Lt Edward Bain and Marine Captain Richard Smith were assigned as the support group for SMM. Actually, support for an effort such as SMM is a major operation in itself, running the gamut from the usual administrative and personnel functions to the intricate business of clandestine air, maritime, and land supply of paramilitary materiel. In effect, they became our official smugglers as well as paymasters, housing officers, transportation officers, warehousemen, file clerks, and mess officers. The work load was such that other team members frequently pitched in and helped.

c. September 1954

Highly-placed officials from Washington visited Saigon and, in private conversations, indicated that current estimates led to the conclusion that Vietnam probably would have to be written off as a loss. We admitted that prospects were gloomy, but were positive that there was still a fighting chance.

On 8 September, SMM officers visited Secretary of State for Defense Chan and walked into a tense situation in his office. Chan had just arrested Lt-Col Lan (G-6 of the Vietnamese Army) and Capt Gai (G-5 of the Army). Armed guards filled the room. We were told what had happened and assured that everything was all right by all three principals. Later, we discovered that Chan

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was alone and that the guards were Lt-Col Lan's commandos. Lan was charged with political terrorism (by his "action" squads) and Giai with anti-Diem propaganda (using G-5 leaflet, rumor, and broadcast facilities).

The arrest of Lan and Giai, who simply refused to consider themselves arrested, and of Lt Minh, officer in charge of the Army radio station which was guarded by Army troops, brought into the open a plot by the Army Chief of Staff, General Hinh, to overthrow the government. Hinh had hinted at such a plot to his American friends, using a silver cigarette box given him by Egypt's Naguib to convey the hint. SMM became thoroughly involved in the tense controversy which followed, due to our Chief's closeness to both President Diem and General Hinh. He had met the latter in the Philippines in 1952, was a friend of both Hinh's wife and favorite mistress. (The mistress was a pupil in a small English class conducted for mistresses of important personages, at their request, by Lt Redick).

While various U.S. officials including General O'Daniel and Foreign Service Officer Frank Meloy participated in U.S. attempts to heal the split between the President and his Army, Ambassador Heath asked us to make a major effort to end the controversy. This effort strained relations with Diem and never was successful, but did dampen Army enthusiasm for the plot. At one moment, when there was likelihood of an attack by armored vehicles on the Presidential Palace, SMM told Hinh bluntly that U.S. support most probably would stop in such an event. At the same time a group from the Presidential Guards asked for tactical advice on how to stop armored vehicles with the only weapons available to the Guards: carbines, rifles, and hand grenades. The advice, on tank traps and destruction with improvised weapons, must have sounded grim. The following morning, when the attack was to take place, we visited the Palace; not a guard was left on the grounds; President Diem was alone upstairs, calmly getting his work done.

As a result of the Hinh trouble, Diem started looking around for troops upon whom he could count. Some Tonkinese militia, refugees from the north, were assembled in Saigon close to the Palace. But they were insufficient for what he needed. Diem made an agreement with General Trinh Minh The, leader of some 3,000

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Date: MAY 19 2014

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Cao Dai dissidents in the vicinity of Tayminh, to give General The some needed financial support; The was to give armed support to the government if necessary and to provide a safehaven for the government if it had to flee. The's guerrillas, known as the Lien Minh, were strongly nationalist and were still fighting the Vietminh and the French. At Ambassador Heath's request, the U.S. secretly furnished Diem with funds for The, through the SMM. Shortly afterwards, an invitation came from The to visit him. Ambassador Heath approved the visit.

On 15 September, a small SMM party in civilian clothes visited Trinh Minh The at his mountain hideout, Nui Ba Den, not far from Tayminh. His troops and small arms factories were inspected. He pledged support to the government, asked for U.S. friendship, and agreed only to defend himself against the French and not initiate attacks. Unknown to the French high command, The later made a pact with local French commanders to permit them to report operations which actually were contrived so that the forces did not meet. At SMM's request, General The released French prisoners he held.

Shortly after the General The meeting, the French complained officially to Ambassador Heath, asking that Lansdale be recalled from Vietnam for his anti-French work. Ambassador Heath refused. The French had a violent hatred for The, blaming him for the death of General Chanson, and had implanted agents close to him.

President Diem encouraged contacts between SMM and sect military leaders such as Trinh Minh The. Shortly after this, he had Hoa Hao General Nguyen Giac Ngo contact us, explaining that he didn't want us to give material help to Ngo, but to teach Ngo how to earn the love and affection of his people. Another leader was Hoa Hao General Lam Thanh Nguyen, whom Diem warned us was avaricious. Following Diem's advice, we kept our contacts with Nguyen brief and social.

The northern SMM team under Conein had organized a paramilitary group (which we will disguise by the Vietnamese name of Binh) through the Northern Dai Viets, a political party with loyalties to Bao Dai. The group was to be trained and supported by the U.S. as patriotic Vietnamese, to come eventually under government control when the government was ready for such activities. Thirteen Binh were quietly exfiltrated through the port of Haiphong, under

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the direction of Lt Andrews, and taken on the first stage of the journey to their training area by a U.S. Navy ship. This was the first of a series of helpful actions by Task Force 98, commanded by Admiral Sabin.

Another paramilitary group for Tonkin operations was being developed in Saigon through General Nguyen Van Vy. In September this group started shaping up fast, and the project was given to Major Allen. (We will give this group the Vietnamese name of Heo.)

Our paramilitary groups came from political parties which later developed into opposition against President Diem, making our work highly sensitive. Both the French and British have dabbled in the troubled waters of these political parties.

On 25 September, the government was re-shuffled to make room for Cao Dai and Hoa Hao leaders in the Cabinet. The United States, among others, had advocated this move as part of "broadening the base of government". Cabinet meetings took on a distinct Machiavellian air.

Towards the end of the month, it was learned that the largest printing establishment in the north intended to remain in Hanoi and do business with the Vietminh. An attempt was made by SMM to destroy the modern presses, but Vietminh security agents already had moved into the plant and frustrated the attempt. This operation was under a Vietnamese patriot whom we shall call Trieu Dinh; his case officer was Capt Arundel. Earlier in the month, they had engineered a black psywar strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed by the Vietminh instructing Tonkinese on how to behave for the Vietminh takeover of the Hanoi region in early October, including items about property, money reform, and a three-day holiday of workers upon takeover. The day following the distribution of these leaflets, refugee registration tripled. Two days later, Vietminh currency was worth half the value prior to the leaflets. The Vietminh took to the radio to denounce the leaflets; the leaflets were so authentic in appearance that even most of the rank and file Vietminh were sure that the radio denunciations were a French trick.

The Hanoi psywar strike had other consequences. Dinh had enlisted a high police official of Hanoi as part of his team, to effect the release from jail of any team members if arrested.

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SMM "Black" leaflet distributed in Hanoi just before the Vietminh entered the city. The Vietminh were largely unsuccessful in denying this.

VIỆT-NAM DÂN-CHỦ CÔNG-HÓA -- năm thứ X

**BÔNG BÀO THỨ-BỘ HOÀNG-DIỆU:**

Mấy tham dự cuộc đại liên-hoan  
kỷ niệm ngày thủ dõ Hoàng-Diệu  
được giải phóng.

**ỦY BAN KHÁNG CHIẾN HÀNH CHÍNH**  
HOÀNG-DIỆU yêu cầu toàn thể dân chúng nội  
ngoại thành Hoàng-Diệu hãy hưởng ứng cuộc  
đại liên-hoan trong ba ngày do Tổng-công-đoàn  
Lao-dộng Việt-Nam tổ-chức với sự hợp tác của  
chính quyền nhân dân để ăn mừng ngày thủ dõ  
Hoàng-Diệu được giải phóng khỏi ách nô-lệ  
của chính phủ bù nhìn lam tay sai cho thực  
dân Pháp.

Trong dịp dõ:

- 1) Công nhân bắt luận các ngành, trừ  
ngành Công An, sẽ được nghỉ ba ngày 11, 12,  
18 tháng mười.
- 2) Hộ Chủ-tịch, sau 8 năm xa cách, sẽ chính  
thức ra mắt đồng bào thủ dõ tại Công trường  
Nhà Hát Lớn vào ngày 12 tháng 10 sắp tới.
- 3) Để thắt chặt tinh thần thiện quốc tế  
với nhân dân Việt-Nam, công nhân Liên Xô và  
công nhân Trung-quốc sẽ gửi biểu thực phẩm và  
quần áo cho các công nhân bị sống dưới bàn tay  
sắt của địch tại Thủ-dõ. Những tặng phẩm dõ  
sẽ được phát không cho đồng bào trong ba  
ngày liên-hoan sắp tới.

**ỦY BAN KHÁNG CHIẾN HÀNH CHÍNH**  
**THÀNH HOÀNG-DIỆU**

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The official at the last moment decided to assist in the leaflet distribution personally. Police officers spotted him, chased his vehicle through the empty Hanoi streets of early morning, finally opened fire on him and caught him. He was the only member of the group caught. He was held in prison as a Vietminh agent.

d. October 1954

Hanoi was evacuated on 9 October. The northern SMM team left with the last French troops, disturbed by what they had seen of the grim efficiency of the Vietminh in their takeover, the contrast between the silent march of the victorious Vietminh troops in their tennis shoes and the clanking armor of the well-equipped French whose western tactics and equipment had failed against the Communist military-political-economic campaign.

CIA 3.3(b)(1) OSD 3.3(b)(1)

The northern team had spent the last days of Hanoi in contaminating the oil supply of the bus company for a gradual wreckage of engines in the buses, in taking the first actions for delayed sabotage of the railroad (which required teamwork with a CIA special technical team who performed their part brilliantly), and in writing detailed notes of potential targets for future paramilitary operations (U.S. adherence to the Geneva Agreement prevented SMM from carrying out the active sabotage it desired to do against the power plant, water facilities, harbor, and bridge). The team had a bad moment when contaminating the oil. They had to work quickly at night, in an enclosed storage room. Fumes from the contaminant came close to knocking them out. Dizzy and weak-kneed, they masked their faces with handkerchiefs and completed the job.

Meanwhile, Polish and Russian ships had arrived in the south to transport southern Vietminh to Tonkin under the Geneva Agreement. This offered the opportunity for another black psywar strike. A leaflet was developed by Dinh with the help of Capt Arundel, attributed to the Vietminh Resistance Committee. Among other items, it reassured the Vietminh they would be kept safe below decks from imperialist air and submarine attacks, and requested that warm clothing be brought; the warm clothing item would be coupled with a verbal rumor campaign that Vietminh were being sent into China as railroad laborers.

SMM had been busily developing G-5 of the Vietnamese Army for such psywar efforts. Under Arundel's direction, the First Armed Propaganda

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Company printed the leaflets and distributed them, by soldiers in civilian clothes who penetrated into southern Vietminh zones on foot. (Distribution in Camau was made while columnist Joseph Alsop was on his visit there which led to his sensational, gloomy articles later; our soldier "Vietminh" failed in an attempt to get the leaflet into Alsop's hands in Camau; Alsop was never told this story). Intelligence reports and other later reports revealed that village and delegation committees complained about "deportation" to the north, after distribution of the leaflet.

SMM had been working to develop a civilian-military team of Vietnamese for "pacification" of Vietminh dominated areas south of the 17th Parallel. Our hope was to have Army psywar personnel make up composite teams with personnel from the Ministries of Social Action, Information, and Public Health. (SMM had worked with Social Action in June and July, in community self-help projects, and had instituted community voting with symbols for illiterates). Despite the bitter contention between the Army and the civil government, SMM managed to bring officers and officials together in a series of luncheon meetings at our Chief's house and construct a joint working committee of Vietnamese for the effort. Lt Phillips took the committee to the Philippines in October, for a firsthand inspection of Philippines military-civil operations which had been so successful against the Communist Huks. The committee returned, cordial friends and full of ideas.

As part of the work to narrow the rift between government and Army, Navy Lt Lawrence Sharpe, an intelligence officer with Task Force 98 who had been a classmate of Vietnamese Army officers at the Ft Bragg Army Psywar School, was transferred for temporary duty with SMM by Admiral Sabin. With Ambassador Heath's approval, Sharpe was moved in with his friend Lt Minh, who was in command of the Army Radio Station. Army radio broadcasts had undertaken a biting character assassination of President Diem and had picked up a big audience in south Vietnam. Army psywar officers and others close to Hinh told us that the anti-government pro-Hinh propaganda campaign was being run by Jean Barre, United Press correspondent and publisher of a weekly newsletter circulated in the French community. Sharpe was instructed by us to gain editorial control of the broadcasts, in stages: switch from character assassination of Diem to attacking him for not taking action against Communist subversion in the south, and then again switch from that to a plain attack against the

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the Communists for their subversive work. It was a tricky task, because the broadcast propaganda line had to be changed after the French propagandists had written it and they kept close tabs on the radio station. One U.S. official complained bitterly to SMM about an American being at the anti-Diem radio station, although the operation was explained to him. USIS wanted to remove U.S. equipment they had given to the radio station, but armored vehicles and troops guarding the station made this unfeasible. Lt Sharpe worked hard at his task, with partial success.

On 14 October, the first medical team of Filipino volunteers for "Operation Brotherhood" arrived, 7 doctors and 3 nurses. SMM, working with Dr Ho Quang "Manny" Phuoc and other members of the Saigon Junior Chamber of Commerce, found a place for them to stay, vehicles, and furnishings. Their original bedding came off our own beds. The Filipinos quickly established a clinic in the refugee center at Bien Hoa. SMM has continued being momma and papa to this group of dedicated volunteers ever since. We're proud that they have earned accolades from leaders of the free world and have won such a place in the hearts of the Vietnamese that word of this unselfish help by free Asians has seeped through all the way to the Chinese border and into areas held by dissidents such as Ba Cut, with patients smuggled through to them. Vietnamese leaders have told us that these Filipinos brought with them the best medicine for a sick nation: courage.

Contention between Diem and Hinh had become murderous. Adherents of each side died in a dirty, gangster-type of warfare of tommy-gun fire from moving vehicles, grenades thrown into houses, kidnappings and tortures. Our work of attempting a compromise solution became most difficult; as we met with friends on either side, we hoped that our friends on the other side hadn't picked that moment for an attack. Finally, we learned that Hinh was close to action; he had selected 26 October as the morning for an attack on the Presidential Palace. Hinh was counting heavily on Lt-Col Lan's special forces and on Captain Giai who was running Hinh's secret headquarters at Hinh's home. We invited these two officers to visit the Philippines, on the pretext that we were making an official trip, could take them along and open the way for them to see some inner workings of the fight against Filipino Communists which they probably would never see otherwise. Hinh reluctantly turned down his own invitation; he had had a memorable

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time of it on his last visit to Manila in 1952. Lt-Col Lan was a French agent and the temptation to see behind-the-scenes was too much. He and Giai accompanied SMM officers on the MAAG C-47 which General O'Daniel instantly made available for the operation. 26 October was spent in the Philippines. The attack on the Palace didn't come off.

e. November 1954

General Lawton Collins arrived as Ambassador on 8 November. He appointed Col Lansdale as a member of his personal staff. Collins flew to Dalat to meet the French chief, General Ely. On his return to Saigon, Collins said that Ely had asked for the removal of Lansdale but that this request was politely but firmly turned down.

Collins, in his first press conference, made it plain that the U.S. was supporting President Diem. The new Ambassador applied pressure on General Hinh and on 29 November Hinh left for Paris. His other key conspirators followed.

Part of the SMM team became involved in staff work to back up the energetic campaign to save Vietnam which Collins pushed forward. Some SMM members were scattered around the Pacific, accompanying Vietnamese for secret training, obtaining and shipping supplies to be smuggled into north Vietnam and hidden there. In the Philippines, more support was being constructed to help SMM, in expediting the flow of supplies, and in creating Freedom Company, a non-profit Philippines corporation backed by President Magsaysay, which would supply Filipinos experienced in fighting the Communist Huks to help in Vietnam (or elsewhere).

SMM conducted a field survey of Vietnamese Army operations in a Vietminh dominated area, the Long-My district near Soc Trang, and discovered that Lt-Col Duc, the local commander, was applying many of the lessons which we had been teaching. Troops were courteous, they had constructed a school and were holding classes for both children and adults with Army volunteers as teachers, they had helped rebuild the market place and church, they carried out active patrolling, and they had placed locked boxes to receive information and suggestions from the population. People responded to the treatment. In a few days they started being friendly with the troops (something usually reserved

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for Communist troops in Asian countries) and, after a Vietminh night hand-grenade attack on the market place, information about names and locations of the Vietminh cadres started to flow to the Army from the people.

Upon return from the survey trip, SMM gave briefings on its findings to Ambassador Collins, General O'Daniel, and U.S. officers in MAAG. Col Jose Banzon, Philippines military observer, assisted SMM in the briefings. SMM suggested that President Diem visit Soc Trang and Long-My, to give impetus to the work of the troops. Ambassador Collins enthusiastically backed the idea. The ensuing trip was the first of a series of such visits, with the Army winning over an area and backed up soon by a visit by the President. The people responded warmly. The visiting by a leader was a new experience for them.

The SMM survey trip also revealed a movement towards Camau by Hoa Hao rebel Ba Cut, who appeared to be picking up some Vietminh cadres in his move and adding them to his ranks. People in the Rachgia area told us stories of tortures by the Ba Cut forces. One torture was new to us, the driving of small nails into the ear drum. Some weeks before, Trinh Minh The had had a sharp brush with Ba Cut in the Seven Mountains region close to the Cambodian border; both The and Ba Cut had requested SMM intervention to arrange a truce, but Ba Cut's terms seemed to consist almost solely of receiving arms and ammunition from SMM which we refused; General The had finally taken a small party of scouts into Ba Cut's rear and surprised Ba Cut and his staff, who were promptly brought down by automatic-weapons fire; Ba Cut had been left for dead on the field, but prompt medical aid (reportedly by a French surgeon) saved his life. Shortly after this, the Vietnamese Army had a disastrous campaign against Ba Cut in the same area, with Ba Cut directing his troops from a stretcher. Vietnamese Army officers were convinced that French advisers with them had brought about the disaster; these officers were particularly bitter about a French-arranged truce, French orders to cease fire and entruck in a convoy which turned out to be a Ba Cut ambush as soon as the troops were in the trucks. True or not, the Vietnamese believed it.

On 23 November, twenty-one selected Vietnamese agents and two cooks of our Heo paramilitary group were put aboard a Navy ship in

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the Saigon River, in daylight. They appeared as coolies, joined the coolie and refugee throng moving on and off ship, and disappeared one by one. It was brilliantly planned and executed, agents being picked up from unobtrusive assembly points throughout the metropolis. Lt Andrews made the plans and carried out the movement under the supervision of Major Allen. The ship took the Heo agents, in compartmented groups, to an overseas point, the first stage in a movement to a secret training area.

f. December 1954

General Le Van Ty was appointed Chief of Staff on 12 December. Our friend General Vy had been acting as Chief of Staff, was slated to be moved up to the top position in the Vietnamese Army, Inspector General. Vy had refused the Chief of Staff post while Hinh was still in Vietnam. We arranged a meeting of the two generals with Ambassador Collins for an informal talk on the necessity of keeping partisan politics out of the Army.

Meanwhile, discussions between the U.S., Vietnamese and French had reached a point where it appeared that a military training mission using U.S. officers was in the immediate offing. General O'Daniel had a U.S. - French planning group working on the problem, under Col. Rosson. One paper they were developing was a plan for pacification of Vietminh and dissident areas; this paper was passed to SMM for its assistance with the drafting. SMM wrote much of the paper, changing the concept from the old rigid police controls of all areas to some of our concepts of winning over the population and instituting a classification of areas by the amount of trouble in each, the amount of control required, and fixing responsibilities between civil and military authorities. With a few changes, this was issued by President Diem on 31 December as the National Security Action (Pacification) Directive.

President Diem had been worrying about the veterans, liked the idea of a veterans legion as a patriotic civic organization, and stated that he would welcome Philippines help. This was a task for the newly organized Freedom Company, which sent the National Commander of the Philippines Veterans Legion, Frisco Juan San Juan, for a brief survey. San Juan brought with him Alfonso Enriquez, who had been active in the PVL and formerly chief of police in Samboanga.

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Enriquez stayed on as Saigon representative of Freedom Company, eventually opening a small office across the street from the Ministry of Defense in Saigon, and working with both the President and the Defense Minister in organizing what later became the Vietnamese Veterans Legion. The main difficulty was in finding veterans who had real leadership and had remained loyal to Diem in the Hinh crisis; it was a frustrating and puzzling search for the Filipinos (and for us), since the government constantly changed its mind about loyalties as rumors, reports and suspicions about persons continued to flood the Presidency. SMM gave guidance and help from the background.

The Freedom Company office in Saigon became, in effect, the unofficial Philippines consulate for a long period. Col. Jose Banzon, official observer for his government, frequently was asked for assistance in getting visas and taking care of other consular chores. As exchange between Vietnam and the Philippines increased, he asked Freedom Company for help, eventually depended upon them for most of the work. It gave Enriquez and his staff, as well as SMM, an unusual knowledge of the Filipino colony in Vietnam.

There was still much disquiet in Vietnam, particularly among anti-Communist political groups who were not included in the government. SMM officers were contacted by a member of such groups who felt that they "would have to commit suicide in 1956 (the 1956 Plebiscite promised in the 1954 Geneva Agreement) when the Vietminh would surely take over against so weak a government. One group of farmers and militia in the south was talked out of migrating to Madagascar by SMM and staying on their farms. A number of these groups asked SMM for help in training personnel for eventual guerrilla warfare if the Vietminh won. Persons such as the then Minister of Defense and Trinh Minh The were among those loyal to the government who also requested such help. It was decided that a more basic guerrilla training program might be undertaken for such groups than was available at the secret training site to which we had sent the Binh and Heo groups. Plans were made with Major Bohannon and Mr. John C. Wachtel in the Philippines for a solution of this problem; the United States backed the development, through them, of a small Freedom Company training camp in a hidden valley on the Clark AFB reservation.

Till and Peg Durdin of the N. Y. Times, Hank Lieberman of the N. Y. Times, Homer Bigart of the N. Y. Herald-Tribune, John

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Mecklin of Life-Time, and John Roderick of Associated Press, have been warm friends of SMM and worked hard to penetrate the fabric of French propaganda and give the U.S. an objective account of events in Vietnam. The group met with us at times to analyze objectives and motives of propaganda known to them, meeting at their own request as U.S. citizens. These mature and responsible news correspondents performed a valuable service for their country.

Army Lt David Smith, who had had political and psychological warfare experience, arrived for six months temporary duty (counting travel time). His performance was superior. Lt Smith, and others sent in for short tours of temporary duty, barely had time to learn Vietnam's problems, became constructive members of the team, before their time was up. These short tours plagued SMM.

SMM had a number of political acquaintances useful to Ambassador Collins. One of these was former Defense Minister Pham Huy Quat, leader of the Northern Dai Viets, whom Collins felt would be a strengthening addition to the government since he had had cabinet experience in previous governments. SMM teamed up with Dr Wesley Fishel, promoted several meetings between Diem and Quat, but Diem never came around to inviting Quat to join his government. Later, following a Cao Dai propaganda attack on Quat personally (which seemed to amuse members of the government), Quat went into open opposition. SMM has maintained friendship with Quat and his associates.

g. January 1955

The Vietminh long ago had adopted the Chinese Communist thought that the people are the water and the army is the fish. Vietminh relations with the mass of the population during the fighting had been exemplary, with a few exceptions; in contrast, the Vietnamese National Army had been like too many Asian armies, adept at cowing a population into feeding them, providing them with girls. SMM had been working on this problem from the beginning. Since the National Army was the only unit of government with a strong organization throughout the country and with good communications, it was the key to stabilizing the situation quickly on a nation-wide basis. If Army and people could be brought together into a team, the first strong weapon against Communism could be forged.

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The Vietminh were aware of this. We later learned that months before the signing of the Geneva Agreement they had been planning for action in the post-Geneva period; the National Army was to be the primary target for subversion efforts, it was given top priority by the Central Committee for operations against its enemy, and about 100 superior cadres were retrained for the operations and placed in the Dich Van organization for the work, which commenced even before the Agreement was signed. We didn't know it at the time, but this was SMM's major opponent, in a secret struggle for the National Army.

At General O'Daniel's request, SMM worked out a reorganization of the National Army's 6th Bureau to fit U.S. concepts. Its operational intelligence was transferred to G-2. It retained special Counter Espionage and an "action force" similar to our rangers.

General O'Daniel was anticipating the culmination of long negotiations to permit U.S. training of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, against some resistance on the part of French groups. In January, negotiations were proceeding so well that General O'Daniel informally organized a combined U.S.-French training mission which eventually became known as the Training Relations & Instruction Mission (TRIM) under his command, but under the overall command of the top French commander, General Paul Ely.

The French had asked for top command of half the divisions in the TRIM staff. Their first priority was for command of the division supervising National Security Action by Vietnamese, which could be developed into a continuation of strong French control of key elements of both Army and population. In conferences with Ambassador Collins and General O'Daniel, it was decided to transfer Colonel Lansdale from the Ambassador's staff to TRIM, to head the National Security division. Colonel Lansdale requested authority to coordinate all U.S. civil and military efforts in this National Security work. On 11 January, Ambassador Collins announced the change to the country team, and gave him authority to coordinate this work among all U.S. agencies in Vietnam.

The new task, too vital in the fight against Communism to be passed up, required a reorganization of SMM. Two teams were formed, the Whites and the Blues. The White team, under Major Conein, was given the responsibility for all paramilitary and support

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duties of SMM, and was to remain compartmented from other activities. The Blues, under newly arrived Lt-Col Edmund Quereau, were responsible for all political-psychological warfare duties of SMM and were moved into the National Security Division of TRIM. This split was dictated by the French move of placing their trained intelligence and security officers into the National Security Division of TRIM.

Life with the French in the National Security Division was a curious and unpleasant experience just below the surface. Some of the French officers were clearly charged with responsibility for espionage on U.S. officers in TRIM, at times were observed writing reports on U.S. personnel. The chief of staff of TRIM, French Colonel Carbonel, brought in his old comrade Lt-Col Jacques Romain-Defosses as Lansdale's deputy. Carbonel, Romain-Defosses, and Axelrad were known within the FEC as "the Three Musketeers" for their intelligence and paramilitary activities in Vietnam in the past ten years. Axelrad, a civilian, later joined the National Security Division as a Lt-Col. Lt-Col Revol, advisor to G-6 of the National Army when the G-6 organization was engaged in terrorist acts against President Diem's government during the Hinh revolt, joined the National Security Division. Others, such as Major Boussiquet who was quickly transferred from an attache post in Pakistan, were brought in. This French group apparently worked under the daily direction of TRIM's chief of staff, Colonel Carbonel, and daily fed us the latest French propaganda line (Diem was weak, Diem was blood-thirsty, the VNA had low morale, the VNA was unable to fight, Americans didn't understand the Vietnamese, all whites must encourage only selected Vietnamese loyal to the French because the remainder would turn against all whites in another "night of long knives" similar to that of 1946).

Despite the under-surface friction, there was immediate work to do. The Vietnamese Army needed help in mounting and carrying out the occupation of zones being vacated by Vietminh forces under the Geneva Agreement. Two large zones were left for regrouping and transfer of Vietminh forces: the Camau peninsula on the southern tip of Vietnam (to be vacated 8 February) and a Central Vietnam zone south of Tourane consisting of Binh Dinh province and half of Quang Ngai province (to be vacated 22 April). The National Security Division was assigned

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responsibility for the success of these operations by Ambassador Collins and General O'Daniel, including logistical support, planning, movement, personnel, training, and psychological problems. Personnel were borrowed from other TRIM divisions and organized into a field team which moved to Sootrang with the VNA command post for the Camau operation. Lt Philips was assigned to the field team for psychological warfare. An Operations Brotherhood field team of Filipino medical personnel was assigned to Camau, with Lt. Smith as the SMM officer responsible in Saigon.

The pressure of work to be done and social gatherings at the Chief's house overcame enough of the friction between the French and us to permit teamwork to develop in the National Security Division. (However, as French officers were won over and started to work sincerely with us, they seemed to earn transfers and were shipped out of Vietnam.) At its peak load, the National Security Division was carrying out 26 large projects. The projects included the take-over of Vietminh zones, planning security "sweeps" by the VNA, making useful citizens of demobilized soldiers, integrating sect forces, extending government into the villages, using the Army to fight illiteracy, securing weak points along the Laotian and Cambodian borders, directing security surveys of the nation, and training G-2, G-5, and G-6.

President Diem had continued requesting SMM help with the guard battalion for the Presidential Palace. We made arrangements with President Magsaysay in the Philippines and borrowed his senior aide and military adviser, Col Napoleon Valeriano, who had a fine combat record against the Communist Huks and also had reorganized the Presidential Guard Battalion for Magsaysay. Valeriano, with three junior officers, arrived in January and went to work on Diem's guard battalion. Later, selected Vietnamese officers were trained with the Presidential Guards in Manila. An efficient unit gradually emerged. Diem was warmly grateful for this help by Filipinos who also continuously taught our concept of loyalty and freedom.

The patriot we've named Trieu Dinh had been working on an almanac for popular sale, particularly in the northern cities and towns we could still reach. Noted Vietnamese astrologers were hired to write predictions about coming disasters to certain Vietminh leaders and undertakings, and to predict unity in the south. The work was carried out under the direction of Lt Phillips, based on our concept of the use of astrology for psywar in Southeast Asia. Copies of the almanac were shipped by air to Haiphong and then smuggled into Vietminh territory.

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Dinh also had produced a Thomas Paine type series of essays on Vietnamese patriotism against the Communist Vietnam, under the guidance of Capt Arundel. These essays were circulated among influential groups in Vietnam, earned front-page editorials in the leading daily newspaper in Saigon. Circulation increased with the publication of these essays. The publisher is known to SMM as The Dragon Lady and is a fine Vietnamese girl who has been the mistress of an anti-American French civilian. Despite anti-American remarks by her boy friend, we had helped her keep her paper from being closed by the government (Hellyer did this) and she found it profitable to heed our advice on the editorial content of her paper.

Arms and equipment for the Binh paramilitary team were being cached in the north in areas still free from the Vietnam. Personnel movements were covered by the flow of refugees. Haiphong was reminiscent of our own pioneer days as it was swamped with people whom it couldn't shelter. Living space and food were at a premium, nervous tension grew. It was a wild time for our northern team.

First supplies for the Heo paramilitary group started to arrive in Saigon. These shipments and the earlier ones for the Binh group were part of an efficient and effective air smuggling effort by the 581st Arc Wing, U.S. Air Force, to support SMM, with help by CIA and Air Force personnel in both [REDACTED] SMM officers frequently did coolie labor in manhandling tons of cargo, at times working throughout the night. Marine Capt Smith had been in charge of SMM cargo operations. They later became the responsibility of Army Lt Garbers. All available other officers pitched in to help, as part of our "blood, sweat and tears".

CIA 3.3(b)(1) OSD 3.3(b)(1)

President Diem made a trip to Central Vietnam. Unscheduled stops and unrehearsed demonstrations by the population clearly demonstrated Diem's popularity, and seemed to surprise French Army officers and journalists who were on the scene (apparently, they had believed French propagandists who claimed that Diem was unpopular, weak, and supported only by Americans). SMM sent Army Lt Smith along on the trip to evaluate Diem's popularity. His report became useful in reappraising Diem in several official U.S. quarters.

By 31 January, all operational equipment of the Binh paramilitary group had been trans-shipped to Haiphong from Saigon, mostly with the help of CAT, and the northern SMM team had it cached in operational

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sites. Security measures were being tightened at the Haiphong airport and plans for bringing in the Heo equipment were changed from the air route to sea. Task Force 98, now 98.7 under command of Captain Frank, again was asked to give a helping hand and did so.

h. February 1955

Operation "Liberty", the occupation of Camau, commenced on schedule 8 February. After consultation with General O'Daniel, and at Vietnamese request, all TRIM officers of the field team in Soc-trang were brought back to Saigon, except for Lt. Phillips who entered Camau in civilian clothes. The Operations Brotherhood medical team of Filipinos set up medical clinics along the road as quickly as their trucks stopped, kept the clinics open 24 hours a day by working in shifts.

In Saigon, Ambassador Collins unconsciously gave SMM an accolade in a country team meeting. He had heard that only one TRIM officer remained of the field team for Camau, a lieutenant, when he had distinctly ordered a team of field grade officers. General O'Daniel explained that the field grade officers had done their work, been pulled back. Ambassador Collins said that it was too soon, to get the team back there again and not leave so much responsibility to one lieutenant. General O'Daniel replied that the lieutenant was Phillips, "one of Lansdale's team". "Oh, that's different then", replied Collins graciously. Phillips stayed on alone, got the job done.

We had a closely-coordinated working relationship with USIS for "Operation Liberty", as we did in many of our other projects. USIS printed up 3-million leaflets written by SMM which were air-dropped by the Vietnamese Air Force in Camau and later in Binh Dinh. We also have had exceptionally fine working relationships with the USIS-USOM motion picture group under Charles Mertz, not only in producing psywar films but in the making of training and indoctrination films as well.

In Saigon, SMM worked long hours to keep logistical support flowing into Camau. It was found that the medical support plan had been based upon faulty reports of available supplies, among a number of other problems which faced us suddenly. Lt. Dave Smith unscrambled the medical problem, but often found himself loading medical supplies on aircraft himself. Other problems

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included the need for potable water, troop behavior of units which arrived at the last minute for the operation and had missed the indoctrination course designed by SMM, and road-building equipment. Anti-Vietminh activities were carried out by a former Vietminh leader who had broken with the Communists; Diem had discussed this with SMM and permitted us to work with the operations commander, Col Due, on this; one action included the off-loading of cloth and sewing material from a ship in Bangkok and flying it to the operation, with the cooperation of USOM (FOA), CARE, and MAAG-Thailand. Colonel Banzon stayed with the Operations Brotherhood team, was invaluable in arranging its field support and in making full psychological use of the team among Vietnamese who had been under Vietminh domination for many years.

Freedom Company in the Philippines reported that it had commenced work on a training camp, for our use as needed, and had christened it Camp Batson after the first U.S. officer with the Philippine scouts.

For some weeks, SMM had been working quietly with Trinh Minh The at Diem's request to bring about the integration of his Lien Minh troops into the National Army. On 13 February, a regiment of the Lien Minh arrived from Ba Den mountain and were integrated at a public ceremony in Saigon attended by President Diem and many foreign observers. After he was made a general in the National Army, The walked over and shook hands with the two SMM members present in the section for foreigners, then re-joined the President for the review. (This action by The caused caustic comments by the French afterwards, although their intelligence reports already had noted The's relations with SMM, been confirmed previously by the U.S. Ambassador.) The Lien Minh were in black calico uniforms, the men closest to the reviewing stand wearing tennis shoes. The others were barefoot. Although their uniforms were faded to a dirty gray, and they were barefoot, their weapons were in excellent condition, clean and ready for use. These were fighting men whose leader had pledged them to SMM, who in turn had insisted that they be loyal to Vietnam.

There is a lesson here for everyone concerned with "control" of foreign persons and groups. The strongest control is one that is self-imposed; it is based upon mutual trust and the awakening of unselfish patriotism on ideals or principles we ourselves cherish. Once established, the foreign person or groups serve our own best

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national interests by serving their own highest national interests, which coincide with ours. SMM based its own methods on a happening when Corregidor and Bataan were besieged by hostile Japanese in early 1942. Philippine President Quezon had cabled the President of the United States, pointing out that an enemy was gaining control of the countryside, that many Filipinos had died fighting with the Americans against this enemy, that to continue the struggle might well cost many more lives, probably without avail, and would the United States release the Philippines from its pledge to continue the fight so that it could withdraw from the struggle? The President of the United States cabled back his reply. The United States was sympathetic towards the plight of the Philippines and freed them to do as they chose, but the United States had pledged itself to defend the Philippines and would continue to honor its word by continuing to fight as long as there were U.S. soldiers for the fight. Word of these two cables was whispered by Filipino after Filipino throughout the islands. The manner in which the Philippines remained loyal to the same cause as the United States amazed the world. The United States has an immense fund of honor and ideals to draw upon among many peoples and nations; it is there, awaiting correct use.

Since early in 1955, President Diem and Defense Minister Ho Thon Minh had been discussing a Vietnamese substitute for the French-conceived Groupes Administratifs Mobiles (GAM's), a form of military government used in the fight against the Vietminh. Minister Minh had given Kieu Cong Cung the task of formulating a Vietnamese organization which would be more permanent than the GAM's. Both Diem and Minh instructed Cung to obtain the advice of our Chief, who brought in the Blue Team of SMM to start helping Cung. After discussions with President Diem, the project was given the name of Civic Action which translated well in Vietnamese. President Diem gave one of his trusted men, Tran Trung Dung, responsibility for developing the project further; Cung became deputy to Dung. SMM requested a census of government employees, since USOM (FOA) had only sketchy estimates. The plan was to establish a small coordinating group under the President and send trained government employees into the provinces, to establish government at the village level and connect it with the national government. Villages were often dominated by secret Vietminh cadres, had been left alone by the French administration, knew little or nothing of the national government.

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Defense Minister Minh called two meetings of all military and civil authorities from the regions and the provinces. The Presidential Directive of 31 December on National Security Action was explained and discussed, along with implementing directives to the Armed Forces from the Defense Minister. Conditions in each province were discussed and its proper zone classification (created by SMM) assigned by mutual consent. Methods of constructing a team between people-government-army, and of using that team against the Communist Vietminh, along lines which SMM had consistently been teaching in Vietnam, were described by Vietnamese officials, discussed, and adopted by most of the officials present. (Later, U.S. observers were surprised to find these methods working successfully in remote areas.)

During the last day of the second big meeting of regional and provincial officials, Mr. Dung introduced his plan for Civic Action. It met a storm of protest. Provincial chiefs looked upon it as an attempt by the central government to decrease provincial authority. (The U.S. country team had reacted in much the same manner to the plan.) Diem, Dung, Cung, and Minh in the following days were insistent that Civic Action be started. SMM suggested some modifications of the plan, which were adopted. President Diem ordered Dung and Cung to start, gave them a small budget. They started recruiting cadres from the Ministries of Public Health, Education, Social Action, and Information and commenced training the first team of these cadres, to dress like villagers, live simply, and work hard to help the villages. On funds eked out a little at a time, mostly under Cung's leadership, a pilot project was tried (SMM brought U.S., French and Vietnamese officials to inspect this pilot project) and Civic Action gradually spread to ten provinces, without U.S. material aid. Province chiefs changed their tune, started asking for teams for their provinces.

As part of National Security Action, SMM suggested that the President visit Camau, talk with the people there who had lived under the Vietminh. The President did so. It was a successful visit, although there was still evidence of the existence of Vietminh political cadres. The National Security Division of TRIM was busily listing and studying the lessons learned in the Camau operation, while planning the next major occupation of Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai. Again, this was our responsibility.

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On 28 February, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles visited Vietnam. He was much struck by Operations Brotherhood and the warmly favorable reaction it had caused among the Vietnamese people. He remarked on it in his public statements.

The atmosphere in Vietnam was lightening. We were learning more about the enemy south of the 17th Parallel, were able to start making specific plans to combat him with increasingly stronger military and governmental actions.

i. March 1955

The Blue Team of SMM in the National Security Division became heavily engaged in a number of problems, the most immediately complex of which was in planning the demobilization of the National Army, which didn't want to be demobilized. Fiscal reasons dictated that the Army be phased down from its strength of 260,000 at the start of the year to about 100,000 in the Fall. As troops were demobilized, Vietminh agents exploited the situation, pointing out that the Vietminh were now sure to win since their own forces were being strengthened (this was among mountain people being softened by Vietminh paramilitary forces). Other troops, as they saw their eight-year way of livelihood about to end, took to the hills with their weapons and became bandits. Still others were recruited by sect forces, to swell the ranks of the private armies. Complicating the problem was the fact that most soldiers had married, with an average of wife and three children per soldier. This meant about 800,000 persons would be affected by the demobilization, making it an even larger problem than that of the refugees from the north.

Since our Chief had been given authority to coordinate U.S. agencies in such work and to contact Vietnamese officials as needed, a series of work groups was established of Americans, French and Vietnamese to find solutions to the problem. It was decided to discharge persons with homes south of the 17th Parallel, as far as possible. President Diem backed this with a directive. A quick survey was made of all public works projects, so that troops in the neighborhood could be discharged and given priority for jobs on the projects; this was keyed in with Defense Ministry demobilization orders. With the help of Ambassador Collins, FOA chief Leland Barrows, and General O'Daniel, 5-million piastres were made available to permit demobilization pay of one-thousand piastres per man as an emergency measure. Then a work group was assigned to

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come up with a more permanent solution, preferably one that would combine solutions to both the refugee and demobilization problems. The immediate crisis had been met.

Another knotty problem was that of the private armies, the sect forces. In early March, it was estimated that the sects had a total of about 40,000 men under arms. Somehow, the best sect troops would have to be selected and integrated into the National Army, and the remainder demobilized. Most of these troops had been paid suppletifs of the French Expeditionary Corps, but payments had ended in February; the national government had had to start paying the bill. Ambassador Collins and General Ely discussed the problem. Ely would contribute all funds he could make available, Collins would try to obtain whatever remainder was necessary. They appointed Colonel Lansdale to head a Franco-American work group to come up with a peaceful solution to the problem of the sect armies, to work closely with General Gambiez while Ely made a quick trip to France.

The French and American work group was formed quickly, split into teams. One team obtained facts on status of forces, strengths, numbers and types of weapons, rates of pay, and available means of livelihood. Other teams worked on economic, political, and psychological aspects of the problem. The whole group caught the spirit of working hard and fast, obtained facts about the sects hitherto only loosely reported, soon had some practical solutions being worked out. We knew that time was running out for us, the sects were getting restless. In the closing days of our work, we worked right around the clock, coming up with our proposed solution ahead of deadline. General Ely returned from Paris. He and Ambassador Collins met with our work group, decided to give the matter further study. We warned them that time was extremely short, that the sects were about to take action by arms and that a peaceful solution would have to be introduced immediately or the opportunity would be lost. The opportunity was lost.

While we had been working on the problem of the sect forces, the leaders of the sects (most of whom were now members of the government) had held a series of secret meetings, formed a United Front. General Trinh Minh The conferred with SMM on the problem, describing these meetings to us almost as they met. He felt that he could be most useful on the inner council of these meetings, rather than walk out of them. Bay Vien and Ba Cut were the ringleaders,

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were advocating an anti-Diem and anti-U. S. program. We asked General The to confer with President Diem; we saw President Diem separately. It was decided to have The stay with the United Front's inner council temporarily.

As a play to break the trend towards an armed coup against the government, our Chief asked for a meeting with Ambassador Collins, General O'Daniel, and the Embassy political staff, recommending to them that the initial step be a briefing of sect leaders on the future of the National Army, the briefing to be given by O'Daniel, Lansdale, Rosson, and Carbonel at TRIM. This was agreed to and accomplished to allay sect fears of the future.

Immediately after the TRIM briefing, however, Bay Vien called another meeting of the United Front, presented it with an ultimatum to be sent to President Diem asking him to meet a series of demands or leave office. Everyone present was forced to sign, under moral suasion. Trinh Minh The signed. So did General Phuong, commander of the regular Cao Dai forces. Cao Dai Pope Tac had been made president of the United Front. Both Generals The and Phuong immediately conferred with us. We pointed out that Bay Vien and Ba Cut were planning armed rebellion in the immediate future, that Vietnam's real future lay in a political solution to the problem, that Diem as a true nationalist offered a way out politically to them, and that they should withdraw from the United Front. They both promised to do so, and were told to see Diem and advise him of their true intention.

It is worth noting here that relations between SMM and the Cao Dai military leaders were based on trust and respect, not money. We had become friends. The only money, aside from the initial fund for the Lien Minh given to President Diem, was the small amount spent for food and drink during our conferences.

At President Diem's request, we had been seeing him almost nightly as tensions increased, our sessions with him lasting for hours at a time. He was trying desperately to get French and U. S. help to remove the Surete from the control of the Binh Xuyen, who had purchased control of surete and police from Bao Dai in the late Spring of 1954 for a staggering sum, including part of the Binh Xuyen take from gambling, prostitution, and the opium traffic. French and U. S. reactions to the problem were in the form of advice to proceed

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slowly, to act with caution. Events would not permit this. Binh Xuyen terrorist squads were acting with automatic weapons and grenades, mostly against civilians; a favorite tactic was to use sub-machine-gun fire on civilian pedestrians at a crowded intersection, then make a fast get-away. Diem decided to gain some measure of control by taking over the prefectural police. On 28 March, a company of paratroopers took over the prefectural police building on rue Gallieni; across the street were Binh Xuyen barricades.

Days before, we had quietly warned U.S. agencies of the possibility of trouble. We asked our Filipino friends in Operation Brotherhood and Freedom Company to institute nightly curfews. Two doctors arrived the evening of 28 March from Camau, stating that the situation there was being endangered by Ba Cut and that they wanted duty either in quiet Saigon or to return to Manila. We sent them to the Brotherhood BOQ, about two blocks away from the Cholon prefectural police headquarters. It came under mortar fire in the early morning. The doctors went home to Manila the next day. The other Filipinos stuck it out, earned further honor by their volunteer care of civilian wounded.

At midnight 28-29 March, the Presidential Palace started receiving mortar fire, one shell hitting the outer wall of the President's bedroom. On rue Gallieni, the Binh Xuyen attacked the prefectural building, were repulsed and then chased down the street. Another paratroop company, in truck convoy on the way to the prefectural building, came under machine-gun fire from a drugstore. The drugstore was quickly demolished. SMM requested permission to send personnel to the Palace; permission was denied. A telephone check gave us a preliminary idea of the situation: some casualties among the troops at the Palace, the Binh Xuyen driven away from the prefectural police building, the Army moving in and taking up positions around the many Binh Xuyen fortified strong-points in the city.

General Ely had decided on imposing a cease-fire, obtaining Ambassador Collins' concurrence in the early morning. French officers and troops moved in and stopped the fighting. Ely saw Diem and insisted upon his desisting from all armed action. The morning sun saw the troops facing each other, often only a few feet from each other, dug in behind sandbags, dirt or concrete structures. Our Chief saw Ambassador Collins early in the morning.

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explaining that only the Binh Xuyen would gain by the cease-fire, that a government which did not control its own police forces in its own capital and permitted a hostile armed force to exist in its midst, a hostile force which had opened fire upon the Presidential Palace, was a government without the power of sovereignty and would be so recognized by the people. The French imposed and U.S. backed cease-fire was continued. Ambassador Collins was sincerely convinced that the Binh Xuyen could be induced by French negotiations to withdraw from the Surete and police control of the metropolis.

The French had been insistent that the National Army was a hollow shell, that its officers would refuse to fight, that morale was so bad the troops would desert rather than follow "bloody Diem." The clandestine United Front radio station, which SMM had located at Ambassador Collins' request as situated at the Y-bridge headquarters of the Binh Xuyen, carried the same theme re a "blood-thirsty" Diem. Colonel Lansdale was placed on the death list by this same radio station. French intelligence and security officers at TRIM were jubilant, although they became glum when we pointed out how the paratroopers made the Binh Xuyen run, that all of us were working to make the National Army stronger and should be proud of the way they proved their combat mettle.

Meanwhile, Major Conein had briefed the members of the Binh paramilitary team and started them infiltrating into the north as individuals. The infiltration was carried out in careful stages over a 30-day period, a successful operation. The Bins became normal citizens, carrying out every day civil pursuits, on the surface.

We had smuggled into Vietnam about eight and a half tons of supplies for the Heo paramilitary group. They included fourteen agent radios, 300 carbines, 90,000 rounds of carbine ammunition, 50 pistols, 10,000 rounds of pistol ammunition, and 300 pounds of explosives. Two and a half tons were delivered to the Heo agents in Tonkin, while the remainder was cached along the Red River by SMM, with the help of the Navy.

On 31 March, General Phuong and his staff attended a ceremony at the Presidential Palace. Eight thousand of his Cao Dai troops were being integrated in the National Army. Pope Tac had left the United Front after a spat with Bay Vien, which included some

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sharp remarks about the Binh Xuyen being chased down rue Gallieni by the paratroopers in the early morning of 29 March. Cao Dai forces under Soai and Ba Cut had failed to join the revolt, despite the attempts by French journalists to describe Saigon-Cholon as "blockaded" by these forces. While Phuong was being sworn in at the Palace, we were sitting in the President's bedroom listening to a detailed run-down on the military and political situation by himself and his staff.

j. April 1955

During the first half of April, there was a continuing decline of public trust in the Diem government, brought about by the cease-fire. Binh Xuyen terrorists shot up the town at night. The Surete remained under Binh Xuyen control. Binh Xuyen troops manned their positions throughout the city. French armored vehicles and troops guarded a large sector of Saigon, extending their boundary lines even further after the late March affair. Bao Dai sent a message to Diem pointing out that Diem had caused the shedding of blood of innocent civilians by his rash actions and was hardly the man to head a government; a copy of this message was also given the Binh Xuyen, who used it over their radio station and in leaflets. Diem was held back from taking corrective measures by the French and U.S. governments, based on the expressed French desire "to prevent more bloodshed".

French journalists and Binh Xuyen propaganda then took up the theme that Colonel Lansdale was really to blame for the blood shed by innocent Vietnamese civilians and that he was rashly provoking another World War. In a few short days, his name had been placed on five "death lists". The propaganda line then changed as the public uneasily wondered why Diem remained inactive against the Binh Xuyen; the new line was that Diem was both weak and unpopular. Unfortunately, U. S. officials who were helping make Diem weak and unpopular now started thinking of ways of changing the government to one that was stronger and more popular. At TRIM, French officers kept us adequately informed of each propaganda change, apparently being given the new line each morning with breakfast at their mess.

Trinh Minh The was part of the Vietnamese delegation to the Afro-Asian Conference which opened at Bandung 15 April. He had become our intimate friend; we were planning a trip together to the Philippines in May for which The was preparing by learning English.

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General The's propaganda theme for Bandung was worked out: Vietnamese nationalists hated the French colonialists and had fought against them, but hated the new Communist colonialism even worse because it would make them slaves, which is why 700,000 Vietnamese had fled from living under the new Communist colonialists in the north. General The had these mimeographed, with many lurid details, and personally handed them out to Communist delegates at Bandung.

Meanwhile, the Heo paramilitary team had finished its training at the secret training site and been flown by the Air Force to a holding site in the Philippines, where Major Allen and his officers briefed the paramilitary team. In mid-April, they were taken by the Navy to Haiphong, where they were gradually slipped ashore. Meanwhile, arms and other equipment including explosives were being flown into Saigon via our smuggling route, being readied for shipment north by the Navy task force handling refugees. The White team office gradually became an imposing munitions depot. Nightly shootings and bombings in restless Saigon caused us to give them dispersed storage behind thick walls as far as this one big house would permit. SMM personnel guarded the house night and day, for it also contained our major files other than the working file at our Command Post. All files were fixed for instant destruction, automatic weapons and hand grenades distributed to all personnel. It was a strange scene for new personnel just arriving.

Army Lt-Col Jorgensen reported for duty with SMM. His quick adaption to the needs of SMM at the moment and his intelligent, energetic work led to his being appointed Deputy to the Chief of SMM.

Tension mounted. With Ambassador Collins' approval, we received the government's plan of action against the Binh Xuyen from Diem, for comment on its effectiveness. This was shown to General O'Daniel, who assigned Lt-Col Hamelin to assist in the work. The annotated plan was given back to Diem, who was still trying hard to get either French or U.S. backing to remove the Binh Xuyen from top positions in the Surete. The green berets of Binh Xuyen shock troops could be seen all over town behind their fortified positions, including Surete headquarters on rue Catinat, the main shopping street of Saigon. The French told Diem that if he tried to take over Surete headquarters which was now included in the French zone, French troops would open fire on the Vietnamese Army. The United States advised Diem to be patient, that the French were really being helpful by negotiating with the Binh Xuyen. The cease-fire limit was extended.

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SMM was making new friends quickly in the Vietnamese Army, including most of the combat leaders commanding troops in Saigon-Cholon and Mai Huu Xuan, chief of military security, whom General Gambiez had tried to dissuade from his course of action. Sizeable sums were being offered to Army officers and to sect leaders who were remaining loyal to Diem, to entice them into being at least neutral. Those who refused were subjected to character-assassination attacks, which always included that they had been bought with huge sums from Diem. We got the barest glimpse of the original type-script of one of these attacks, in the hands of TRIM associate Romain-Defosses who said that it had been prepared for Col Carbonel; it was a purported intelligence report of rapes, tortures, murders, and opium smuggling performed by Colonel Xuan. Xuan had long been deputy Surete chief under the French; they were infuriated that he would no longer do their bidding. Others came in for attack for the same reason, including Colonel Don who was chief of the General Staff and had been one of the two most promising French agents among Vietnamese graduates of French intelligence schools. Don chose to stick to his country, his President, and his Army. Both Xuan and Don started working with SMM; we only asked them to be loyal to their own country.

Old contacts started appearing. There were three different attempts by Bay Vien and the Binh Xuyen to open secret negotiations with SMM, one of these was via Corsican gangster friends of Major Conein which continued right into the later fighting. The others were through old Vietnamese acquaintances of ours. At the same time, the Hoa Hao dissident leader Ba Cut made contact through a former high official trusted by Diem. To them all, we replied that the U.S. was still supporting the legal government, Diem, and that we would listen to the dissidents only if they were willing to accept complete surrender from their attempt at a coup. Murder threats against us increased. There was a plot to kidnap Lansdale. Meanwhile, we were helping the government in its work to get the Binh Xuyen chief of staff, Colonel Manh, to rally to the government with troops loyal to him, who comprised about half the Binh Xuyen forces.

At the National Security Division of TRIM, despite obvious French hostility, we continued finishing plans for Operation "Giai Phong" (breaking of slave shackles), the name given to the National Army occupation of southern Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh provinces, using troops of the new 31st and 32nd Divisions. The area had been a real stronghold of the Communists, noted as a leftist hotbed as far

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back as the early 1930's. The Mixed Commission (French-Vietminh) had agreed on a number of phase date lines within the area for Vietnamese occupation and Vietminh withdrawal. Communication routes were badly damaged by the war. Almost all available shipping, needed for landings along the thousand mile shore-line, was being used for the evacuation of Haiphong and couldn't be spared. On top of all the usual headaches attending logistical support of an operation, which in our case also included support for Operations Brotherhood medical teams, we had the additional chore of supervising the psywar and behavior training of all troops assigned to the operations. At the last moment, divisional troops were moved south to reinforce Saigon-Cholon. We had to "make do" with fewer troops than the job required.

Colonel Le Van Kim had been assigned as commander of the operation. He had been the brightest of all Vietnamese officers given both military and intelligence training by the French, probably the most capable staff officer in the Vietnamese Army. President Diem was dubious about the choice; he simply didn't trust an officer who had been that close to the French. We offered to assign Lt Phillips to monitor the operation, to be with Col Kim day and night, and suggested that the President call in Kim, tell him that he knew about Kim's past but that he was entrusting him with an operation vital to the nation. As in similar cases in the past, we pointed out that this was real leadership and that Diem was the leader of his people and must demonstrate it to them. He took the advice, expressed surprise to us privately afterwards at the way Kim was bucked up by the confidence placed in him. Phillips was assigned to the operation, with General O'Daniel's approval, the only non-Vietnamese military officer participating since Kim was firm in refusing to allow French or U.S. officers be present (including U.S. advisors with the 31st and 32nd Divisions).

Operation "Giai Phong" kicked off on time, 22 April. The troops were still a little dubious about their behavior doctrine, but Kim held them to it strictly. As the troops saw it working, they responded; as the troops responded, started helping people along the route of march, the people opened up to them; by the third day, the behavior action had snow-balled into genuinely brotherly feelings between the people and the troops. The people started to point out Vietminh stay-behind cadres and their arms caches, started bringing food and flowers to the troops. The news swept into the zones being closed out by the Vietminh, where they were promising to return soon, and were warning the people against the barbaric practices of the National Army. The last days of the Vietminh in Dinh Dinh were spent in slinking out past a population no longer supporting them and getting ready to welcome the

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National Army; children had been hidden in the hills, because the Vietminh were taking boys and girls down to the age of 12 for shipment to the north; Vietminh currency became worthless, unlike their currency in other areas. The news from Binh Dinh was cheering to us in Saigon.

Saigon was now seething. Kidnapping of red beret paratroopers and green beret Binh Xuyen was active daily; hacked open bodies of victims floated down the Saigon River. The respected Chinese who was starting to give President Diem (and SMM) the truth about the opium traffic was kidnapped at high noon from a crowded restaurant on a Cholon main street, never to be seen again. Colonel Xuan, whom the President had told to help SMM on the same opium project, was losing his best agents. French officers in the Binh Xuyen headquarters were busily obtaining the release of G-6 troops kidnapped by the Binh Xuyen, since G-6 was still being used as an arm of French intelligence. General Ely shrugged off Diem's repeated requests for the French to take back the six armed river vedettes of the French Navy being used by the Binh Xuyen, refused to deliver the armored vehicles promised months ago and held just outside of town at Bien Hoa.

General The was asked to move his troops from their camp near Bien Hoa down into the Rung Sat area adjacent to the Saigon River, which was being readied as a guerrilla base for the Binh Xuyen. General The could obtain no water supply for his troops (lack of water was to plague the Binh Xuyen later in this area) and found French armored squadrons accompanying him as he attempted to push towards the Rung Sat area. He left his troops in command of Col. Cao and slipped through to Saigon to ask our help; he needed water carriers and heavier weapons for the reduction of Binh Xuyen strong-points ahead of him. We saw Diem, who was bitter at The's hesitancy; we patiently explained that these were genuine military needs, that Col Minh at First Military Region had given General The neither essential supplies nor encouragement nor a plan of support, and that The's effort would be wasted under these circumstances. The President made no comment.

Major Bohamman, who had been supporting us strongly from the Philippines, arrived in town. He had been about to visit the U.S. on home leave, after years of extra duty in the Philippines, but gave it up when he sensed that SMM was heading into a time of trouble. He was a combat infantryman of experience, had been

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Colonel Lansdale's valued deputy in the struggle against the Huks in the Philippines. Bursts of fire from automatic weapons could be heard around town, now and then the explosion of a plastic bomb. It was rapidly becoming the time and place for experienced hands.

Ambassador Collins had left for Washington. He and we had been meeting several times a day; just before he departed he told Lansdale not to be worried by newspaper rumors that the U.S. would stop supporting Diem. Lansdale asked then if his orders were to continue supporting Diem; Collins said yes. Members of the country team privately felt that Diem should be supported by us, that the National Army was ready to support him and had the capability of defeating the Binh Xuyen. Washington suggested that we get the country team leaders to state this, each through his own channel. This suggestion reached us the morning of 28 April, when we were working on support problems for "Giai Phong" and on a proposal to transfer the veterans bureau to the Ministry of Defense. A call came through from President Diem who wanted us to see him urgently.

On the way to the Palace, Lansdale and Redick came under fire from Binh Xuyen troops occupying the Petruski School near TRIM, forcing them to abandon their vehicle. Civilian cyclists near them were the only casualties. It was the usual terrorist strafing. When it stopped, they drove past Petruski to the Palace. Diem was worried, having just received word from his Washington Embassy that the U.S. appeared to be about to stop supporting him. Bao Dai was ordering him to go to France immediately, had requested a meeting there of a number of Vietnamese, including a majority composed of Diem's enemies, to discuss a new government. The telephone interrupted the conversation; the call was from the General Staff. It had just come under sub-machinegun fire from a jeep passing along rue Gallieni, a French Army jeep driven by a white man in colonial army uniform, with three green-beret Vietnamese handling the weapons. Col Don had been going out the doorway of the building, almost been hit. There were casualties.

Diem told Col Don on the telephone to return any further fire by the terrorists, hung up, then continued with describing his problem. On the 25th, the majority of the police had pledged loyalty to the government, although surete personnel were still holding out with the Binh Xuyen. The trouble was that the prefectural police were becoming

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frightened for the safety of their families when they left home, since Binh Xuyen troops still held strongpoints throughout town, French armor protected a large sector of Saigon containing not only Surete headquarters but also a Binh Xuyen reserve force of shock troops. Most of his Cabinet had resigned as he had failed to take action against the rebellious Binh Xuyen in the capital city. The people were furious against this bold armed holdup of the government by what they knew were only gangsters. Army and people laid the blame on the French, because they could see French armored vehicles and troops in the streets, evidently ready for action against the Vietnamese. We told him that it looked as though Vietnam still needed a leader, that Diem was still President, that the U.S. was still supporting him.

Shortly after starting a late lunch at home, and making dates to meet with General O'Daniel and Mr Barrows to ask them to send messages to Washington through their own channels, the sound of mortar explosives was heard. The telephone rang, amid increasing explosions, some of which were in the neighborhood. It was Vo Van Hai, Diem's confidential secretary on the telephone. He said that the Palace was under heavy mortar fire, that the President was on another line talking to General Ely, that Ely stated that he couldn't hear any explosions and the President was holding the mouthpiece out towards the explosions so Ely could hear them. Hai started to ask what should be done, interrupted himself to say that the President had just ordered the National Army to start returning the fire and had so informed Ely. He hung up.

We had prepared for the emergency. A small team had been formed with the CIA station in Saigon, whose acting chief Phil Potter had voluntarily placed himself under our Chief's guidance for the emergency period. Potter had been appointed head of a small operation group, with Bohannon as deputy and with members from both the CIA station and SMM. Key houses were linked by radio. Operational planning was done jointly, intelligence take shared instantly. All measures possible under the limits permitted by U.S. policy were taken for action against the Binh Xuyen and Ba Cut. (These will not be described here, but there were a number of successful actions).

Conein had been waiting for contact with Bay Vien's men, who still wanted a conference with us. He was ordered to return from the contact point. On the way to report in, he saw a taxi take a

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direct hit in front of him; the taxi was filled with civilians as only Vietnamese taxis can be. Mortar fire was increasing. Some shells were landing around the White team's building, where ammunition and explosives had been stored. Permission was requested to abandon the building, after destroying the files. This permission was denied, since the building was solid enough to sustain direct hits by 81-mm mortar fire and still protect our stored supplies. Even so, those on guard in the building were distinctly uneasy; the National Army had set up batteries across the street which Binh Xuyen mortars were attempting to reach. The Binh Xuyen had set fire to a large section of Cholon and the skies darkened with the smoke. Wrecked cars in the streets, troop movements, and firefights between combatants in business and residential districts made detours necessary in driving.

Our Chief had asked Charge Randy Kidder to call a meeting of the country team, which Kidder had declined under the inconclusive circumstances of the morning. It was decided to try again, after a brief check in at the White team house to see conditions there. Everything was under control, so our Chief drove to the Embassy to see Kidder. Kidder was having a meeting with the military attaches. They were drafting a report on the fighting for Washington to which we contributed. When this was finished, our Chief asked Kidder again to call a meeting of the country team that evening, the subject to be the support of President Diem by the U.S. under the changed circumstances. Kidder stated that he was not in position to do this, since Collins was still Ambassador.

General O'Daniel and Mr Barrows were seen in late afternoon. They both felt strongly that the U.S. should continue supporting Diem, particularly now that he had been challenged and was fighting back, but neither felt that they should so inform their headquarters, since this was a political matter. (Next morning, Washington asked for the views of the country team on this subject; a meeting was held; the country team quickly agreed that Diem should be supported).

Fighting continued. We were getting fatigued, going without sleep in planning and taking actions, in keeping Washington up to the minute on events in Saigon. Dixie Reese, USOM (FOA) photographer, had taken a light civilian aircraft over the Binh Xuyen lines to get

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pictures, was shot down; the Binh Xuyen radio and propaganda leaflets promptly announced that Reese was a spy for Colonel Lansdale. Reese and his French pilot were killed.

The next morning, we saw Trinh Minh The. The Army had asked him to bring his troops in from Bien Hoa and take the left flank when the Army started driving the Binh Xuyen south across the Saigon River and the Canal de Derivation. He was going now to get his troops and bring them past French armor into town. He had a large scale map of the entire area and showed us his plan. He then commented that the people in Cholon were overjoyed that the Army was continuing the fight and that talk had started openly against Bao Dai and the French whose armor was clanking around the streets.

President Diem wanted to see us. Vietnamese troops had captured some French while taking Binh Xuyen strongpoints south of rue Gallieni, more French were seen in the Petruski School which was being reduced by the Army, close by FEC headquarters at Camp de Mares. Bao Dai had sent a message ordering Diem to stop the fight immediately and go to France, that General Vy would take over. The President's eyes were red-rimmed from lack of sleep, but he had confidence in what he was doing. He would ignore Bao Dai. His manner was the same as a few days previously when he heard that General Hinh was returning, and calmly gave orders to either prevent Hinh's entry or arrest him upon landing. The Hoa Hao forces of Ba Cut and Soai had not moved towards Saigon; this was still a localized fight with the Binh Xuyen and the Army was determined to win.

Negotiations with Colonel Manh, Bay Vien's chief of staff, had reached a successful conclusion. His men were crossing the Canal de Derivation; he would prepare them for joining up with the National Army and was convinced that the men were eager to do so; they didn't want to fight the government. SMM worked with the Defense Ministry on surrender leaflets, to exploit this development with the remaining Binh Xuyen when the time came.

We had been getting reports of General Vy's movements during the afternoon (visits to Gambiez, Quat, and others). That night, John Mecklin of Time Magazine telephoned to say that Vy had been arrested at the Palace. We checked with the Presidency; Vy was there but not

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under arrest. Later Major Hoai of the Lien Minh visited us. The "Revolutionary Committee" had arrested Vy at the Palace, paratroopers were coming to free him, and what should the Revolutionary Committee do now? Generals The and Phuong, we learned, were members of this Committee and at the Palace. We commented that it was a hell of a way to run a revolution, and maybe the committee should escape out of the back door.

Just then, The and Phuong arrived at our Chief's house, grinning in embarrassment. President Diem had sent Vy back to the Army, to spend the night in General Hinh's old quarters. The Revolution had failed to arrest Vy, but the people were aroused against Bao Dai. They explained that the Revolutionary Committee had grown out of the Front organization which Diem's brother Nhu had tried to organize some days earlier; they had followed our advice and had joined with Nhu in the Front, but were dissatisfied with some of the weak organizations they felt Nhu was depending on, so had organized something more dynamic to meet the threat of Vy and Bao Dai, and called themselves the Revolutionary Committee. They wanted Bao Dai dethroned and wanted the French to stop interfering in Vietnamese affairs.

The Presidency telephoned early the next morning. Vy had arrested General Ty and Colonel Don, was holding them at Hinh's house, where they were being guarded by a battalion of Imperial Guards which had just arrived from Dalat. Could we come over? SMM officer drove over to the Palace. As we entered, Captain Cao ran down the stairs, told us that Vy's troops had just captured the Post Office two blocks away (it was the communications center for Saigon) and the National Treasury. We had barely started talking with the President when Cao returned. He had grabbed some men from the Presidential Guards, rushed to the Post Office and Treasury buildings, talked the Imperial Guard into leaving, and both building were now secure. He explained that quick action was dinned into him by Col Valeriano when he and others received training with the Malacanang Guards in Manila recently. The President made Cao a major.

Colonel Don reported in. He and Ty had been released by Vy, and Vy was leaving for Dalat with his troops (where Majors Conein and Allen met him secretly later for a conference on our Heo project). Don and other officers had teased Vy about being able to get gasoline and ammunition from the French, when they couldn't. Vy answered that the French would give him anything. The others then asked him to call up the French and

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request the armored vehicles which the French had been holding at Bien Hoa so long without delivery to the Vietnamese Army. The French rushed these vehicles to Hinh's house, evidently having been holding them just outside town for this emergency, where Army men took them over and drove them into the fight against the Binh Xuyen. Don said the French still hadn't caught on, still thought that Vy would use this armor to bring the Army into line to stop fighting the Binh Xuyen and be loyal to Bao Dai. Don added that the Army felt the same as the Revolutionary Committee: Bao Dai was finished.

The addition of the armor hastened the withdrawal of the Binh Xuyen. By noon of 30 April, almost all of their forces had withdrawn across the Canal, except for strongpoints in Cholon which were still manned but cut off. National Army troops on the north bank were exhausted, catching quick naps before attempting a crossing. Boats were being gathered for the crossing, but the six vedettes of the Binh Xuyen were in the canal, ready to stop the crossing.

In the afternoon, Trinh Minh The slipped in for a visit with us. (His troop movement through Saigon had thoroughly alarmed many foreigners, including Americans, who felt that he was going to attack the colony of whites). General The reported that all of his troops except one battalion had crossed the canal over a bridge; that they were being held up now by the fire of the six vedettes (river gunboats) who were firing on the bridge at point-blank range from the canal; he wanted to finish the movement and join this last battalion to his troops across the canal where they had to reduce a Binh Xuyen fort which appeared to be heavily manned. The's hand was bleeding on the map he used to show us his position. We bandaged it for him, while giving him tactical advice on how to engage the gunboats from the shore, including the use of artillery. General The told us shortly afterwards that no artillery could be spared for him. We went to the Palace to see if something could be done. The General Staff was there, listened to us, and started artillery moving to the flank to support General The.

Diem wanted to talk about the Revolutionary Committee which was in session. He explained that there were some hot-heads on the Committee, particularly Soh and Lang. He sketched in their political backgrounds for us, including the smattering of political work they had

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learned as minor officials of the Vietminh. He felt that Phuong relished the wild action of the Committee, and that Trinh Minh The had been very foolish to join in with the action. Diem was going to call a Congress of delegates from all provinces to sit in with the Committee, change its character from one dominated by the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao (of General Ngo), to one that could speak with the voice of the people. He had sent a radio message to Hue and delegates from Central Vietnam provinces would be arriving in Saigon shortly. What would the United States do if this Congress dethroned Bao Dai? We explained that the United States probably would accept a legal action, but that dethronement by voice vote in a Congress such as that described by Diem was hardly a legal proceeding.

The President's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu came into the room hurriedly at this point and interrupted us. "Trinh Minh The is dead," he said. He explained that a report had just come in by telephone. General The had been shot through the head while directing the fire against the vedettes. It was news that hurt. Diem broke into tears. We sat with the President for a time, talking about our mutual friend The, then left.

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We suggested to President Diem that the government provide for General The's family, which was done. We also arranged that the Lien Minh make Ngo Dinh Diem their honorary leader. This was done at a private ceremony when The was buried at Nui Ba Den in the presence of his mother, his wife, his children, the Lien Minh staff, Lansdale and Redick. There had been a large public ceremony in Saigon, since The was a national hero. Colonel Gao assumed command of the Lien Minh and was made a general.

In late April, President Diem had requested funds to finance a former Vietminh leader who promised to get rid of Ba Cut (through Vietminh close to this Hoa Hao rebel). SMM furnished 2-million piastres, as a first installment of the funds requested, but advised Diem to check details thoroughly before expenditure. The funds were passed in a large suitcase to Diem's confidential secretary. In following days, President Diem seemed somewhat embarrassed when queried about the project. Finally, he indicated that the plan had not worked out and asked what he should do with the money we had given him. We advised him to return it to us, which he did.

Fighting continued in Cholon, where some Binh Xuyen strongpoints still held out. SMM held one conference with General O'Daniel at MAAG on obtaining bridging material for the Binh Dinh operation, (Col Kim and Lt Phillips had flown down to get help) during which the Binh Xuyen strongpoints around MAAG were reduced; much of the conference was in shouts above the noise of machine guns and mortars, since some of the strongpoints were just across the street.

Colonel Manh was reported as probably dead. He had gone to his home in a little village south of Cholon to get his wife and a file of documents he had hidden. He had said previously that he had documents which gave details of the opium smuggling, including French participation. As he was leaving his house, an armed group seized him. He was last seen, bound and gagged, on the rear floor of a small taxi. His troops were under attack by the remainder of the Binh Xuyen, who were blocking their route through to the National Army. Surrender leaflets, which we had prepared, were dropped from the air, saturating areas held by the Binh Xuyen. On 2 May, five of the battalions fought their way through and joined the National Army. Little more than a thousand men were still alive in these units.

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On 4 May, the National Congress of People and Administrative Representatives met in Saigon, as called by President Diem. He had asked to see us and we sat in the bedroom talking to him while he prepared to appear before the Congress. Diem had been weeping, having just returned from Trinh Minh The's house, and put on dark glasses. We discussed the rumors that the French were asking the U.S. to recall certain Americans (as printed in the local French press as news), the Presidential Directive on Nationality (which would require Army officers to declare themselves either as French or as Vietnamese), and vicious rumors about Col Kim in Binh Dinh. On the latter, we suggested that the President send a mature person he trusted to Binh Dinh to investigate, since reports reaching us showed that Kim was behaving in exemplary and laudable fashion. (An investigator from the Presidency was sent, confirmed our reports.)

Operation Brotherhood had grown into an organization of 105 Filipino doctors and nurses, plus administrative personnel. They were operating ten medical centers, and were training Vietnamese in these operations to prepare them for eventual takeover. More than 2,000 patients were being treated on an average day. The hard work of these teams and their gaiety off-duty when they entertained refugee and orphan groups had become almost a legend in Vietnam. The "tinikling" (Filipino barefoot dance between clanking bamboo poles) was taken up by the Vietnamese (and Americans in Saigon). SMM continued its help and guidance.

The National Security Division was collecting information about Vietminh activities and organizations south of the 17th Parallel, through available intelligence reports, field trips, and a provincial survey system which made use of TRIM and National Army field personnel (which we had established through the Ministries of Defense and Interior; they trusted us as friends not to mis-use unfavorable information). Results of this work were given to the country team and brought the remark by Ambassador Collins that this was the first detailed picture he had obtained of the enemy. He asked that it be given to General Ely, which was done.

Vietminh paramilitary organizations were located at several places in the foothills of Central Vietnam, in the high plateau jungles north of Kontum, along the jungled Laotian border west of Ban Me

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Thuot, in the swamps of the Plaine des Joncs, and in small cadres along the rivers and canals of the south. Their secret political control of villages was growing, since they were advocating the non-payment of taxes to a government which was to be replaced by the Vietminh in 1956 and were using small-scale terrorism to bring village elders into line.

Although the National Army was still engaged with the Binh Xuyen, and activities by Ba Cut and Soai in the West against the Army had been stepped up sharply (including the shelling of such population centers as Long Xuyen), the National Security Division started planning measures against the Vietminh, including operations in Central Vietnam and immediate security screening actions in provinces south of Saigon, such as Gocong and Bentre. Civic Action, which was developing rapidly on its still extremely limited budget, was asked to put teams into the more troubled areas as quickly as possible.

Haiphong was taken over by the Vietminh on 16 May. Our Binh and northern-Heo teams were in place, completely equipped. It had taken a tremendous amount of hard work to beat the Geneva deadline, to locate, select, exfiltrate, train, infiltrate, equip the men of these two teams and have them in place, ready for actions required against the enemy. It would be a hard task to do openly, but this had to be kept secret from the Vietminh, the International Commission with its suspicious French and Poles and Indians, and even friendly Vietnamese. Movements of personnel and supplies had had to be over thousands of miles.

As Haiphong was taken over by the Vietminh, Binh Dinh was taken over by the Vietnamese Army. SMM's black psywar, through Vietnamese Army agents, had embarrassed the Vietminh: in the name of the local Vietminh Committee, the people of Binh Dinh had been asked to redeem their Vietminh currency (as promised by the Vietminh) for Bank of Indochina piastres by seeing Vietminh officials at the last evacuation point. Thousands traveled to Qui Nhon where red-faced Vietminh lamely explained that they had no money. On 27 May, President Diem visited Qui Nhon and Binh Dinh, where he was given a tumultuous welcome.

Ambassador Collins left, with a warm letter of appreciation to SMM for its help to him. Frederick Reinhardt, the new Ambassador, arrived, and presented his credentials to Diem on 28 May.

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Alfonso Enriquez of Freedom Company had been working day and night, with a small team supporting him and with background guidance and help by SMM, to organize the Vietnamese Veterans. The First National Congress of the Vietnamese Veterans Legion was held on 29 May. This first Vietnamese Veterans' convention was a marked success, with President Diem and General O'Daniel as the honor guests, heading a long list of Vietnamese and foreign officials, including invited visitors from the Philippines Veterans Legion. Surete Chief, General Nguyen Ngoc Le, was chairman of the first convention and was elected as commander of the Legion. Enriquez had become highly popular with the Vietnamese, was asked to make a speech. He distributed gift shirts from the Philippines Veterans Legion. The convention adopted resolutions supporting President Diem and against the Vietminh. After the convention, work started on organizing provincial chapters. Membership in the World Veterans Organization was requested.

On 25 May, President Diem called us in to meet General Mai Huu Xuan, chief of Military Security. He told Xuan that he wanted Xuan to work closely with us in developing his intelligence work. Diem also asked SMM for help in seeing that Xuan got a good rest and some leave in the Philippines. This was arranged.

Our French associates at National Security Division told us that the French mission in Hanoi estimated that there were about 400 Chinese advisors with the Vietminh, mainly as advisors to the higher echelons. A French business man from Hanoi estimated that there were a total of perhaps 2,700 foreign advisors with the Vietminh, including a small Soviet mission. The General Staff of the National Army estimated that there were about 10,000 Vietminh clandestine cadres south of the 17th Parallel; the Vietminh paramilitary in the south were organized in 9 skeletal battalions and 14 skeletal companies.

By the end of the month, SMM was the recipient of unguarded comments by senior French officers, during work on combined projects or at social functions. The gist of these comments was: the French Expeditionary Corps would not fight the Vietminh, except to defend themselves or to protect the evacuation of French civilians.

On 30 May, President Diem told SMM that fighting in the West against SOAI and Ba Cut was imminent, perhaps by 31 May or 1 June.

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Dissident actions against the National Army had become intolerable. General Hinh was with Soai at his Cai Von headquarters. Soai's clandestine radio station was broadcasting propaganda similar to that of the Binh Xuyen and Vietminh. Soai had artillery in position to fire on Cantho across the Bassac River from his headquarters; French gunners were reported as serving these guns. (High French officers stated these men were deserters). The plan given Soai was to capture Long Xuyen, Raggia and Chaudoc quickly, to create a favorable international opinion favoring these Hoa Haos over a "weak" government. The National Army was set to capture Cai Von and Lai Vung as soon as hostilities opened.

1. June 1955

On 5 June, General Hinh had called a meeting of sect leaders and Vietminh at Cai Von. The National Army struck swiftly, over-running dissident Hoa Hao positions and strong-points the first few hours. 1,500 of Soai's troops rallied to the National Army. Soai with a few men headed for a juncture with Ba Cut at the Seven Mountains, close to the Cambodian border near Hatien. Ba Cut left one regiment as a rear-guard; it was quickly destroyed by artillery. Ba Cut and Soai headed for hideouts. Hinh fled to Cambodia. Our old friend, Captain Gial, whom we had taken to the Philippines when he was on Hinh's staff planning a coup, was reported to have been killed by Ba Cut in anger over the disaster. One of the students from Redick's former English classes for mistresses was reported to have been in Cai Von with Hinh, safely escaped to Cambodia; we were relieved that this lovely, spirited girl got away.

The failure of a French-type of sect uprising was followed by a bitter and at times hysterical psychological operation by the French. Its main themes were:

1). The basic French mistake in 1945 was in not giving Vietnam its independence. From then on, France was supported by U.S. dollars and was no longer able to act as a free agent. In every showdown, France had to give in to U.S. policy, which was the root of all trouble in Indo-China. Cardinal Spellman influenced the U.S. to back Diem in 1954. The French might have found a modus vivendi with Diem if only certain Americans hadn't encouraged his antipathy towards the French. 100,000 men of the Expeditionary Corps and 30,000 French civilians were going home bitterly anti-American. This would drive France into the neutralist camp, aid the Communists in the next election.

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2). Dictator Diem was trying to hold the masses through terrorism and propaganda. The Army was corrupt. The Vietminh were increasingly powerful. (This line formerly included: the sects are unified and ready to overthrow the government).

3). (In diplomatic circles). Colonel Lansdale was financing Ngo Dinh Nhu in printing anti-French propaganda in a small shop in Cholon.

4). (Raymond Cartier, Paris Match, 4 June). Every Frenchman believes that Lansdale is writing anti-French propaganda at his desk. An anti-French commando group at the American Embassy is playing a mechanical political game and has plunged Vietnam into chaos.

5). (Cafes and army messes). Lansdale is now attempting to buy off the Hoa Hao. French Army personnel saw him with a suitcase containing 1-million piastres trying to bribe Ba Cut (who nobly turned down the offer). Soai had turned down a Lansdale check for 150-million piastres.

Lt-Col Jorgensen had been assigned by General O'Daniel to the Embassy, to assist Ambassador Collins in staff planning for a Civil Guard (national police force). Ambassador Reinhardt had requested that Jorgensen continue this work. SMM had brought in Colonel Valeriano to work with the Vietnamese on this organization, at President Diem's request. Jorgensen and Valeriano teamed up with the police experts of the Public Administration team of Michigan State University, who had arrived to establish a school of public administration in Vietnam, under FOA auspices. The plan finalized by Jorgensen was under long study by the country team; the Vietnamese were impatient to get started with their organization. As a first step, then, Jorgensen arranged for the inclusion of selected Guard officers at the newly-established Army Leadership course at Quang Trung. Twenty others were selected and sent to Manila for a brief Constabulary course given by the Philippines Constabulary, arranged by SMM through Freedom Company. The first group of Civil Guard officers arrived in Manila 10 June; training was given under the guidance of Freedom Company.

The first ten days of June saw a series of killings on the streets of Saigon and Cholon. Despite the fact that all of the victims were French, propagandists labelled this as an "anti-American" campaign, and it was so reported in the U.S. press. The victims were security officials and transportation people, mostly Corsicans recently moved down from

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Tonkin, who apparently had attempted to establish their own opium traffic organization and were stopped by Saigon gangsters from encroaching on long-held preserves.

SMM had long been attempting to reorganize Psychological Warfare in the Vietnamese Army, which had been an ineffective organization since the G-5 had supported Hinh the previous year. Civilians with assimilated rank had been placed in G-5, but had little knowledge of Army organization or capabilities. In June, Minister Adjoint of Defense Tran Trung Dung and Lt Phillips worked out a new psywar organization together, one which would have effective control from the Ministry down through battalions, but with military personnel in executive positions. Diem agreed to this new organization (but has never agreed to which personnel would be placed in key positions). Finally, 15 Army officers were approved by the Ministry to man the top organizations. Training of these men was arranged through Freedom Company at a special Philippines Army course, including field work. While these 15 were in training in the Philippines, SMM was informed that none of the men were trusted sufficiently for key jobs. Upon graduation, they were placed back into lower echelons.

Colonel Kim, whom Diem still suspected of being a French agent, had proven to be an excellent commander in the Binh Dinh operations. We had hopes that he would be selected to head all Army engineering organizations. SMM arranged an indoctrination trip to the Philippines for him in June, had him gently "brain-washed" by the Filipinos through Freedom Company.

President Diem had become enthusiastic about friendship with the Philippines. He told SMM that the very open and warm manner of the Filipinos, in contrast to other Asians whose feelings were continually half-masked, was imparting the true spirit of freedom and democracy among Vietnamese with whom Filipinos came in contact. Most of the government and army now wanted to visit the Philippines, he said. Col. Jose Banzon strongly recommended to President Diem that Nguyen Bao Toan, president of the Revolutionary Committee, be shown democracy in action by sending him to Manila for a visit. Toan arrived in June, where he was taken under the wing of Freedom Company and met leaders of both the executive and legislative branches of government. Toan was greatly interested in the Constitution. SMM arranged meetings through Freedom Company, with two practical Filipino Constitutional lawyers, Senator Lorenzo Tanada and Dr. Juan Orendain. Both had been

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admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court, were working lawyers, and knew the hard truth about politics from the inside. Toan was greatly impressed by these two and invited them to visit Vietnam, at the Revolutionary Committee's expense, and give advice on constructing a constitution for Vietnam.

Two of the Binh paramilitary teams, now operating behind enemy lines, opened radio contact with us. The third team sent a courier message; the Vietminh security measures in its area were still too strict to permit risking radio contact with us.

SMM within the National Security Division had initiated plans to establish a medium-wave radio transmitter, for Free Vietnamese use, to cover both the Vietminh areas of Tonkin and the Center, as well as Center and South Vietnam of Free Vietnam. The plan was originated by Lt Dave Smith, then given to SMM associate Lt-Col George Melvin. Melvin carried through lengthy surveys and coordination with both USOM (FOA) and USIS. A 100 kw transmitter located in the vicinity of Hue could dominate Tonkin over water; an oriented antenna would give complete coverage of the south. This was turned over to USOM and USIS for action.

m. July 1955

The Philippines recognized Vietnam on 12 July. The story behind this goes back several years, when our State Department first started suggesting this strongly to Philippines officials. In December 1954, Senator Claro Recto spoke out vigorously against recognition, arguing that Vietnam was going to turn Communist and the Philippines would be embarrassed. In June 1955, Alfonso Enriquez, who represented Freedom Company in Saigon, and Frisco Juan San Juan, National Commander of the Philippines Veterans Legion, attended the Veterans Convention in Cebu. They decided to push the recognition of Vietnam through the emergency session of the Philippines Congress which had been called by President Magsaysay. They enlisted the support of Senator Mac Peralta, a Legionnaire.

San Juan and Enriquez then turned to Major Bohannon for help. A campaign was mapped out. Mimeographed information brochures on Vietnam were sent to Legion posts, congressmen, civic leaders, and the press. Legion posts started writing their congressmen. Catholic

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Action and the Junior Chamber of Commerce were induced to help the campaign. When Congress convened on 8 July, there was vigorous support for the recognition of Vietnam from the press, from many civic organizations. Senator Recto again attacked, but found himself against an overwhelming tide of public opinion. On the basis of this popular support, President Magsaysay extended recognition of 12 July without waiting for the Congress to pass a resolution. By the time Recto could muster ammunition for his own isolated stand, 23 July, it was too late.

One of the Binh courier routes makes use of a sailing junk. It put in at a small coastal spot near Nhatrang in Central Vietnam, and the Binh team went ashore to find its contact men. The head of the Binhs assigned one of his men to meet the northern crew. Shortly he was picked up at a military check-point. His name was similar to a Binh Xuyen agent who was wanted by the National Army, and he was arrested. He was interrogated by being handcuffed to a laper, both beaten with the same stick to draw blood, told he would now have leprosy, and both locked up in a tiny cell together. SMM was able to have him released.

SMM became involved in the integration of the sect forces of Phuong (Cao Dai) and Ngo (Hoa Hao), the final formula was that half of each force would be integrated as a unit and the other half as individuals, all to receive training and equipment at Quang Trung. The propagandists were busily at work, attempting to induce hostility between the government and these two forces. General O'Daniel and SMM commenced work on the problem, with the approval of President Diem, and quickly obtained Phuong's and Ngo's agreement to working principles.

One of our Heo agents was given the task of interrogating refugees from Vietminh zones and has furnished much detailed information, some of which is being compiled in a State Department study of social and economic conditions under the Vietminh.

Now, there were indications from Washington that SMM paramilitary operations would be transferred to the control of the Saigon CIA station, and that other SMM activities might be limited to purely clandestine operations. Some of the most stalwart support personnel in the Philippines were being removed. The Freedom Company camp was being shut down, limits placed on its operations. Since personnel slots for military are

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strictly limited under the Geneva Agreement, it appeared that there would be little or no room for SMM. We started to work on these problems.

General O'Daniel reorganized TRIM, with most of our personnel being transferred to MAAG, into the Direct Aid Liaison Section. In the reorganized TRIM, he gave SMM secret responsibility for the G-2 Branch of the Army Division. SMM placed this under associate Lt-Col Melvin, with Lt Phillips to help him. Lt Joseph Palastra was added later, to train Vietnamese commandos. This G-2 Branch is responsible for all intelligence, psywar, ranger, and paramilitary training of the Vietnamese Army. The Vietminh Army has the capability of over-running Free Vietnam; the National Army is planned to have the capability of delaying that enemy until the SEATO nations can send in forces to help, but SEATO has plain escape clauses for its participating nations. Thus, there is the distinct possibility of large portions of Free Vietnam being occupied by the Vietminh enemy in the future. If this happens, Army personnel now being trained by the G-2 Branch of TRIM will be the key to resistance by the Free Vietnamese, just as they will be the key to present actions against Vietminh paramilitary forces south of the 17th Parallel.

SMM itself was reorganized to fit the TRIM and MAAG reorganizations. The new SMM has four teams: Political-Psychological (Blue), Paramilitary (White), Intelligence-Security (Gold), and Support (Red). The White team has been separated physically from the others. Lt Hugo, who has been on duty in the Philippines as our support liaison officer, will be recalled for paramilitary duties at SMM, with another officer replacing him in Manila.

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IV. ORGANIZATION, SAIGON MILITARY MISSION  
31 July 1955

CHIEF

Col Edward Lansdale, USAF

:.....MANILA LIAISON  
Lt Victor Hugo, USA

:

EK O

Lt Joseph Redick, USNR

:

.....  
OPERATIONS

Lt-Col Gordon Jorgensen, USAR\*

.....  
POL-PSYWAR  
(BLUE)

Lt Rufus Phillips,  
USAR, Chief

Lt John Gates, Jr,  
USMCR

Lt Richard  
Mellor, USNR

PARAMILITARY  
(WHITE)

Maj Lucien Conein,  
USAR, Chief

Maj Fred Allen,  
USAR

Lt Cristopher  
Dock, USAR

Lt Joseph  
Palastra, USA

INTELL &  
SECURITY  
(GOLD)

Lt-Col Edmund  
Quereau, USAR,  
Chief

Lt Edward  
Williams, USAR

Lt George  
Moseley, USAR

SUPPORT  
(RED)

Lt Frank Garbers,  
USAR, Chief

Lt Jerome  
Morris, USNR

Sgt Charles  
Sandman, USA

PFC Elwood  
Butler, USA

PFC William  
Flanagan, USAR

OPN ASSOCIATE

Lt-Col George Melvin, USAR

(\*Acts as Deputy Chief in Col Lansdale's absence)

FORMER MEMBERS

Army:

Lt-Col Raymond Wittmayer  
Capt Michael Moriarity  
Lt David Smith  
Lt Richard Halloran  
M/Sgt Alex Alvarez

Navy:

Lt Edward Bain  
Lt Robert Andrews  
Lt Lawrence Sharpe (assoc)

Air Force:

Lt-Col Jesus Villamor

Marine Corps:

Capt Richard Smith  
Capt Arthur Arundel

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## V. EXPENDITURES

Expenditures listed here are for FY 1955. While this does not cover the precise period of the report, it does cover all major expenditures. Expenditures not covered are minor recurring expenses. Included herein are initial costs for establishing the mission, such as official vehicles and office equipment. Pay and allowances of U.S. personnel are not included, nor are weapons, ammunition and radios drawn from U.S. stocks.

Operational, including pay and expenses of agents  
(including Binh and Heo paramilitary teams), safe-  
houses, transportation (such as a sailing junk)

Support Equipment, such as vehicles, safes, desks,  
darkroom photographic equipment, office equipment

Living Quarters, mostly Saigon but includes Haiphong,  
both cities were landlords' heaven

Per Diem and Travel, including \$20,565 for Vietnamese  
Garde Civile personnel trained in the Philippines (the  
bulk of this money will be reimbursed to us); a number  
of U.S. personnel were with us for fairly short periods  
of TDY and received per diem; Filipinos are included

Expendable Items, such as operational clothing  
and cover equipment for safehouses

Maintenance of Fixed Property

Storage, Maintenance and Operation of Vehicles,  
gasoline and oil are bought on the local market

Wages for local caretaker, guard personnel

Miscellaneous, including transportation of property,  
confidential fund commo charges

Total

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Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. § 552  
Chief, RDP, ESD, WHS

Date: 19 MAY 2014 Authority: EO 13526

Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_

Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_

Reason: \_\_\_\_\_

MDR: 13 -M- 1346

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22 December 1958

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Date: MAY 19 2014

## PLAN FOR UTILIZATION OF FOREIGN MANPOWER AIR UNITS

### PHILIPPINE AIR SECTION

#### I. ASSUMPTIONS:

- A. That it is desirable to be prepared to utilize Filipinos and other foreign nationals on a non-governmental volunteer basis for air missions in support of United States and Philippine Free World objectives in the Southeast Asia area.
- B. That necessary Philippine Government officials have agreed that Filipinos may be used on a volunteer basis to man air units and that such units may be activated and based in the Philippines, when the need arises.
- C. That an affiliate of Freedom, Inc. has been established in the Philippines.
- D. That the Country Team in the Philippines, including the Air Section of JUSMAG, the U.S. Air Force Commander and the U.S. Navy Commander, has been briefed and instructed to take a positive approach and assist the Air Section with its mission.

#### II. PERMANENT AIR SECTION ORGANIZATION:

- A. The permanent air organization would be an Air Section of the Philippine Affiliate of Freedom, Inc. It would be manned by a Senior Air Officer, a secretary and a clerk-messenger, with an American Advisor attached to it.
  1. a. The advisor would be an American, selected from the regular U.S. Air Force or the U.S. Air Force (active or retired) reserve, with the following qualifications:
    - (1) Screened and cleared for U.S. "TOP SECRET" activities.
    - (2) Vision and resourcefulness necessary to bring prestige and prominence to the project.
    - (3) Experience in jungle warfare including air support of ground forces.
    - (4) Appreciation of and respect for the capabilities of Filipinos.
    - (5) Preferably, with service in the Philippines and known to be respected and liked by the Filipinos.

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- (6) A patriotic and strong leader.
- (7) Preferably, a working knowledge of the Tagalog language.
- b. The American Advisor would, in addition to being advisor to the Air Section, be responsible for the following:
  - (1) Submission of periodic reports on the activities and progress of the Air Section to the U.S. Freedom, Inc.
  - (2) Liaison with U.S. Government agencies and U.S. Armed Forces Commanders in the Philippines.
  - (3) Liaison with U.S. Government agencies and missions throughout the Southeast Asia area, as necessary.
- 2. The Senior Air Officer of the Air Section would be a Filipino, selected from the Regular Philippine Air Force or the Philippine Air Force Reserve (active or retired), with the following qualifications:
  - a. Screened and cleared for Philippine "TOP SECRET" activities.
  - b. Well known and respected for accomplishments in the Philippine Air Force and the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
  - c. Known not to have anti-American tendencies.
  - d. Preferably, with experience in jungle warfare, including air support of ground forces.
  - e. An experienced administrator.
  - f. A patriotic and strong leader.
  - g. A potential commander of the Volunteer Air Group.
  - h. A good command of the English and Tagalog languages and, if possible, other Filipino dialects.
- 3. The secretary would be a Filipino civilian with the following qualifications:
  - a. Screened and cleared for Philippine "TOP SECRET" activities.
  - b. Resourceful and efficient in secretarial duties including taking dictation, typing, filing and courteous handling of telephone calls and visitors.

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c. A good command of the English and Tagalog languages.

4. The clerk-messenger would be a Filipino with the following qualifications:

a. Typist.

b. Good command of English and Tagalog.

c. Resourceful and trustworthy.

**B. Office Location:**

1. The Air Section office would be located with the offices of the Philippine Affiliate of Freedom, Inc. if the offices are located in a place where necessary security precautions can be taken.

2. If the necessary security precautions are not feasible at the offices of the Philippine Affiliate of Freedom, Inc., the Air Section Office would be located in Armed Forces of the Philippines or other suitable Philippine Government installations.

**C. Estimated Cost to Maintain Air Section:**

1. Salaries:	<u>Annual</u>
American Advisor	\$15,000
Executive Air Officer	6,000
Secretary (all inclusive)	3,600
Clerk-messenger (all inclusive)	1,650
2. Housing, traveling, insurance, and miscellaneous expenses for American Advisor	6,000
3. Traveling, insurance, and miscellaneous expenses for Senior Air Officer	2,500
4. Office equipment (non-recurring and of residual value)	2,000
5. Rent	2,250
6. Utilities	1,200
7. Vehicle (non-recurring and of residual value)	3,000

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8. Vehicle operating expense including driver	\$2,400
9. Contingency	<u>3,000</u>
Total Estimated Annual Cost	\$44,850

Notes:

1. The above cost estimates are accurate enough for planning purposes for an Air Section located in Manila.
2. All cost estimates are based on current prices in the Philippines and conversion of U. S. dollars to Philippine pesos at the rate of exchange (\$1.00 = P2.00).

### III. AIR SECTION ACTIVITIES

#### A. Research and Intelligence:

The majority of the following listed data, needed by the Air Section for planning and operational purposes, will be available from Hq, 13th Air Force, the Air Section of JUSMAG, the Philippine Civil Air Authority and commercial air lines. Whenever the required data is readily available from other sources, the Air Section will not duplicate the efforts of others and will limit its activities to collection of required data not readily available from other sources.

1. Keep up-to-date records of regular Philippine Air Force units strength, qualifications, experience and training status.
2. Keep up-to-date records of Reserve Philippine Air Force personnel, by units or on individual basis, strength, qualifications, experience and training status.
3. Keep up-to-date records of all commercial and private flight personnel in the Philippines.
4. Keep up-to-date records of all types of equipment available to the PAF and the status of such equipment.
5. Keep up-to-date records of all commercial and private aircraft of Philippine registry.
6. Keep up-to-date records of the commercial aircraft maintenance capability in the Philippines.
7. Keep up-to-date records of all Air Force, commercial and private airports and airport facilities in the Philippines.

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8. Keep up-to-date records of all equipment and supplies procured and stockpiled for Volunteer Air Group use.
  9. Recommend to appropriate authorities (by arrangement this would probably be JUSMAG), additional types of training and experience required to have trained personnel available to meet estimated Volunteer Air Group mission requirements.
- B. Plans for the activation of a Volunteer Air Group capable of supporting Free World objectives in the Southeast Asia area would include, but are not limited to, the following:
1. Earmark a base location for the Air Group, giving consideration to the following:
    - a. At an airfield with an all-weather runway at least 5,000 feet long -- 8,000 feet being desirable.
    - b. For security purposes, an airfield with a minimum of other activities and located as far as possible from population centers is desirable.
    - c. Access to ports and highways is desirable.
    - d. Availability of communications facilities, shops, hangars, housing, medical facilities, and storage facilities should be considered in selecting a base but are not considered to be controlling factors as climatic conditions are conducive to operating with minimum field type or temporary facilities.
    - e. Suggested base locations in the Philippines in the order of preference are:
      - (1) Puerto Princessa.
      - (2) Zamboanga
      - (3) Guiuan
      - (4) Davao
      - (5) Mactan
    - f. The status of U.S./Philippine bases agreement should be considered prior to any substantive discussions with the Philippine Government for use of a base for the Volunteer Air Group.
    - g. The requirement for a base suitable for a Volunteer Air Group should be taken into consideration when planning the future U.S. assisted air base construction programs in the Philippines.
  2. Induction of volunteer personnel:
    - a. Earmark an induction center close to the sources of personnel.

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- b. Make plans for printing the detailed personnel policy, standard contract forms, and other required forms for maintaining adequate personnel records.
- c. Complete plans for handling pay and allowances, bonuses, direct payment of allotments to families and printing of necessary record forms. The probability that volunteers will need a cash advance to carry them and/or their families until the first regular pay day should be considered.
- d. Select and make plans for training personnel for manning the induction center on a temporary employment basis.
- e. Plan for housing and subsistence for volunteer personnel at the induction center and transportation to the base. When directed to activate units, contracts with commercial sources will probably be the best way to handle these requirements.

3. Personal equipment and supplies:

Maximum use of uniforms and other items of personal equipment belonging to volunteer personnel will be made, thereby holding purchases by the Volunteer Air Group (VAG) to a minimum. Regular summer khaki uniforms are suitable for most of the Southeast Asia area. Philippine or U.S. insignia will not be used, making it necessary to design and plan for procurement of distinctive insignia, arm bands, and/or shoulder patches for VAG personnel.

- 4. Plan for temporary housing and subsistence of volunteers at or near the base until the time self-sufficient units are activated and ready to take over. Contracting with commercial sources may be feasible.
- 5. Plan for evacuation of sick, wounded and deceased personnel from the home base and mission areas. At the home base in the Philippines, charter arrangements with commercial carriers until volunteer unit transport aircraft are available are feasible. Evacuation from mission areas to the Philippines or nearest commercial airline facilities will have to be accomplished with unit transport aircraft.
- 6. The policy and procedures for notification of next of kin of deceased personnel, burial benefits, gratuities to families and payment of insurance will have to conform to the customs and laws of the home country of the deceased.
- 7. Plan for procurement and stockpiling of organizational equipment required for units when activated.

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8. Plan for procurement and stockpiling of aircraft, spare parts, POL, ammunition, bombs and specialized equipment required to equip, maintain and support units in training at the home base and in other areas when performing assigned missions.
9. Plan for movement of units to and from mission areas. Include for both air and surface movements and resupply of units in action.
10. In making plans for clothing and other personal equipment and subsistence for personnel, climatic conditions, local customs and habits must be considered.
11. Prepare policy and complete plans for employment of indigenous labor needed at the home base on a daily or contractual basis.
12. Prepare policy and plans for "sheepdipping" regular Philippine Air Force personnel for service in a volunteer capacity.
13. Prepare policy and plans for discharging personnel and returning them to their respective Air Force units or civilian status as applicable.

#### IV. PURPOSE, COMPOSITION AND MISSIONS OF VAG

##### A. Purpose:

1. To plan for the effective utilization of foreign manpower by being prepared to activate air units and have them ready for employment in the shortest possible time as an effective instrument of initiative as directed by the Defense Department, for use in a way that the forces so employed will be "deniable by the United States" and without injecting the risks of starting a general war which would attend the commitment of regular United States "flag" forces.
2. When activated, the VAG will be an air combat and air support force of the size required to attain U.S. objectives or make a substantial effort toward accomplishment of U.S. objectives by assisting friendly forces, during the period between the time requirements are beyond the scope of CIA capabilities and the time it is considered practicable to commit regular U.S. and/or friendly countries' air forces.
3. When activated, Volunteer Air Group I (VAG-I) will be capable of performing air support and transport missions requiring the use of small and unsophisticated forces in terms of manpower, aircraft, equipment and support systems and using obsolete and obsolescent reciprocating engine aircraft.
4. When activated, Volunteer Air Group II (VAG II) will be capable of performing air combat and support missions requiring the use of modern

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jet types of equipment with the personnel being recruited on a unit basis from the Philippine Air Force.

5. The general purposes for which the VAG will be employed are the following:
  - a. Assist friendly countries in combating Communist encroachment from outside.
  - b. Assist with combating Communist movements within friendly countries.
  - c. Assist revolutionary movements that may occur within Communist-dominated countries.
  - d. Support overt activities of the Philippine Affiliate of Freedom, Inc. by providing air transport services not readily available from commercial sources.

**B. Mission:**

1. The specific missions VAG-I will be capable of performing include, but are not limited to, the following:
  - a. Air-lift and air-drop (paratroopers and supplies) capability for supporting friendly forces.
  - b. Air-lift and air-drop capability for public welfare and mercy missions.
  - c. Close support of ground forces by strafing and bombing.
  - d. Capability of air-lifting and placing small groups of friendly forces in Communist-controlled areas.
  - e. Air evacuation capability to evacuate friendly groups from untenable Communist-controlled areas and to evacuate sick and wounded from combat zones.
  - f. Night bombing and intruder missions.
  - g. Fighter missions when the enemy is using or being supported only with comparable types of fighter aircraft.
2. The specific missions VAG-II will be capable of performing include, but are not limited to, the following:
  - a. Fighter missions against any known type of enemy aircraft.

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b. Fighter-bomber missions in support of ground forces.

c. Reconnaissance and photographic missions.

**C. Sources of Volunteer Personnel:**

1. The primary source of personnel for fighter and fighter-bomber crews will be from the Regular Philippine Air Force. PAF personnel are now receiving training under the JUSMAG program and, in planning future JUSMAG training programs; the specific personnel requirements of VAG should be taken into consideration.
2. Philippine Air Force Reserve and Retired personnel will be the primary source of transport aircraft crews. It may be practicable to have JUSMAG give additional guidance and support to the training of Philippine Air Force Reserve personnel specifically aimed at qualifying them for VAG type missions.
3. Philippine Air Lines, other commercial airlines and private pilots will be the secondary source of transport, liaison and rotary wing aircraft crews.
  - a. Philippine Air Lines is the largest potential source of twin-engine and four-engine transport crews and also has helicopter and liaison type crews. The suspension of Philippine Air Lines long-range international services resulted in the company having a surplus of twin-engine and four-engine aircraft crews. At the present time, six complete four-engine aircraft crews (pilot, co-pilot, engineer and navigator) and ten twin-engine aircraft crews (pilot, co-pilot and navigator), all with a minimum of 8,000 hours experience, could be drawn from PAL without handicapping the commercial services now being operated.
  - b. Civil Air Transport has American crews qualified on most types of aircraft and arrangements could be made to have them employ personnel with special qualifications needed by VAG, thereby having them available in the area for voluntary service with VAG on short notice.
4. Maintenance, communications and ground personnel would come from the PAF, commercial air lines and private sources. Philippine Air Lines has a large pool of well qualified personnel with experience on major overhaul of U.S. Air Force transport types of aircraft and engines readily available for volunteer service with the VAG, since the PAL maintenance contract with the USAF was recently terminated.

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5. Flight crews and other personnel, when required, due to language barriers, could be recruited from other friendly countries in the Southeast Asia area.
6. Operations such as "Operation Brotherhood," Freedom Company and the training of Vietnamese, Laotians, and Indonesians in the Philippines have done much to eliminate doubts concerning Filipinos being acceptable to nationals of other Southeast Asian countries and have proven that they are able to work together toward attaining a common goal.
7. Several years ago, at the time it was decided to have the former Freedom Company of the Philippines activate Air Units, the operations department of the Philippine Air Lines and the Commander of the Philippine Air Force were briefed on the plan. The number of individuals from both organizations volunteering for service within 48 hours far exceeded the demand for qualified flight crews. In fact, a group of Philippine Air Force officers prepared a petition requesting Freedom Company Philippines to give priority to PAF personnel.
8. U.S. Air Force active and reserve personnel would be recruited only when impossible to obtain highly specialized personnel required from Southeast Asian countries.

## V. LOGISTICS

### A. Funds:

1. The Philippine Affiliate of Freedom, Inc. will provide the funds required by the VAG.
2. Ostensibly, the funds will come from voluntary contributions; however, the major portion of funds required will be supplied through the mechanism established for U.S. Freedom, Inc.
3. It is conceivable that voluntary contributions to Freedom, Inc. in the U.S. and to the foreign affiliate in the Philippines will not sufficient funds to support the Permanent Air Section.
4. At the present time, due to Philippine currency controls and low international dollar reserves, it must be made clear to Philippine Government authorities that conversion of pesos to dollars for purchase of supplies and equipment for operation of volunteer units will not be required. In fact, it would be desirable to be able to point out that dollar contributions from Freedom, Inc., USA, will be a source of dollar revenue for the Philippines and that dollars brought into the country in this way will be converted to pesos in the legal manner through the Central Bank of the Philippines.

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5. All supplies and equipment for volunteer units not obtainable in the Philippines will have to be purchased elsewhere and sent to the Philippines as contributions.

**B. Equipment and Supplies:**

1. Ostensibly, the Air Section will obtain aircraft, equipment and supplies from voluntary contributions from individuals and non-governmental organizations and by purchase from non-governmental sources. It is essential that open transfer of U.S. Government resources to the volunteer units are not made.
2. Aircraft, spare parts, components and supplies will be secretly procured from U.S. continental and overseas sources, with some being withdrawn from USAF active and surplus inventories insofar as possible. Other supplies will be procured from commercial sources in the Philippines, Japan and the U.S.
3. For public purposes, aircraft, spare parts, components and other supplies could be procured from the USAF and other U.S. Government sources through normal public surplus and salvage sales procedures. In actuality, such procurement will be handled on a secret negotiated sale basis.
4. Insofar as practicable, all supplies and equipment, including subsistence, available in the Philippines, Japan and other Asian markets, will be purchased by the Philippine Affiliate of Freedom, Inc. and/or Freedom, Inc.
5. Petroleum, oils and lubricants will be procured directly from commercial sources in the areas where the VAG is stationed.
6. Weapons and ammunition will be furnished the VAG on a secret basis from USAF and MDAP sources with some being stockpiled as close as possible to the home base of the VAG and/or the areas in which it is anticipated the VAG will be employed.
7. USAF surplus aircraft, spare parts, components and supplies needed for operation of a VAG should be earmarked and stockpiled for this purpose.

**C. Transportation:**

1. USAF equipment and supplies will be moved from the ZI to designated storage areas in Asia in the normal way USAF units are supplied.

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2. Equipment and supplies purchased from commercial sources for VAGs will be shipped on a commercial basis.
3. Advance planning and stockpiling of equipment and supplies in areas where VAGs may be activated should be accomplished to the greatest extent possible in order that units may be activated and equipped expeditiously and to avoid costly last-minute air shipments.

## VI. CONTROL AND OPERATIONAL PLAN

### A. Control:

1. The American Advisor to the Air Section will be responsible for directing, through the Senior Air Officer of the Air Section, all activities of the VAG when it is in the Philippines in accordance with the secret policy, plans and instructions received from U. S. Freedom, Inc.
2. When special air task forces are dispatched to other countries to perform authorized missions, they will come under the direction and control of the Air Advisor in the country assigned.
3. VAG air task forces will maintain their identity when on assigned missions and will not normally be placed under the direct command of the Commander of the forces being supported.
4. The Air Advisor will be responsible for liaison with the forces being supported and direction of missions to be performed by the VAG air task forces.

### B. Operational Plan:

1. The VAG will not be committed to any action in support of combat forces until ordered by the U. S. Freedom, Inc. to perform specific missions.
2. All requests for VAG's resources and services received directly by the VAG will be referred by the American Advisor through pre-arranged channels of communications to the U. S. Freedom, Inc.
3. The approved general operational policy of the affiliate of Freedom, Inc. will include a section that will clearly define the responsibilities and authority of the VAG to participate in other than combat activities such as performing mercy missions, furnishing air-lift for Freedom, Inc. overt activities, etc.

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## VII. ACTIVATED VAG-I

### A. Organization:

The following proposed VAG headquarters organization and squadrons are being indicated for planning purposes only. It is not intended to prescribe any specific air order of battle as a unit of this nature must have the maximum degree of flexibility and be prepared to put air task forces composed of fighter, fighter-bomber and transport aircraft of only the size necessary to accomplish the assigned mission in the field in the shortest possible time after orders have been received to perform a mission. It is envisaged that missions may require from one or two transport, fighter or fighter-bomber aircraft to as many as all the aircraft assigned to the three squadrons listed in this plan.

1. Volunteer Air Group I Headquarters will be manned with the minimum number of qualified personnel required to handle the following:
  - a. Administration and liaison with the Air Section.
  - b. Research, intelligence and plans.
  - c. Communications, operations and supply.
2. The following three types of squadrons will be able to perform the mission it is now anticipated the VAG would be directed to perform and should be activated in the order listed:
  - a. Light transport squadron.
  - b. Utility squadron.
  - c. Fighter-bomber squadron.
3. See attachment "A" for command relations and composition of units.

### B. Typical types of obsolete and obsolescent aircraft in the USAF inventory suitable for VAG use are:

1. B-26 and RB-26 for multi-purpose aircraft for day and night bombing, intruder missions, reconnaissance, para-drop of personnel and materiel and light transport.
2. F-51 for fighter, fighter-bomber and reconnaissance aircraft.
3. C-47, C-119, and C-54 for medium and heavy transport and para-drop of personnel and materiel.

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4. SA-16 for a multi-purpose amphibian for reconnaissance, para-drop of personnel and materiel, air/sea rescue and light transport.
5. Other fixed and rotary-wing aircraft suitable for the VAG are the L-19, L-20, L-21, T-6, H-13, H-19, and H-21.
6. Aircraft of foreign manufacture may also be suitable for VAG use and it may be desirable to consider this possibility carefully as the use of some aircraft of foreign manufacture may be a good cover for indicating the VAG is not U.S. Government sponsored.
7. USAF aircraft earmarked for use by the VAG should be completely equipped for combat missions before being placed in storage.

**C. Activation Procedure:**

1. When the green light from the agencies concerned has been received, to activate the Volunteer Air Group, or such portion thereof as is required, instructions and authority to proceed with the previously developed plans will be transmitted to the American Advisor to the Air Section.
2. At the same time orders are issued to the American Advisor to the Air Section to proceed to activate the VAG, the American Ambassador and involved members of the Country Team in the Philippines would be informed of the detailed approved plan and directed to talk with necessary Philippine Government officials for final agreement to permit their nationals to volunteer and for the VAG to be activated and based in the Philippines.
3. The Senior Air Officer of the Permanent Air Section with the assistance of the American Advisor would handle the negotiation of the contract for use of an airfield with appropriate Philippine Government authorities as the home base for the VAG.
4. The Permanent Air Section would proceed with execution of the detailed pre-arranged approved plans for induction of personnel, procurement of supplies and equipment and activation of units.
5. Providing that aircraft, spare parts, supplies and equipment are stockpiled in the Philippines, the basic VAG would be activated, equipped and ready for action quickly from the date orders to activate units are received. Single aircraft should be given 48 hours lead time. To establish an operational base for VAG-1, up to 60 days should suffice.

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
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**D. Miscellaneous**

1. VAG headquarters and VAG units will utilize indigenous labor, hired on a daily or contractual basis, to the maximum extent possible.
2. VAG units will be equipped to perform field and organizational maintenance only. Depot maintenance will be accomplished by contracting with commercial sources when commercial sources are capable of meeting VAG requirements.
3. When commercial sources are not capable of performing depot maintenance requirements of the VAG, arrangements will have to be made for the USAF VAG requirements.

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


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**VOLUNTEER AIR GROUP**




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


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# **VOLUNTEER AIR GROUP**



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10 September 1958

OSO Working Paper

The Problem: To provide the United States with the means of having foreign manpower readily available for military use, with the following characteristics:

- a. Legally deniable by the United States, if desired;
- b. Trained for ground, naval, and air combat;
- c. Operating under U. S. control;
- d. At an acceptable cost.

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Facts Bearing on the Problem

a. There is nothing new in using "volunteers" to satisfy national objectives in foreign areas. It has long been an established practice. There are numerous examples in modern times, such as the U. S. Army's Macabebe Scouts and its Philippine Scouts (including the 12th and 14th Divisions after World War II), as well as the AVG who flew for the Chinese. Several nations had volunteer forces in the Spanish Civil War, as part of the Spanish forces.

b. The Communists are adept at the practice; witness the Communist "volunteers" in Korea and Khrushchev's recent threat to send "volunteers" into the Middle East.

c. The Freedom Company of the Philippines permitted some telling action in saving Vietnam from Communist take-over.

d. Recent examples of employment of "volunteers" is illustrated by the infiltration of Egyptian and Syrian "volunteers" into Lebanon

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and Jordan before and during the recent crisis in the Middle East.

e. In the past few years, the U. S. has considered several plans for developing a foreign manpower capability to combat Communist-guided forces in foreign areas. Most of this planning has envisioned a "Foreign Legion" type of organization, with considerable political and budgetary problems, and has not been implemented.

f. At present, the U. S. has some limited capability of this type through clandestine projects, mostly fixed to a local area and local contingency.

g. U. S. defense programs have created a potential pool of foreign manpower for U. S. military use, which only awaits proper exploitation.

h. Through the Lodge Act (PL 597) and through language and area training, there are military personnel equipped to deal with the peoples and problems of a number of Communist target areas.

i. Through our 38 JUSMAGs, MAAGs, and Military Missions in foreign countries, there are now foreign armed forces equipped and trained with U. S. materiel, schooled in U. S. tactics, and with personnel who generally meet security standards acceptable to the U. S.; most of these foreign armed forces include ground, naval, and air forces.

j. Sizable numbers of these foreign military officers and men have shown a willingness to volunteer when man's freedom has been threatened in a neighboring country. This fact will be attested to by American officials in foreign countries during the Hungarian Revolt, the Indonesian Rebellion, the Indochinese War, and the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines. Today's

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trouble in the Middle East is no exception.

k. Methods could have been developed in several nations of the Free World, including the United States, for processing military personnel so they can be used in foreign areas and be diplomatically deniable by the government involved. Although the processes for doing this in free countries are more complex (to protect the individual) than those in Communist countries, the Free World does have this capability.

It is contemplated that the foreign manpower being discussed in this paper would be employed only in accordance with national policy on approval by the President.

During the past few years several situations have existed wherein it appeared that foreign manpower could have been used to advantage in carrying out our national policies. Some assets were available and were clandestinely employed on a small scale without achieving the initial objectives. It therefore appears that a method can be devised by which trained foreign manpower on a larger scale can be made available in a manner that would not require the United States to have any official connection with such use of foreign manpower.

A potential reservoir of trained foreign manpower exists within the units being supported by the various military assistance agreements and within units receiving the assistance of United States military and naval missions. The feasibility and practicability of utilizing manpower from

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these sources will depend upon the nature of agreements that can be made with the respective governments in each instance. It is doubtful that any pattern of agreement can be obtained because of various problems which may be created in certain areas of the world. It is preferable that agreements be made on a country basis. Planning should be done on a regional basis in order that manpower employed in a given locality would resemble as closely as possible the indigenous population in the areas in which it is to be employed.

Other factors which would influence employment of foreign manpower would be certain religious bitterness and racial animosity which may exist in the areas concerned.

The implementation of any basic plan for employment of foreign manpower must take into consideration the factors enumerated in the above paragraph, stability of the government being dealt with, the possibility of an internal coup d'etat and other security hazards that may exist. Implementation of such a plan would also need to take account of the political and foreign policy problems in regard to the relations of the United States with the country willing to provide volunteers.

It is required that the foreign volunteers be employed by the entity which we are supporting or by some mechanism which has no visible relationship with the U. S. Government. The Central Intelligence Agency is specifically charged with the conduct of clandestine operations in support

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of our national policies. The extent of participation by the Defense Department initially would be in a support role. Should the covertly supported operation develop beyond the capability of CIA, the direction of the operation should pass to the Defense Department, with CIA continuing in support. The exact point at which this change of direction and control would be made from CIA to the Department of Defense is difficult to determine, but for planning purposes it is regarded that when the size of the foreign volunteer units is that of a battalion or greater, such change should be made. Thus, the type of organization dealt with in this paper in each instance must have the capability of processing and handling units of battalion size or larger.

#### Discussion

Considering the aforementioned factors, it appears that the following courses of action are open for consideration as a means for the development of a plan as follows:

Course I (Ad Hoc) - When the situation requires, arrange for the entities that the United States is supporting to set up one or more purchasing agencies, the purchasing agencies to assume the responsibility of processing the volunteers in accordance with the agreement of the country providing the volunteers, and arrange for them to join the entity to be supported. The purchasing agency should also engage in the purchase of certain war supplies.

Course II (Covert Permanent) - To organize permanent covert units which would organize covert affiliates in countries willing to provide volunteers, for the purpose of processing the volunteers and arrange means

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for them to join the entities to be supported, conduct advance planning for organizing, equipping the troops, and logistics support of the volunteer project, as well as demobilization upon completion of the operation.

Course III (Covert-Overt Permanent) - To establish a new, or utilize an existing, organization within each country under secret U.S. sponsorship and with no visible affiliation between each other or with the United States. These organizations would conduct appropriate local programs in addition to carrying out the activities listed in Course II.

Course IV (Overt Permanent) - To organize a permanent, non-profit corporation which would establish affiliates in countries willing to provide volunteers. This corporation would conduct a suitable overt program through the affiliates as well as secretly carry out the activities listed in Course II above.

#### Discussion of Courses of Action

Course I (Ad Hoc) would appear to have the following advantages:

- a. Provide a means for employment of foreign manpower in support of the selected entity designated.
- b. The plan is simple and would provide a high degree of deniability of United States involvement.

The disadvantages of Course I (Ad Hoc) are:

- a. This course of action would function initially at least on a crash it basis and/is doubtful that it would have the capability of an operation of any magnitude.

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b. It has a disadvantage of not having predetermined plans or personnel for supporting the designated entity.

Course II (Covert Permanent) would appear to have the following advantages:

- a. A small permanent organization would be in being and in contact with the officials who would be involved in assisting and providing volunteers.
- b. Better control of procurement of equipment, organization, logistic support could be provided.
- c. Predetermined plans could be made and adequate personnel could be earmarked and positioned.

The disadvantages of Course II (Covert Permanent) appear to be that it would be difficult to operate on a covert basis for an extended period of time and be deniable because of the possible magnitude of the operation.

Course III (Covert -Overt Permanent) appears to have the following advantages:

- a. There would be no visible evidence of U. S. sponsorship and support.
- b. The public program could be conducted so as to provide excellent justification for the activities in connection with the foreign volunteer project.
- c. Predetermined plans could be made and adequate personnel could be earmarked and positioned.
- d. It appears possible, especially in the case of existing organizations, that part of the program could be financed from public contributions.

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The disadvantages of Course III (Covert-Overt Permanent) are:

- a. Because of the requirement for covert U. S. participation, control would not be as effective as direct participation makes possible.
- b. In some instances it would be more costly, at least initially, than either Courses I or II because the public programs would have to be covertly financed by the U. S. Government.

Course IV (Overt Permanent) appears to have the following advantages:

- a. The affiliates would receive guidance and supervision on a permanent basis from the unit organized in the United States.
- b. The public program could be conducted so as to provide excellent justification of activities connected with the foreign volunteer project.
- c. The affiliates could conduct their programs in such a manner and under such titles as to indicate a relationship or affiliation with the organization in the United States.
- d. Once the programs are underway, it appears possible that part of the program could be financed from public contributions.

The disadvantages of Course IV (Overt Permanent) are:

- a. It would be more costly, at least initially, than either Course I or II because the public programs would initially have to be financed by the government.
- b. The visible relationship between the affiliate and the U. S. organization could be a weakness. (Note: Covert funding would be the sole clandestine aspect of Course IV.)

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Courses I, II and III if adopted would be the exclusive responsibility of CIA as regards control and direction. Pre-planning and logistic support with the Defense Department to the extent possible will be necessary in each instance. (Course III would involve closer coordination and would make possible more extensive planning than Courses I and II.)

Course IV is overt in nature, with the sole covert aspect the funding of the organizations involved. Major responsibility therefore should lie with the Department of Defense, with CIA supporting on the covert aspects. Because of its overt nature, Course IV permits the greatest amount of pre-planning and pre-arrangements vis-a-vis the other courses of action.

Any of the four courses of action listed above would appear to have the following advantages for the utilization of foreign manpower versus the "foreign legion" concept as follows:

a. They would be more likely to secure the enthusiasm and support of other free world nations than a solely U. S.- sponsored foreign legion volunteer effort. It could conceivably contribute to uniting the free world to some extent against communist-inspired subversion.

b. The United States would be much less susceptible to Soviet propaganda charges of "war mongering" than if it were to establish a "foreign legion" type force and attempt to hold it in readiness.

c. The cost factor would be much more acceptable since training costs would be largely absorbed within existing military aid programs.

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d. A much greater flexibility could be achieved with regard to the type of forces to be employed and the nature of their employment. Forces to be committed could be readily tailored to meet the demands of the existing situation.

e. This concept would permit commitment of a volunteer force largely indigenous to the geographic area in which the emergency exists, thus relieving it of the stigma of being a force for Western imperialism in contravention of nationalistic aspirations.

f. U. S. Government sponsorship under this concept can be maintained on a secret basis and could be legally deniable.

g. No substantial detracting from regular U. S. military programs would result from this approach.

h. Regular U. S. foreign military assistance programs would not be duplicated but rather they would be rendered more immediately productive in terms of their being more responsive to the immediate threat.

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS - FREEDOM, INCORPORATED

- Reference a. My memorandum dated 28 October 1958, Re: Freedom, Inc.  
Reference b. Memorandum from Asst. Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated  
24 November 1958, Re: Freedom, Incorporated

1. Q. What will be the size of the operation, such as air, naval  
and jungle fighting?

A. The size of the operation cannot be predetermined in this  
type of warfare any more clearly than can limited war  
operations be determined beforehand. The magnitude of  
the operation will depend upon the forces which may be  
involved. Conceivably, Freedom, Inc. may be concerned  
with sending of a single infantry battalion or possibly  
a force as large as two divisions. Much would depend  
upon the capability of the opponent and the amount of  
assistance that the U. S. decides to provide. It should  
be remembered that in a recent situation President Rhee  
volunteered several divisions. The amount of support  
required may depend to a large degree upon the amount of  
Communist volunteer support provided to the opponent.

2. Q. What will be the nature of the mechanism under which the  
volunteers and equipment would be supplied?

A. Freedom, Inc. and its foreign affiliates will provide the  
organizational structure through which volunteers and  
equipment can be supplied as described in my previous memo.

3. Q. Considering that the scale of operations envisaged would  
not be expected to be massive, would it be feasible to  
try to accomplish the objectives of the plan under the  
auspices of CIA?

A. The purpose of the plan is to cover situations which are  
of such magnitude that they are beyond the capability of  
CIA operations and are still short of direct U. S. inter-  
vention in a limited war. This particular point has been  
discussed before, resulting in the Secretary of State  
having passed the problem to the Secretary of Defense for  
his consideration.

4. Q. Could the plan be worked out without resorting to the use  
of a corporate foreign affiliate structure?

A. It is possible, and considered highly desirable, for such  
a plan to work without a corporate foreign affiliate

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Date: MAY 19 2014

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. § 552

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 19 MAY 2014 Authority: EO 13526

Declassify: X Deny in Full: SECRET

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Reason: \_\_\_\_\_

MDR: 13-M-1346

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structure. The plan recommended and which has been discussed during previous meetings does not contemplate corporate affiliation between Freedom, Inc. USA and the foreign affiliates. The United States organization would sponsor and advise the foreign affiliates but would not have legal corporate ties between them. The foreign affiliates would be separate corporate entities governed by the corporate law of the country in which they are established. We see no way that this would add grist to enemy propagandists beyond the enemy's normal capability of exploiting any story for propaganda.

5. Q. Will an over-all understanding with State concerning the roles of State, Defense, CIA and participating countries be worked out?
- A. Yes. Our efforts up to this point have been directed toward reaching an understanding with all agencies concerned and to development of a plan to facilitate proper understanding and coordination between agencies in the future. The working group seems to offer an ideal mechanism for resolving this action.
6. Q. Will State brief its ambassador in detail during the course of consideration and implementation of the plan in particular countries?
- A. This is a matter for determination by the State Department in each case just as it would be a matter for determination by Defense on the amount of briefing for a MAAG chief and other Defense officials stationed in the areas concerned.
7. Q. What is the meaning of a statement on page 4 of my memorandum which indicates only that the U. S. advisor will "advise the ambassador" on his arrival in a foreign country?
- A. This statement is intended to mean that the representative from the United States Freedom, Inc. office would give the ambassador a detailed briefing in accordance with the approved plan for the establishment of an affiliate in the country concerned. It is not believed that it will be possible to inform the ambassador in advance except in very general terms by cable or dispatch prior to the arrival of the Freedom, Inc. representative. The U. S. advisor, who should be properly authenticated to the ambassador concerned, will give the ambassador an adequate briefing upon his arrival.

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8. Q. Can the relationships to the country to which deployed and to the sending country be more explicitly stated, as to (1) the foreign corporations, (2) the volunteers, and (3) U. S. military personnel (including volunteers)?
- A. Relationships regarding the foreign corporations have been discussed above. Our relationship with volunteers will be through third parties; in the country of origin it would be through the foreign corporation; in the country of combat, it would be through the foreign entity requesting volunteers; the U. S. control would be through financial and other support. As regards U. S. military personnel, it appears that the methods now employed for using such personnel in CIA operations would be applicable. These methods are similar to those used in the "Flying Tigers."
9. Q. What will be the relationship of the U. S. Government to sending and receiving countries in terms of agreements, commitments, requests for assistance, etc.?
- A. There should be no official overt relationship between the U. S. Government and the sending and receiving countries. The purpose for establishing Freedom, Inc. is to give the U. S. unofficial means for accomplishing necessary and approved missions. It is anticipated that requests for assistance would have been made by the receiving country, screened and approved prior to any action being taken to have Freedom, Inc. (USA or its foreign counterparts) make any commitments to participate in any operation since Freedom, Inc. is designed to step in only when the proposed operation exceeds the capability of CIA.
10. Q. Will U. S. personnel participate in raising and training volunteers?
- A. The volunteers will be recruited by the foreign affiliate mainly from forces now being supported by MAP. The affiliate may also recruit certain personnel, particularly officers, from reserve force and civilian personnel residing in the sending country. U. S. personnel in MAAGs and training missions will have only their normal relationship with the Armed Forces of the countries in which they are stationed. It is possible that U. S. personnel of Freedom, Inc. will assist with assembly, indoctrination, and training in the sending country, and engage in some training of volunteer units after their arrival in the receiving countries.

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11. Q. Since the United States will not be formally involved, what would be the relationship to the foreign countries of U. S. personnel participating?
- A. The same relationships as have existed in the past operations of a similar nature.
12. Q. Does U. S. law permit our citizens to become involved in foreign military operations short of U. S. Government involvement?
- A. It has been done many times in the past. It is understood that legal counsel in ISA is aware of many aspects of this action. ISA and OSD General Counsel could provide sound guidance on this point. If desired, CIA could be requested to discuss this with ISA and OSD General Counsel.
13. Q. Would dispensation be needed and possible to protect their individual rights as citizens?
- A. This question has been answered above.
14. Q. Can the outline indicate a scale on which U. S. personnel can be utilized?
- A. This question does not indicate whether it refers to military or civilian personnel. The home office of Freedom, Inc. would be wholly manned by U. S. personnel approximately in accordance with the table submitted in my memorandum for that office. A portion of the personnel employed in the main office should be military personnel possibly reserve officers called to active duty. The remainder should be civilian employees outside Civil Service. It is possible to man all of the U. S. personnel positions by civilian employees outside Civil Service and retired and reserve officers. MPR indicates that there is a considerable potential of exceptional officers who would be available for this purpose in a civilian status. U. S. military personnel on MAAG and similar duty status will not participate in the recruiting or volunteers or in military operations of Freedom, Inc. or its affiliates. MAAG personnel probably will be involved in the training of Ranger, Commando, and similar units forming a part of the regular and reserve forces of a foreign country from which foreign volunteers may be recruited. However, these units are integral to the armed forces in many countries today and their unit training is being undertaken at the present time. No additional burden will be placed

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on MAAG personnel as a result of this operation, except that MAAG personnel should ensure that units from which volunteers will be recruited will be in combat readiness, and at full strength, thereby permitting withdrawal of trained volunteers whenever required.

15. Q. Can the plan make more clear the reservation of participating countries of decision as to the use of their forces in specific situations?

A. It is obvious that certain past relations, traditions, amenities, and religious feelings, may influence participating countries regarding areas in which their volunteers may be utilized. For example, it is doubtful that the Chinese Nationalists could be used in some countries where there is antipathy for the Chinese even though the Nationalists would be eager to send volunteers. Politically the Turks might be similarly eager to participate in any actions in Greece and vice versa. It is also doubtful if it would be wise to employ Israelis in Jordan or Sudan. The readiness of the leaders in such countries as Pakistan, Viet Nam, Nationalist China and South Korea, to furnish volunteer units would need thoughtful consideration on an ad hoc basis to meet the circumstances of a specific contingency when it arises.

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

MAY 19 2014

26 April 1962

Dear Ed:

SUBJECT: Jose Banzon

Thank you for your memorandum of 23 April. I do indeed recall the essentials of Jose Banzon's background, although your note gives us additional material on his capabilities.

Joe has for some years, as you know, been working closely with the ACSI people who are in liaison with J-2, AFP. This was certainly true during his tour of duty in Indonesia. Now that he is back at Camp Murphy we have no reason to believe that there has been any change in that respect. Whereas I am sure Banzon could be very helpful to our people, I would be reluctant to encourage any contact that might convey to ACSI the impression we are trying to dislodge them from their J-2 beachhead. Any thoughts you might have on the latter point would be of interest to me. In the meantime I shall forward your comments on Banzon to [redacted] and ask the latter to comment on his current situation.

CIA 3.3(b)(1) OSD 3.3(b)(1)

Sincerely,



Desmond Fitzgerald

Office of the Secretary of Defense *505.C.3 552*  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: *19 MAY 2014* Authority: EO 13526  
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Reason: *3.3(b)(1)*  
MDR: *13-M-1346*



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Chief, Records & Declass DM, WHS  
Date:

MAY 19 2014

23 April 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR DESMOND FITZGERALD, CIA

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Jose Banson

It has come to my attention that Colonel Jose Banson of the Philippine Army is now stationed at headquarters, Camp Murphy, Osmon City. As you know, he has had long and fruitful experience in neighboring countries: Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.

I don't know what his current duty assignment is, but Joe is the sort of operator who undoubtedly is yearning for another assignment abroad. Your stations in Southeast Asia, ~~██████████~~ might have a spot where he could give a strong helping hand - so I pass his name along for some consideration. C1A 3.3(b)(1)

Joe is a real charmer, as you know, with considerable ability to get close to local military and civilian officials in these countries. Not so well known is his wide knowledge of Filipino lore in Southeast Asia, and his skill in making use of that knowledge; I doubt that anyone else has quite this same ability. For example, the Royal Khmer Orchestra, with its genesis in a Philippine battalion band in the latter days of the 19th century, has unique Filipino leads into the Cambodian cabinet and to Prince Sihanouk. There are similar Filipino leads, going back several generations, in other countries, which the uniquely at all levels of society and which can be made of real constructive use in operations.

I mention this because Banson usually is thought of in his advisory role on civic action, in which he is an unusually imaginative expert. He was of great assistance to U.S. advisors in the pacification campaigns in Vietnam and in the early military civic action in Laos. In the first campaign in the Philippines, he acted as personal executive officer for Banson Magaway when Magaway was Secretary of National Defense; among other things, he made the 10-centavo telegram operation, with its complaints and tips to the Secretary, really work.

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also see Perm cover



Office of the Secretary of Defense 505.C. 5552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 19 MAY 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
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MDR: 13 -M- 1346

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 19 2014

22 June 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY MC NAMARA  
DEPUTY SECRETARY GILPATRIC**

**From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale**

**Subject: Psychology. Special Combat**


For your information. Last Thursday afternoon, Dr. Andre Morali-Dominec of the SDECE (French counterpart of our CIA) stopped by for an informal visit.

He is a psychiatrist and psychologist with years of experience in personnel selection, training, and secret operations (not only intelligence, but also "action service" or guerrilla-type operations). We discussed psychological testing for singleton operations in enemy territory, factors of Communist interrogation, and personnel psychology in escape and evasion. I was able to bring him together with Admiral Frankel of DIA, Dr. Gordon who is just commencing some psychological testing of Army Special Forces, and Major Baker who is concerned with selection of Air Force personnel for Jungle Jim.

CIA 3.3(b)(1) OSD 3.3(b)(1)

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Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 199942014 Authority: EO 13526  
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Reason: 3.3(b)(1)  
MDR: 13-M-1346

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CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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**TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM**

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

**DISSEMINATED BY IW**

COUNTRY

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT

COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL  
INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

DATE DISTR.

23 APRIL 1963

PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

REFERENCES

IN 23641

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

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THIS UNVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

1. PLANS FOR A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (NIB)  
HAVE BEEN DRAWN UP. IT WILL BE HEADED BY COLONEL BO LWIN,  
WHO NOW DIRECTS THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (MIS). HE  
WILL HAVE FOUR DEPUTIES: THE CURRENT HEADS OF THE SPECIAL  
BRANCH (U TIN MAUNG MAUNG), CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION  
DIVISION (LT. COLONEL HLA MAUNG), BUREAU OF SPECIAL  
INVESTIGATION (U BA NYEIN), AND A FOURTH OFFICIAL, NOT  
YET DESIGNATED, FROM THE MIS. THE FOUR UNITS INVOLVED  
WILL IN THEORY BE AMALGAMATED INTO THE NIB WHICH WILL BE

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50.5-c-5552

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 19/11/14 2014 Authority: EO 13526

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Reason: 3.3(b)(1)

MDR: 13-M-1346

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Date: MAY 19 2014

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IN 23641

PAGE 2

DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO NE WIN.

2. DUE TO THE NECESSITY FOR ENABLING REGULATIONS TO BE PROMULGATED, THE NIB WILL PROBABLY NOT COME INTO EXISTENCE UNTIL 1 OCTOBER, THE BEGINNING OF THE FISCAL YEAR. IN THE MEANTIME COLONEL LWIN EXERCISES POLICY CONTROL OF THE UNITS INVOLVED THROUGH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD WHICH HE CHAIRS.

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS CONFIRMS AND AMPLIFIES INFORMATION [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AID AIR CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

CIA 3.3(b)(1) OSD 3.3(b)(1)

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 19 2014

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD  
INFO : DCSOP  
DA IN 40135

END OF MESSAGE

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CONTINUATION OF DCS INFORMATION REPORT

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

COUNTRY

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT

BRIGADIER TIN PE'S DETERIORATING  
RELATIONSHIP WITH GENERAL NE WIN

DATE DISTR.

23 APRIL 1963

PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

DATE OF  
INFO.

REFERENCES

IN 23448

PLACE &  
DATE APPRAISAL

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SOURCE

CIA 3.3(b)(1) OSD 3.3(b)(1)

1. BRIGADIER SEIN WIN, COMMANDING OFFICER, CENTRAL  
COMMAND AND MEMBER OF REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, MADE THE FOLLOWING  
REMARKS

2. REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL CHAIRMAN NE WIN IS CONCERNED  
ABOUT MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE BRIGADIER TIN PE'S INCREASING  
STATURE AND WOULD PREFER TO HAVE BRIGADIERS SAN YU AND SEIN  
WIN AS THE NUMBER TWO AND THREE MEN ON THE REVOLUTIONARY  
COUNCIL. IN ORDER TO HAVE REASONS FOR DOWNGRADING TIN PE,  
NE WIN HAS ALLOWED HIM TO GO AHEAD WITH HIS PLAN TO ESTABLISH

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Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS 5636-552  
Date: 19 MAY 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
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MDR: 13 -M- 1346

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IN 23448

PAGE 2

VILLAGE COOPERATIVES IN PEGU AND THARRAWADDY DISTRICTS, EXPECTING THAT IT WILL FAIL. THE AREA IN WHICH THE VILLAGE COOPERATIVES ARE TO BE ESTABLISHED IS RECLAIMED LAND WHICH DURING THE MONSOONS WILL BE HEAVILY INUNDATED RENDERING THE LAND USELESS.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

3. ONE EXAMPLE STATED BY SEIN WIN FOR NE WIN'S DIS- TRUST OF TIN PE HAD TO DO WITH THE RECENT PURCHASE OF RICE PADDY BY PRIVATE RICE MILLERS. AFTER ANNOUNCING THAT IN 1964 THE PRIVATE RICE MILLERS WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO BUY RICE AND WOULD ACT ONLY AS MILLERS FOR THE UNION OF BURMA AGRICULTURAL MARKETING BOARD (UBAMB), NE WIN TOOK A TRIP UP COUNTRY. IN INTERVIEWS WITH RICE CULTIVATORS HE LEARNED THAT THEY WERE HAVING DIFFICULTY SELLING THEIR PADDY TO THE PRIVATE RICE MILLERS BECAUSE THE LATTER WERE TOLD BY THE LOCAL SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATION COUNCIL (SAC) THAT THEY WERE NO LONGER PERMITTED TO BUY RICE. NE WIN WAS INCENSED WHEN HE LEARNED THIS AND CALLED FOR BRIGADIER TIN PE WHO ADMITTED THAT IT WAS HE WHO TOLD THE CENTRAL SAC TO ISSUE THE ORDER PROHIBITING THE PRIVATE RICE MILLERS FROM BUYING THE PADDY DURING THE CURRENT CROP YEAR. NE WIN THEN DIRECTED TIN PE TO RESCIND THE ORDER AND SEVERLY CHASTISED HIM.

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Date: MAY 19 2014

4. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINGPAC PACFLT  
ARRPAC PACAF. ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD, END OF MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ INFO: DCSOP CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS  
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